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ABSTRACT
This research is exploratory and is intended to help us 
understand the diverse interests and forces that helped shape 
various developments in the Nigerian banking industry, during 
the pre-independence era. The study investigates the
activities of colonial banks in British Nigeria. Emphasis is 
placed on the dealings between these colonial banks and the 
Africans and the claim, by the Africans, that these foreign 
institutions were unhelpful to them. The motives and
activities of the indigenous banks, subsequently established 
by the Africans, are also examined.
Furthermore, the study investigates the different modes 
of bank regulation while Nigeria was a British Colony, 
studying the extent to which bank regulation in Nigeria has 
been influenced by that in other countries, and examining the 
complex role of banking sector regulation in a developing 
economy where banks have often been used overtly as
instruments of political policy. Special emphasis is placed on 
the forces that helped shape the law and enforcement of 
banking regulation and the structure of the emergent
regulatory institution.
This research makes a contribution in a number of areas: 
(1) to our understanding of how banking regulation operates in 
a highly politicised environment (2) to our knowledge of the 
diffusion of banking practices and ideas and the significance 
of political control and social contact to the diffusion 
process and (3) to our appreciation of the forces shaping 
banking regulation over a long period.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Preamble
This thesis investigates the diverse interests that 
helped shape banking developments in pre-independence Nigeria. 
The study is historical and relies extensively on archive 
materials. To help us understand these developments, this 
study appeals primarily to the two main theories of regulation 
(public interest theory and capture theory).1 Such theories, 
it is hoped, will help provide insights and perhaps answers to 
some of the questions that arise in the study of banking in 
Colonial Nigeria. These questions include, among others: Why 
did foreign banks come to Nigeria; Why were these banks 
unhelpful to the Africans; Why did these colonial banks remain 
unregulated for a long time; Why did the Africans establish 
indigenous banks; What factors precipitated the indigenous 
banking boom and (doom) of the 1940s and 1950s; Why were some 
ailing indigenous banks helped and others allowed to wind up; 
What factors impacted on the provisions of the 1952 banking 
legislation; What precipitated the African Continental Bank 
Crisis and why did the Colonial Government take so much 
interest in probing it; Why was the Nigerian Central Bank set 
up and what factors impacted on its legislation; Why did 
Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas) reverse its 
credit discrimination policy, against the Africans, in the
1 See chapter 2.
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1950s and why did this meet with disastrous results?
Answers to the above questions will make a contribution 
in a number of areas: (1) to our understanding of how banking 
regulation operates in a highly politicised environment (2) to 
our knowledge of the diffusion of banking practices and ideas 
and the significance of political control and social contact 
to the diffusion process and (3) to our appreciation of the 
forces shaping banking regulation over a long period. There 
have been few, if any, studies focusing on the regulation of 
a particular industry over such a long period in a developing 
country. Subsequent chapters of this thesis will, therefore, 
attempt to answer the above questions.
Evidence from this thesis shows that neither the capture 
theory nor the public good theory can fully explain the 
rationale for banking regulation in pre-independence Nigeria. 
A combination of both theories leads to a better understanding 
of the various banking developments in the colony. The 
regulatory process, encompassing regulation formulation and 
regulation implementation, is often politicised. In pre­
independence Nigeria, the Colonial Government, which 
officially defended regulation on grounds of public interest, 
saw regulation as a tool for protecting British banking 
interests, where such interests were compatible with those of 
the Colonial Government. Very little attempt was made to take 
the needs and desires of the Africans into consideration. 
While the Colonial Government relied on 'experts' to achieve 
its aim of influencing the regulatory process, African 
Nationalists relied on nationalist sentiments to counter what
12
they considered as unfair regulation.
Throughout the pre-independence era, for instance, the 
Colonial Government always encouraged British banks to merge 
their interests in order to create monopolies. There was 
besides no attempt to regulate the excessive service charge of 
colonial banks in the colony.2 When poorly capitalised, poorly 
staffed and sometimes fraud infested indigenous banks emerged 
with the aim of aiding Africans, the Colonial Government 
reacted with regulation. Regulation was defended by the 
Colonial Government and Bank of England 'experts' on grounds 
of public interest. Yet schemes like deposit insurance and 
training facilities for indigenous bankers, which may have 
served the public interest even more, were never put in place. 
The fact that the United Nations and some other banking 
experts recommended such schemes did not change this fact.3 
Regulation that was thought to constitute an unnecessary 
hindrance to the activities of foreign banks was conveniently 
avoided, an example being the issue of banking inspection.4
Where external regulation is absent or weak, control 
becomes mainly an internal matter. An example is in the area 
of bank credit policy. The limitations of internal controls in 
an era of change are developed in the chapter dealing with the 
accounting and control consequences of a politically motivated 
experiment by Barclays Bank (DCO) to liberalise its credit 
policies towards Africans. The evidence in that chapter
2 See chapter 3.
3 See chapter 4.
4 See chapter 5.
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suggests that internal control is not always a substitute for 
external regulation and that individual enterprises may not be 
the best judges of their economic and political self.5
The Colonial Government also used regulation as a tool to 
settle political scores. For instance, although the 
circumstances surrounding the investment of public money in 
the African Continental Bank (ACB) rightly provoked worry in 
colonial circles, the main reason why the Colonial Government 
expended enormous resources investigating the African 
Continental Bank was to discredit the bank's owner, Dr 
Azikiwe, an "anglophobe" nationalist leader.6 This thesis 
further provides evidence that Colonial Office stopped at 
nothing to ensure that its views reigned paramount. On the 
issue of a central bank, for instance, the Bank of England 
'expert' who investigated it was instructed to stamp on the 
idea. The Bank of England also employed questionable tactics 
in order to get the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), which took a contrary position on the 
issue, to change its mind.7 The next section will review the 
existing studies on Nigerian banking history.
1.2 Literature Review
Banking developments in pre-independence Nigeria8 have
5 See chapter 8.
6 See chapter 6.
7 See chapter 7.
8 The country that is now Nigeria first came into being 
in 1914 with the amalgamation of Northern and Southern 
Nigeria. For the purposes of this thesis, however, it is
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been a subject of research since the colonial era. Perhaps the 
first comprehensive, but unpublished, study in this arena was 
undertaken by Mars.9 Some subsequent researchers in this area 
however benefitted from the Mars's study. For instance, Newlyn 
and Rowan (1954), which is widely cited as the foundation 
treatise on banking in colonial Nigeria, acknowledged Mars's 
unpublished study.10 Newlyn and Rowan's study, which covered 
the period up to 1951, attempted to describe the monetary and 
financial institutions then in existence and analyze the 
operations of the existing institutions in the context of the 
economic and social policies at the time. The text was 
therefore contemporary and comparative, with little emphasis 
on the archive. As Newlyn and Rowan explained:
The method we have adopted is comparative rather 
than historical. Our concern has been with the 
monetary and financial institutions as they are now, 
and not in the way in which they have evolved over 
the past.... This approach to the subject would have 
been less justified if our primary purpose had been 
to give an historical account of the development of 
the territories' monetary and financial systems.11
Brown (1966), following in the footsteps of Newlyn and 
Rowan, described and analyzed the developments in the Nigerian 
banking system from 1950 to 1963. Again, there was little
convenient to use "pre-independence Nigeria" even when we are 
discussing events and territories prior to the amalgamation.
9 The date of this pioneer study is unknown. However, a 
"very brief extract" of the study was subsequently published 
in 1948.
10 p.25. Also note that the sections of the book dealing 
with Colonial Nigeria relied heavily on Rowan (1951, 1952).
11 1954, pp.v-vi.
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archival support for his thesis. Despite the above approach, 
Newlyn and Rowan (1954) and Brown (1966) remain, till date, 
the must important studies on banking in pre-independence 
Nigeria.
Some of the colonial banks active in the region at the 
time have also commissioned their own histories. An example is 
the history of the Bank of British West Africa (Fry, 1976) and 
the history of Barclays Bank (DCO) written by Crossley and 
Blandford in 1975. Besides being narrowly focused on the 
activities of each bank, such official histories sometimes 
tend to cover the bank's operations across a wide geographical 
area with cultural, social and political differences. In-depth 
analysis of specific regional problems is therefore not always 
possible. This is mostly true for the official histories of 
multinational banks. For instance, it is not surprising that 
the official history of Barclays Bank (DCO)-with branches in 
over forty countries-contains very little detail on the Bank's 
West African activities. Moreover such official histories 
almost always present a partisan view of the bank's 
activities.12
This thesis adopts a different approach from that adopted 
by Newlyn and Rowan (1954) and Brown (1966). My approach is 
historical and I am mainly concerned with the underlying 
processes and forces at work that influenced the various
12 Some evidence of this, with respect to the official 
history of the BBWA, will be shown in chapter 3(7).
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developments in pre-independence banking in colonial 
Nigeria.13 Considerable amount of resources have been spent 
searching the archives. This is so since archives usually 
provide a much richer base for historical research than 
published materials.14
This thesis is unique in two ways: it introduces new
evidence, mainly from the Bank of England Archive,15 into the 
discourse of banking in colonial Nigeria.16 Secondly, by 
relying substantially on regulatory theories and principles, 
it attempts a re-interpretation of the various banking 
developments in pre-independence Nigeria.
To help put the entire study in the context of the 
political, social and economic changes that Nigeria underwent 
prior to Independence, the next section will summarise some of 
these developments. We shall in the main focus on political 
changes. Indeed in Nigeria at the time, the speed for 
political change determined "almost everything except the
13 With banking regulation being seen as ever more 
problematic, it has become necessary to inquire into the 
processes through which it has come to be and through which it 
continues to change (adapted from Hopwood, 1981, p.294).
14 We have chosen the cut off date of 1960, the year of 
Nigeria's Independence, for this study. This politically 
strategic date is convenient because access to archive 
materials on post independence Nigerian banking is not always 
possible. This is mainly due to the widespread archival 
practice of allowing considerable time to lapse before company 
materials are made available. For instance, the Bank of 
England has a minimum thirty year rule in this regard.
j
15 Other archives used include those of the IBRD 
(Washington DC), Barclays Bank (Manchester) and the Standard 
Chartered Bank (London).
16 Materials from this very rich Bank of England Archive, 
to the best of my knowledge, have never been used in the 
discourse of banking in pre-independence Nigeria.
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weather and crops."17
1.3 Pre-Independence Developments in Nigeria
Prior to 1861 Africa, which was dubbed the 'dark 
continent' by European adventurers and traders, was a 'no 
man's land' and an 'every man's land'.18 In those days there 
was no uniform method of trading or uniform accepted means of 
exchange even within territories.19 In 1861, the territory of 
Lagos was formally ceded to the British Government and it 
became known as the Lagos Colony. It thus became the first 
part of the present day Nigeria to come under British rule. In 
1885, the British Government proclaimed the Oil Rivers 
Protectorate20 over some parts of present day Southern
17 Report by J B Loynes, 30/6/60, Bank of England Archive 
File Number OV138/1, p.23.
18 Onoh, 1982, p.25.
19 This statement remained largely true up until the early 
20th century. For instance, in 1912, it was asserted that "In 
the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, local 
differences are well marked. The Western (or Lagos) Province 
has arrived at a state of development permitting the use of 
silver practically throughout its area. In the Eastern and 
Central Provinces, on the other hand, trading by barter is 
still carried on in a large extent, and although the use of 
silver is spreading rapidly, we are informed that it is at 
present received freely in only about half of the markets. 
Native forms of currency known as "manillas", and brass and 
copper rods and wires were formerly legal tender. They have 
recently been demonetised but we understand that they are 
still used to a considerable extent.... In Northern Nigeria, 
the use of British silver is rapidly expanding, but there is 
probably still only a comparatively small amount in
circulation. Cowries are used extensively among the natives, 
and furthermore trade is carried on largely by means of
barter" (Emmott report, 1912, p.3).
20 A British Protectorate is an area administered by 
Britain and defended by her. Britain is responsible for doing 
all the things Governments do in a country and no other 
country can interfere in any way within its boundaries.
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Nigeria.21
In 1896, a number of British companies then operating 
around the Niger, amalgamated into the Royal Niger Company. 
The charter of the new company gave it powers to "administer, 
make treaties, levy customs duties and trade in all 
territories in the basin of the Niger and its affluents."22 
This brought the Northern territories of Nigeria under the 
influence of British traders. In 1900 the British Government 
took over the administration of the Northern territories from 
the Royal Niger Company proclaiming the area as the 
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Also in the same year, the 
administration of all parts of Southern Nigeria, with the 
exception of Lagos, was unified under the Protectorate of 
Southern Nigeria.23 In 1906, Lagos was made part of the 
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.24 Finally, in 1914, the
Legally a protectorate is a very much looser and vaguer form 
of ownership than a colony but in practice, there is very 
little difference. The same Government services extends to 
both, the same staff look after both and the same laws apply 
to both. Note however that while the inhabitants of a British 
colony are British subjects in practically every way like the 
English themselves, those of a protectorate are not British 
subjects. They are called British Protected Persons (Niven, 
1946, p.161).
21 It was not until 1891 that steps were taken by the 
British Government to create an administration for this area. 
In 1893, its name was changed to the Niger Coast Protectorate 
with the new protectorate incorporating a larger area (ibid, 
pp.166-167).
22 Ekundare, 1973, p. 12.
23 This also incorporated a part of the territory 
previously administered by the Royal Niger Company.
24 Lagos however retained its position as a colony having 
a separate administrator and a legislative council which 
passed laws as far as it was concerned (Niven, 1946, p.173).
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Protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria were 
amalgamated to become the Colony and Protectorate of 
Nigeria.25 The new Government constituted a Government- 
nominated Nigerian Council of thirty Europeans and six 
Nigerians. This council was however without legislative or 
executive powers and its function was to advise the Colonial 
Governor.26
From the time of amalgamation, the whole concept of 
colonisation was under threat. Opposition came mainly from the 
then emerging class of educated Africans. By 1917, for 
instance, they formed the National Congress of British West 
Africa under the leadership of Caseley Heyford- a Gold Coast 
(Ghana) Lawyer. The body, which had its headquarters in Cape 
Coast (Ghana), was interested in uniting the four British West 
African colonies of Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia 
with the goal of self determination. Accordingly, it 
maintained offices in each colony including Lagos. R A Savage 
was the branch leader for Nigeria.
In its early years, the National Congress of British West 
Africa focused mainly on constitutional issues. By 1920, 
however, it had formulated its first clear economic policy 
asserting that:
...the time has come for... the formation of a
25 In 1922, the area of Nigeria was increased by the 
"Cameroons under British Mandate." At the end of the war, the 
allied powers gave the German colonies to the neighbouring 
states who held them under "mandate" being responsible to the 
League of Nations for their administration (ibid, p.244).
26 Blitz, 1965, p.3.
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Corporation, to be known as the British West African 
Co-operative Association... to found Banks, promote 
shipping facilities, establish Co-operative Stores, 
and produce buying centres in such wise as to 
inspire and maintain a British West African National 
Economical Development.27
In 1920, the Congress sent a delegation to London to petition 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Their demands 
included: the establishment of a legislative council in each 
territory of West Africa, one half of whose members would be 
elected Africans and the other half nominated; the 
establishment of a house of assembly composed of members of 
the legislative council, together with six other 'financial' 
representatives elected by the people to control taxation, 
revenue and expenditure; the appointment of Africans to 
judicial offices and; the establishment of a West African 
University.
The British authorities treated the congress with little 
respect. Governor Hugh Clifford of Nigeria, for instance, 
dismissed the members of the congress as unrepresentative of 
Africans. Their British education, he asserted, made them 
virtually foreigners and their idea of a West African nation 
was dismissed as an absurdity.28
By 1922 the growing demand by these educated Africans for 
direct representation in the legislative council had forced 
Sir Hugh Clifford, the Governor of the Nigerian Colony, to
27 Quoted in Kimble (1963, p.384).
28 Flint, 1966, p.159.
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change his mind.29 The 1922 Constitution subsequently, for the 
first time, enshrined the elective principle into Nigeria's 
political process.30 This, according to Sir Hugh Clifford, was 
a step towards eventual self Government.31 The concession of 
the elective principle by the British colonial administration 
led to the constitution of the Nigerian National Democratic 
party led by Herbert Macaulay. This became the dominant 
political party in Nigeria for the greater part of the 
interwar period. Although its programme included a statement 
calling for "equal treatment for native traders and 
producers", its main focus was on constitutional issues.32
Events during and after the Second World War further 
accelerated political change in Colonial Nigeria. In August 
1941, for instance, Prime Minister Churchill and President 
Roosevelt met in Placentia Bay, in Newfoundland to make common 
declarations of purpose with respect to the war. Their meeting 
resulted in the Atlantic Charter, which declared among other 
things, that the signatories to the Charter "respect the right 
of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which 
they will live."33 Apart from raising the fighting morale of
29 Ezera, 1964, p.26.
30 The Constitution of 1922 increased the size of the 
Legislative Council to forty-six. Four of the ten Nigerians on 
the council were elected. The council also had legislative 
powers for the Lagos Colony and Southern Provinces. The 
Governor continued to legislate for the Northern Provinces 
(Blitz, 1965, p.3).
31 Ezera, 1964, p.27.
32 Coleman, 1958, p. 198.
33 Quoted in Ezera (1964, p.39) .
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the resistance elements in the Nazi occupied countries of 
Europe, this declaration also acted as an added catalyst to 
pro-independence nationalists in most occupied territories 
including Nigeria. Though Churchill later declared that "they 
had only European States in mind" when drafting the charter, 
opposing powerful views at the time ensured the redundancy of 
his declaration.34
By 1946, a new Constitution (Richards Constitution) was 
introduced. It provided for a central legislature for the 
whole country and three regional Houses of Assembly for each 
of the three provinces. The most important achievement of the 
Richards Constitution was the integration of the north and the 
south for legislative purposes. The Constitution was however 
criticised by Nigerian nationalists on the grounds that it 
allowed Africans only discussions and no genuine participation 
in the running of the country's affairs.35 This led to the 
review of the constitution only two years after its 
introduction. It was subsequently replaced by the Macpherson 
Constitution which came into effect in 1951. The Macpherson 
Constitution granted increased regional autonomy and extended
34 For instance, President Roosevelt declared that the 
"Atlantic Charter applied to all humanity." Similarly, the 
Labour Party was at the time sympathetic to the cause of 
colonised people. The colonial policy of the party was then 
stated as follows "Labour repudiates imperialism. We believe 
that all peoples of whatever race have an equal right to 
freedom and to an equitable share in the good things of the 
world." Other forces at work that helped accelerate the change 
process include the rise of African journalists, the pressure 
and lobbying activities of West African students abroad among 
others. See (Ezera, 1964, chapter 3) for a detailed analysis 
of these influences.
35 Ezera, 1964, p.77.
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to the Nigerians a fuller share in shaping policy and in the 
direction of executive Government action. The desire for 
greater regional autonomy and the need for a more precise 
definition and clarification of functions between central and 
regional governments led to a constitutional crisis in March 
19 5 3 . 36 Two constitutional conferences were subsequently held 
in London and Lagos to resolve the crisis. This resulted in a 
new constitution in October 1954, which introduced a federal 
system of government. Under the new system, Colonial Nigeria 
was divided into five parts: the Northern Region, Eastern
Region, Western regions, the federal territory of Lagos and 
the quasi federal territory of Southern Cameroons.37 In 1957, 
the Eastern and Western regions were granted regional self 
government. In 1959 the Northern Region gained regional self 
government. Finally, in October 1960 Nigeria became an 
independent nation.
The next chapter will examine the various theoretical 
issues in the politics of regulation with the view of 
developing a conceptual framework for this study of banking in 
pre-independence Nigeria.
36 Ekundare, 1973, p.13.
37 In 1961, this territory decided, through a plebiscite, 
to leave the Nigerian Federation and join the Republic of 
Cameroon.
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CHAPTER TWO
REGULATION, CONTROL AND POLITICS
2.1 Introduction
Regulation generally suggests some form of intervention 
in any activity, and ranges from explicit legal control to 
informal peer group control by Government or some such 
authoritative body.1 Regulation sometimes stems from market 
failure which usually occurs when market transactions give 
rise to spill-over effects (or externalities) on third 
parties, or when there is information inefficiency in the 
market.2 Some forms of regulation, however, tend to be 
paternalistic in nature, often overriding the individual's 
right to choose, even when such an individual has all the 
relevant information available to him.3 For instance, it is 
common practice for people to be prevented by law from driving 
a motor vehicle without putting on their safety belts or 
working under a contract of employment without contributing to 
a pension scheme. But paternalistic regulation is sometimes 
entwined with regulation on grounds of public interest. For 
instance, the failure to wear a safety belt, when driving a 
car, may give rise to medical costs which are borne by the
1 Ogus, 1994, p.l.
2 See Bromwich (1985, 1992) for an extensive discussion 
of market failure.
3 Dworkin (1971) defined paternalism as "the interference 
with a persons liberty of action justified by reasons 
referring exclusively to welfare, good, happiness, needs, 
interests or values of the person being coerced" (Quoted in 
Ogus, 1994, p.51).
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taxpayers via the National Health Service Scheme.
The taxpayer thus has an interest in reducing such costs 
and paternalistic regulation is one way of achieving this. 
Taxpayers may also have to come to the rescue when the 
individual is left indigent as a result of unwise financial 
decisions such as a reluctance to save for years when paid 
employment is no longer feasible. The end point of all 
regulatory processes is to enshrine some code of conduct for 
the regulated activity. Whatever rules that are finally agreed 
upon usually have diverse consequences on various interest 
groups. This has made the regulatory process-ranging over how 
such regulation is proposed, formally considered and approved, 
administered, interpreted, evaluated and altered-a political 
activity.4
The aim of this chapter is to examine the various 
theoretical issues in the politics of regulation with a view 
to developing a conceptual framework for this study of banking 
in pre-independence Nigeria. To achieve its aim, the chapter 
is divided into six parts including this introductory section. 
Part two discusses the two main theories of regulation while 
part three examines alternative styles of regulation. Part 
four discusses the special nature of the banking trade which 
further impacts on its regulation while part five investigates 
the banking regulation environment in the United Kingdom. 
Finally, part six concludes the chapter.
4 Lasswell (1950) defined politics as who gets what, when 
and how. For the purposes of this study, we shall, in the 
main, adopt the Chambers English Dictionary definition of 
politics as the "manoeuvring and intriguing" involved in the 
formulation and implementation of regulation.
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2.2 Theories of Regulation
Two main conflicting theories have evolved over time in 
the attempt to explain both the origins and practice of 
regulation: public interest and capture theories. The public 
interest theory holds that regulation is supplied in response 
to the demand of the public for the correction of inefficient 
or inequitable market practices.5 It is therefore not 
surprising that up till the late 1960s, most economists 
regarded the growth of regulation as an attempt by Government 
to improve upon the allocation of resources which would 
otherwise occur in unregulated markets.6 This belief was based 
on the implicit assumption that some forms of activities, 
business or otherwise, do not always function in the public 
interest without supervision or control. This view has a 
historical antecedent: regulation in the past (and even
presently) had almost always followed some form of crisis or 
public dissent. For instance, it was the protest of the 
populist farmers against the exploitative rates levied by 
railroads that led to the creation of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in the USA.7 The establishment of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission is yet another example of a crisis 
driven regulation.8 The Food and Drug Act of 1938 in the USA
5 Peltzman (1989, p.4) and Ogus (1994, p.15).
6 Peacock, 1984, p.8.
7 See for instance, Huntington (1952).
8 Investigations subsequent to the great crash of 1929 
revealed that the speculative fever of the 1920's had been 
worsened for thousands of small investors and speculators by 
fraud in the touting of equity securities. For instance, 
stocks were issued for worthless corporations without true
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was passed following a drug accident.9 The 1962 Drugs 
Amendments Act, also in the USA, was passed shortly after the 
Thalidomide incident, even though the bill had languished in 
committee hearings for years.10 Examples of crisis inspired 
legislation in the United Kingdom include the Royal Exchange 
and London Assurance Corporations Act (Bubble Act) of 1719. 
This Act, which outlawed the joint stock companies of the 
time, was a direct consequence of the widespread abuse of the 
system, mainly in the form of fraudulent promotion of such 
companies, culminating in the famous South Sea Company 
Scandal.11 Likewise, the 1956 Clean Air Act, was a direct 
consequence of the London 'killer smog' of 1952.12
An implicit assumption of the public interest theory is 
that regulation is, in the main, aimed at protecting the
information being made available to purchasers. Investment 
companies affiliated with commercial banks also manipulated 
market prices to the advantage of insiders and the distress of 
outsiders. The consequence was legislation in 1933 
(information disclosure regarding new securities) and 1934 
(regulation of securities market) culminating in the 
establishment of the SEC (Reagan, 1987, p.22).
9 The drug involved was Elixir Sulphanilamide which 
contained a poison that killed more than 100 people in 
September 1937 (Temin, 1979, pp.94-95)
10 The bill gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
authority to require that new prescription drugs be proven 
effective for the announced purposes. This followed the public 
disclosure, in the Washington Post, that there was a 
widespread birth defect problem of truncated or missing limbs 
in babies born to European women who had used the sedative, 
Thalidomide, while pregnant (Reagan, 1987, p.20).
11 Edwards (1980, p.vi). This Act was repealed in 1825.
12 The incident which caused the death of 4,000 people, 
in the area of Greater London, led to the Government 
appointment of the Beaver Committee and the consequent 
legislation (Gunningham, 1974, p.59).
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public. To achieve its aim, regulation based on the above 
principle should aim at equipping the public with all relevant 
information necessary for decision making. Regulation in the 
public interest should also strive to protect the public from 
monopolies and industries that generate substantial external 
costs or benefits. This does not always happen in practice.13 
Furthermore, were this theory right, one should also expect no 
support for regulation from regulatees.14 This has not always 
been the case. In the United States, for instance, the 
railroads supported the enactment of the first interstate 
commerce act which was designed to prevent railroads from 
practising price discrimination. This was because 
discrimination was undermining the railroad's cartels.15 Also, 
American Telephone and Telegraph pressed for state regulation 
of telephone services because it wanted to end competition 
among telephone companies.16
Also, the image of Government as a costless and reliable 
instrument for altering market behaviour has been extensively 
questioned.17 Costs are incurred in the provision of data and 
information to regulators. It is also possible for regulation 
to reduce the reactive and flexibility capabilities of
13 Posner, 1974, p. 336.
14 An implicit assumption of the public interest theory 
of regulation is that public interest and the interest of 
regulatees are dissimilar.
15 Posner, 1974, p.337.
16 Ibid.
17 See, for instance, Posner (1970) , Gerwig (1962) and 
Stigler (1971).
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companies to adapt to changing environments.18 Regulation 
could also affect management style. Management, for instance, 
may become more oriented towards satisfying the regulators 
than towards meeting its proper business demands and 
objectives.19 Based on the above, it has been widely claimed 
that the costs of regulation are greater than any welfare 
losses arising from inefficiencies in market based allocation 
of wealth.
Empirical studies consequent to these contradictions in 
the public good theory show little evidence that Government 
regulation, especially in the form of state intervention, is 
beneficial to the public.20 If regulation could no longer be 
assumed to be implemented in the pursuit of efficiency 
objectives, then it becomes legitimate to inquire into its 
effective objective.
Stigler (1971) in a pathbreaking article21 attempted an 
answer asserting that "as a rule, regulation is acquired by
18 Regulated companies are sometimes required to seek 
approval before adopting new technologies or venturing into 
new areas.
19 Gardener, 1986, p.29.
20 Stigler (1964), for instance, compared the performance 
of a typical portfolio of new issues before and after the 
setting up of the Securities and Exchange Commission which 
attempted to impose regulations to ensure the accuracy of the 
information accompanying the floatation of new shares. Stigler 
similarly concluded that "grave doubts exist whether, if 
account is taken of the cost of regulation, the SEC has saved 
the purchasers of new issues one dollar". See also Gerwig 
(1962) and Stigler and Friedland (1962).
21 The title of Stigler's 1971 paper (The Theory of 
Economic Regulation) is somewhat misleading. As Becker (1976) 
emphasised, it is best to think of an economic theory of 
regulation rather than a theory of economic regulation.
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the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its 
benefit".22 This proposition has come to be known as the 
capture theory of regulation.23 Bluntly put, the regulatory 
agencies are captured by the industry they are supposed to be 
regulating. In other words, regulation, far from supporting 
the general public interest by achieving efficiency gains, is 
enacted and implemented in the interest of specialist producer 
groups.24
Proponents of this theory argue that people in their 
political behaviour could not be assumed to be motivated by 
fundamentally different forces than in their private choice 
making behaviour. Self interest is usually put above all other 
interests.25 The industry which seeks regulation must be 
prepared to pay with two things a political party needs: votes 
and resources. In non democratic societies, sometimes, the 
price may be remarkably less: personal friendships with the
22 p. 3 .
23 The capture theory was not new in 1971. Well known 
versions had appeared earlier (see for instance, Bernstein, 
1955). What was new was its broad appeal to economists based 
on the accumulating evidence of empirical research (Peltzman, 
1989, p.5).
24 Some scholars have since attempted a modification of 
the basic capture model. For instance, Peltzman (1976) argues 
that the complete capture of any agency by any group wold 
imply that the activities of the agency were run exclusively 
in the interest of that group. Such a policy must inevitably 
arouse opposition from other groups who are adversely 
affected, and a more likely outcome of the regulatory process 
would be a balancing of opposing interests. The point of 
political equilibrium in the Peltzman model will depend upon 
the organisational costs faced by the two opposing groups.
25 For instance, it is a well known fact that the 
allocation of television channels among communities does not 
maximise industry revenue but reflects pressures to serve many 
smaller communities (Stigler, 1971, p.7).
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junta members or family relationships could be very useful.26 
In general, people simply pursue their objectives, whatever 
they are, using the resources available to them. Persuading a 
customer to utilise one's services will no doubt produce a 
payoff, but so also can getting the Government to impose some 
form of tariff on your competitors or to grant you subsidies. 
In the pre-colonial and colonial setting, similar examples 
abound. For instance, it has been argued that one of the 
reasons for the establishment of British colonial rule in the 
Southern Nigerian Coast was in response to the pressures of 
British commercial enterprises operating in the area who 
wanted to break down the middlemen system of which Ja Ja27 was 
the master.28
26 This is perhaps because such governments are usually 
less accountable. The absence of checks and balances 
discourages reason and dialogue in decision making. Any 
attempt, therefore to understand the mechanisms of decision 
making under such systems becomes onerous.
27 In December 1863, the British Consul to the territory 
described him as a "son of an unknown bushman, a common Negro" 
who had been elected to head the Annie Pepple House."He is 
young, healthy, and powerful, and not less ambitious, 
energetic and decided. He is the most influential man and the 
greatest trader in the river". Quoted in Dike (1956, p.184).
28 In February 1882, for instance, John Holt appealed to 
the Foreign Office to protect one Mr Watts, a British trader 
in the Qua Eboe River whom he claimed was a victim of Ja Ja's 
persecution. He further suggested the annexation of the coast 
from Lagos to Cameroon as the only safeguard for the British 
merchants. "These requests for annexation" commented a Foreign 
Office Official "are becoming frequent" and they came almost 
entirely from merchants and the Consul who needed direct 
Government intervention "to break down the middlemen system of 
which Ja Ja is the Champion" . In June 1883, an internal memo of 
the Foreign Office urged the annexation of Cameroon in order 
to enable Britain "to obtain the great influence in the 
interior now exercised by the Kings and Chiefs of Cameroon". 
The memo further suggested that annexation would enable "the 
white traders... [to] push into the interior and [so] get rid 
of the services of the [Africans]... as middlemen". Quoted in
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But the interest divide was not always along colonial 
lines: even among the Africans, variant interests existed. For 
instance, the abolition of the slave trade was opposed not 
just by the European slave traders but also by the African 
middlemen. The King of Bonny, Africa's greatest slave market, 
once declared that:
We [i.e. the King and Council] think that the trade 
must go on. That also is the verdict of our Oracle 
and the priests. They say that your country however 
great can never stop a trade ordained by God 
himself.29
While it may have been easier for a colonial business to 
influence legislation in Whitehall in order to protect its 
interests, the African businessmen might have found appeals to 
nationalist sentiments a better and more effective way of 
protecting their interests. The choice therefore between 
market and political action is essentially an economic one and 
will depend upon the relative costs involved and the chances 
of success in each case.30 It was this trend towards analysing 
the use of political processes from an economic perspective, 
rather than implicitly assuming that they are infallible 
mechanisms for the production of the 'public good'31 that led
Dike (1956, p.216).
29 Quoted in Dike (1956, p.13).
30 Ricketts and Shaw (1984, p.14).
31 Society's perception of 'public good' changes over 
time. This is because such perceptions are determined by a 
shifting interplay of a variety of forces: bureaucrats, 
careerists, professionals, political appointees, legislators, 
courts, interest groups, the media etc, with differing 
objectives, views and stakes that are subject to change
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to the reappraisal of Government regulation.
Sometimes, regulation imposed on the grounds of public 
interest may end up serving the interest of the regulated 
group. An example of this can be found in the regulation of 
the tobacco industry in the USA (The Prohibition of 
Advertising Act of 1971) . Here, it has been argued that it was 
the industry, not the consumers, that benefitted from this act 
which banned cigarette advertising in the broadcasting 
media.32 Such benefits arose mainly because of the following 
factors: (1) the ban on such advertising made the fairness
doctrine inapplicable;33 (2) the industry saved money after 
the ban because it reduced its advertising expenditures; (3) 
industry sales increased significantly after the ban and; (4)
depending on the issues and the circumstances (Katzmann, 1990,
p.200) .
32 Before the industry was mandated to stop advertising 
in the broadcasting media, it was low in the ranking of 
profitable American industries. In the 1970's, subsequent to 
the ban, they catapulted to the top (Doron, 1979, p.86). By 
1972, the failure of the prohibition of cigarette commercials 
had been realised in some quarters. For instance, Bruce W. 
Wilson, then the Deputy Assistant Attorney General told the 
Senate Consumer Sub Committee hearing that "the public 
interest might be better served through the assumption of both 
cigarette commercials and the anti-smoking messages that were 
so prevalent before the broadcasting ban" (quoted in Doron, 
1979, p.89).
33 According to the American Cancer Society, "While this 
law [The Prohibition of Advertising Act] was hailed as a 
victory for the anti-smoking forces, it could not be foreseen 
that it would also produce a serious drawback. Since the 
broadcasters could no longer advertise cigarettes, they no 
longer were required to carry anti cigarettes messages. How 
powerful these messages had really been was demonstrated by 
what happened when they were no longer there. By the end of 
1971, the per capita consumption curve for cigarettes had 
begun to point upward again; then it continued to move up 
gradually through 1972, 1973 and 1974" (quoted in Doron, 1979, 
p.91) .
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it helped the then existing local firms perpetuate their 
control of the national market. This was so because the ban on 
advertising made it difficult for new firms to enter the 
market.34
Public and private interests, it has also been argued, 
are entwined. For instance, it has been suggested that the 
best way to act in the interest of the public is by putting 
your private interest first.35 In 1903, for example, Sir Harry 
Johnston, one of the principal figures in the overthrow of 
indigenous sovereignties in Southern Nigeria, advised that:
Between the White Nile and the Zambesi, the black 
man's interests must come first of all since the 
lands he occupies are not in the main suited to the 
white man's occupation. We must educate the black 
man to make the best use of his limbs, his land, his 
intelligence, and our experience, advice and wealth. 
Our return for these services should be the 
commercial development of all Africa on a gigantic 
scale with most profitable results to Europe and 
Africa.36
34 Doron, 1979, p.84. The Tobacco Industry in America has 
undergone extensive changes since Doron's work. This is 
perhaps due to the ever increasing activities of the anti- 
smoking campaigners. Doron's findings, therefore, are unlikely 
to be legitimate now. See for instance, Financial Times (18 
March 1996, 9 April 1996).
35 According to Adam Smith "As every individual... 
endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the 
support of domestic[k] industry, and so to direct that 
industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every 
individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of 
the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither 
intends to promote the public[k] interest, nor knows how much 
he is promoting it... he intends only his own gain, and he is 
in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention" (quoted in 
Raphael, 1985, p.70) . The invisible hand theory is not without 
its critics. See for instance (Hahn, 1982) .
36 Quoted in Ofonagoro (1979, pp.158-159) .
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It is also the shifting concept and varied interpretations of 
'public good' that has enabled the use of regulation to shield 
major players in some industries from public scrutiny and 
indeed to prevent competition in some.37 Regulation, therefore 
serves different purposes for different interest groups on 
different occasions.38
Because of the ever shifting perception of 'public good' , 
shifting individual and group interests and perhaps the 
entwinement of public and individual good, neither the capture 
theory nor the public good theory has yet fully explained the 
rationale for regulation.39 Interest groups and accidents also 
impact on the method of regulation employed.
37 For instance, the 1905 Companies Act in the Gold Coast 
(Ghana) prevented Gold Coast registered Companies from 
engaging in banking activities. This legislation effectively 
eliminated Africans from engaging in such practices. At the 
time, the Africans,though an interest group in the Gold Coast 
Economic arena, were not a political force to be reckoned 
with. The political equation was altered in the 1940s. With 
the imminence of independence, the retention of the native 
exempt clause became politically inexpedient for the colonial 
Government. Thus a shift from direct discrimination regulation 
to those that appealed to economic reasoning and the 
protection of the 'public interest'. -See Paton (1948a) and 
Trevor (1951) for a general discussion of the pre-independence 
regulatory changes in the Gold Coast banking industry.
38 There is little doubt that the national policy
objective of any nation is non static. For a society
transiting from colonisation to independence, the change in 
its perception of public good may be drastic. The rejection of 
the colonial system presupposes that the system acted more 
against the interest of the Africans. Implicit in the 
rejection of the colonial system, therefore, is a call for a 
change of status quo. All components of the old system,
including its banking structures, must therefore come under 
scrutiny with a view to restructuring them to satisfy the new 
national interest.
39 There have been calls for a synthesis of the two
regulatory theories. See for instance, Reagan (1987, chap 2) 
and Levine and Forrence (1990).
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2.3 Types of Regulation
There are in the main, two types of regulation: 
Government regulation and self regulation. Government 
regulations are sometimes administered through Government 
parastatals or agencies. Such regulations are usually backed 
by Statute laws established by acts of parliaments or military 
decrees. They are therefore rules which are intended, in all 
stages of their application, to be interpreted and enforced by 
the courts. Such laws usually prescribe punishments for non 
compliance. The power of statutes therefore lies in the 
general willingness of society to obey the law and in the 
willingness of the state to enforce the punishment for non 
compliance.40 Government regulation in some activities may 
however be advisable. This is especially so in the arena of 
social regulation41 where externalities are widespread. An 
example is the case of pollution. In such an activity, a 
statute backed regulatory regime may reduce both the 
information and enforcement costs.42 Regulation by a third 
party, unlike self regulation, also has the advantage of 
ensuring the maintenance of the separation of powers 
doctrine.43 This is so since it ensures the separation of the
40 BOE, September 1978, P.380.
41 This is the term generally used to refer to regulation 
which typically affects a number of industries and is intended 
to promote a general societal good such as clean air or water 
(Wilson, 1984, p.203).
42 Ogus, 1995, pp.107-108.
43 This may not hold when the regulatory authority is 
'captured' by the industry as it then becomes a front for the 
industry.
37
function of adjudication and enforcement of rules from the 
regulated industry.44
Government regulation is however not without its 
problems. State laws, for instance, are usually content with 
the provision of minimum standards.45 This may be an incentive 
to companies just to adhere to the minimum standards. Another 
problem with statute laws is the fact that the very nature and 
power of the law make its change a serious matter, not to be 
undertaken frequently. Such laws therefore tend to be slow in 
adapting to new developments and changing circumstances. 
Finally, an inherent feature of statute law is that it tends 
to be its letter not its spirit that the courts interpret and 
enforce. For the above reasons, statute law, particularly 
where it relates to the administration of regulation, is 
sometimes framed in a manner which gives some degree of 
discretionary authority to the regulator.46 It is the above 
difficulties that make self regulation attractive to some 
parties.
According to the National Consumer Council (United 
Kingdom), self regulation, means that:
rules which govern behaviour in the market are
developed, administered and enforced by the people
(or their direct representatives) whose behaviour is
to be governed.47
44 Ogus,1995, p.99.
45 BOE, September 1978, p.379. This is perhaps because 
laws and rules often reflect compromise rather than the 
interests of any one group (Gunningham, 1974, p.61).
46 BOE, September 1978, p.380.
47 National Consumer Council (NCC), 1986, p.l.
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The extent to which these people control these rules can in 
fact vary considerably48 mainly because of lack of a 
homogeneity in the interests of the forces that drive self 
regulation. Typically, the debate over the setting up of self 
regulatory schemes does not address constitutional issues.49 
Self regulation, instead, usually arises out of two main 
circumstances: to repel the threat of Government imposed
regulation50 or to curtail the activities of fringe operators 
and protect industry reputation.51
The benefits of a self regulatory scheme could be 
immense. For instance, by reducing reliance on statutes, self 
regulatory schemes generally offer a speedier and more 
flexible means of solving problems.52 Also by utilising the 
skills of those involved in the business, self regulation 
schemes may be able to overcome the information problems 
sometimes faced by Government regulatory bodies, and standards 
can conceivably be set higher than in a statutory scheme.53
Finally, the costs of self regulatory regimes are normally
48 Ibid.
49 Graham, 1994, p. 195.
50 This extensively explains the advent of codes of 
practice for the banking, press, advertising and building 
society industries in Britain (Graham,1994, p.195).
51 An example of this is the British Board of Film
Classification. Its origins could, to some extent, be traced 
to the uneasiness in the early cinema industry about the loss 
of reputation due to the activities of fringe operators
(ibid).
52 Ibid, p. 194.
53 Ibid.
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internalised in the trade or activity which is exposed to 
regulation.54
Perhaps because of the variety of interests that impact 
on self regulation, in practice it has not been without 
blemish and some schemes have found it difficult to meet some 
of the guidelines aimed at enhancing the credibility of self 
regulation.55 Criticisms of such schemes include the fact that 
such schemes do not necessarily cover all the firms in the 
industry.56 The negotiation and bargaining necessary to 
introduce a self regulation scheme, in some cases, also take 
place without an input from third parties.57 Finally, it has 
been claimed that self regulation schemes have a poor record
54 In the case of independent public agencies, such costs 
are usually borne by taxpayers (Ogus, 1995, p.98).
55 The NCC, for instance, recommended that self regulatory 
schemes should adhere to the following guidelines: (1) the 
scheme must be able to command public confidence; (2) there 
must be a strong external involvement in the design and 
operation of the scheme; (3) as far as practicable, the 
control and operation of the scheme should be separate from 
the institutions of the industry; (4) consumers and other 
outsiders should be fully represented on the governing bodies 
of such schemes; (5) the scheme must be based on clear 
statements of principles and standards; (6) there must be a 
clear, accessible and well publicised complaints procedure 
where breach of the code is alleged; (7) there must be 
adequate and meaningful sanctions for non observance; (8) the 
scheme must be monitored and updated in the light of changing 
circumstances and expectations and; (9) there must be a degree 
of public accountability such as an annual report (NCC, 1986, 
p.15) .
56 Those who have not agreed to follow self regulatory 
schemes are usually the source of consumer problems (NCC,
1986, p.6). Reynolds (1981) also asserted that as "a social 
group grows and becomes more complex, the efficiency of non 
market implicit controls declines. The group becomes more 
heterogeneous, and general agreements on ethical values and 
other institutional arrangements decreases" (quoted in Reagan,
1987, p.34).
57 Ramsay, (1987, p.191) and Breyer (1982, p.179).
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of enforcing their standards against disobedient members.58
Apart from all the above disadvantages, self regulation 
is not always possible. For instance, the industry concerned 
may be too diverse making it impossible for the level of 
agreement necessary for such regulation to be obtained. An 
example is the Estate Agency Industry in Great Britain, where 
the Office of Fair Trading had for a long time encouraged the 
industry to take voluntary regulatory measures but with little 
success until the formation of the Ombudsman for Corporate 
Estate Agents, which still covered only half of the industry. 
This led to the enactment of the Estate Agents (Provision of 
Information) Regulations, 1991, by the Government.59 In 
general, the more the external consequences of an industrial 
practice, the less acceptable self regulation becomes. An 
example can be found in the banking industry.
2.4 The Special Nature of the Banking Industry
The banking industry is special in terms of regulation as 
experience has shown that failure (bankruptcy) in this 
industry has external consequences.60 The concern to safeguard 
the viability of the depository industry arose from the fact 
that financial failure had significant external effects that
58 Graham, 1994, p. 195.
59 Ibid, pp.195-196.
60 The supervision of banks, unlike the other non- 
financial industries arises from the unique fiduciary 
responsibility which bankers assume when they accept other 
people's money for safe keeping. It is therefore not 
surprising that the defining activity for statutory control is 
usually the act of deposit (Cooke, 1982, p.547).
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reached beyond the depositors and stockholders of the 
financial firm.61 The depository institution played an 
important role as the chief conduit in both the payment 
process and the savings-investment process. Failure of 
individual firms in the depository industry may lead to 
widespread deposit runs that could overflow to other 
depository firms.62 This has come to be known as the contagion 
effect.63
Institutional developments like the rise in inter bank 
lending and various money market operations, propelled mainly
61 In an attempt to safeguard such depository firms, it 
is usual for regulating bodies to set up entry barriers into 
such activities. For instance, a licence is widely required 
before any company can engage in banking functions. Licensing 
conditions usually include: a minimum paid up capital, 
security clearance of the directors, availability of competent 
manpower amongst others. Licensing is also sometimes 
influenced by the overall macro-economic goal of the 
territory. Established financial institutions also come under 
regulatory scrutiny. The are usually subjected to various 
capital adequacy, liquidity, reserve, risk management and 
lending regulations.
62 The losses of depository failure are however not 
constrained to the depositors and deposits. The external 
effects are usually large. For instance the cumulative failure 
of the depository industry has been identified by some 
scholars as the reason behind the great depression of the 
1930s (Spellman, 1982, p.9).
63 Justifying its support operations during the fringe 
banking crisis of 1973, the Bank of England argued that it 
found itself "confronted with the imminent collapse of several 
deposit-taking institutions, and with the clear danger of a 
rapidly escalating crisis of confidence. This threatened other 
deposit-taking institutions and, if left unchecked, would have 
quickly passed into parts of the banking system proper. While 
the UK clearing banks still appeared secure from the domestic 
effects of any run-indeed the money-market deposits withdrawn 
from the fringe were largely redeposited with them-their 
international exposure was such that the risk to external 
confidence was a matter of concern for themselves as well as 
for the Bank. The problem was to avoid a widening circle of 
collapse through the contagion of fear" (BOE, 1978, p.233).
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by the spirit of competition with the aid of advancements in 
information technology, have also added to the contagion 
problem. There has therefore been a steady rise in the 
entwinement of banks not just with their customers, but also 
with other banks. Therefore no matter how small a financial 
institution may be, the impact of its failure may be far 
reaching on the entire financial system.64
The danger of contagion is particularly acute for the 
banking system. If a cement manufacturer, for instance, fails, 
the ill effects are likely to be felt most by those who have 
had dealings with the institution. The repercussions for the 
industry and the general economy as a whole will tend to be 
much less serious. In fact, the competitors may inherit some 
of their late rival's market share. The above scenario can of 
course occur in an isolated bank failure especially when the 
reason for the failure can be clearly seen to be specific to 
the bank or a group of banks. In certain circumstances, 
however, the collapse of a bank could, in the absence of any 
official action, lead to loss of confidence in the entire 
banking system and a subsequent mass withdrawal of depositors' 
funds from the system. In such a scenario, therefore, formal 
disclosure requirements are likely to be of little practical 
assistance. Irrespective of the bank's balance sheet strength,
64 In line with this, the 1985 Annual Report of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, commented as follows "The 
interconnections among institutions and markets in the new 
environment get more and more complex. A shock that starts in 
one market may spread quickly along this network until it 
finds a weakness in some seemingly unrelated place. In fact 
there is a growing tendency to build financial links along 
regulatory fault lines where the responsibility for
supervisory oversight is weak, divided or clouded"(p.26).
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it may still be rendered insolvent by the actions of other 
depositors.65
Also the increased integration of the financial system, 
which has resulted in the rise in inter bank dealings, has 
also increased the prospects of contagion should one bank 
fail. Therefore when the banking system co-operates to save a 
distressed member, it is more of a self preservation act than 
an act of charity. It is mainly on the above basis that it has 
been possible to secure the co-operation of the banking 
community in times of stress. For instance, during the 1973 
secondary banking crisis in Britain, large sums of money 
flowed out from the secondary banks to the clearing banks. 
These funds were recycled back to the secondary banks through 
the famous 'lifeboat operation'.66
It is thus clear that it is the problem of contagion that 
is the reason for preventing those who do not meet the minimum 
requirement necessary to achieve the status of a bank or 
licensed deposit taker from taking deposits. If the problem of 
contagion did not exist, there might be a case for confining 
regulatory action to only 'club members' without going on to 
formally bar non 'club members'67 from carrying on depository 
businesses.68
But not all ailing banks have been saved in the past.
65 BOE, March 1984, p.49.
66 Reid (1986, p.100) .
67 BOE, March 1984, p. 50.
68 There is however a case for protecting the 
unsophisticated depositor from the unreliable operators. This 
will be discussed later.
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Between 1933 and 1982, 620 banks failed in the USA alone.69 
The size of a distressed bank, no doubt, plays a major role in 
determining whether it gets helped.70 In an economy 
approaching political independence, this may create problems. 
For instance, new indigenous banking businesses are likely to 
be small with perhaps insignificant effect on the financial 
system should such banks collapse. Such banks therefore will 
be unlikely candidates for assistance under the above regime. 
It is perhaps because of this that the protection of infant 
industries has become a reason for Government intervention in 
banking (and other businesses) especially in developing 
countries.71 Size alone, however, is not the only explanatory 
factor in the theory of which distressed bank gets 
assistance.72 Other factors, no doubt, are usually part of the
69 Dale, 1992, p.8.
70 For instance, the bailing out, in 1984, of Continental 
Illinois, was justified by the then FDIC Chairman, Mr William 
Isaac on the grounds that "closing the bank and paying off 
insured depositors could have had catastrophic consequences 
for other banks and the entire economy. Insured accounts 
totalled only slightly more than $3bn. This meant that 
depositors and other private creditors with over $30bn. in 
claims would have had their funds tied up for years in a 
bankruptcy proceeding awaiting the liquidation of assets and 
the settlement of litigation. Hundreds of small banks would 
have been particularly hard hit. Almost 2,300 small banks had 
nearly $6bn. at risk in Continental; 66 of them had more than 
their capital on the line and another 113 had between 50 and 
100 per cent. More generally, closure of a bank whose solvency 
was apparently not impaired, in response to its liquidity and 
confidence problems would have raised concerns about other 
soundly managed banks"(Quoted in Dale, 1992, pp.9-10).
71 This will be discussed later on in this section.
72 In the 1973 banking crisis, the 'lifeboat' committee, 
required the following conditions to be satisfied before 
support was provided: (1) that the company seeking support was 
currently trading solvently and was likely to remain solvent 
provided it received liquidity support by way of recycled
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explanatory variables.
The desire by some countries to limit or preclude foreign 
participation in a sector which is regarded as vital to the 
proper functioning of the national economy and the attainment 
of National policy objectives is yet another reason for 
Government intervention in banking.73 This is usually entwined 
with the typical infant industry argument.74 It was in this 
respect that the Reserve Bank of Australia cautioned that:
Banking is a key sector of the economy providing the 
community with money balances and payments 
arrangements. Control of ownership of banks should 
therefore be maintained in Australian hands to 
ensure concern for the National interest. Foreign 
banks may be inclined to give prior place to 
commercial advantage or to another country's 
national interest.75
The protection of depositors is yet another objective of bank 
regulation. Subsequent to the financial crisis of 1929-1933, 
banking regulators around the world emphasised this objective. 
Such an emphasis drew its strength from the political and
deposits; (2) that the company exhibited sufficient banking 
characteristics to justify inclusion in the scheme (the 
possession of a section 123 certificate, for instance) and had 
attracted a significant level of deposits from the public; and 
(3) that the company did not possess any institutional 
shareholders whose interest in the company was such that they 
might properly be expected to provide the necessary support 
(BOE, June 1978, p.233).
73 Reserve Bank of Australia (1979, chap 12).
74 It is usually argued that it is necessary to offer some 
form of protection to indigenous companies. Such protection is 
required in order to protect them from the usually better 
equipped foreign companies. This is necessary for the survival 
and constrained development of indigenous companies (UNCTC, 
1981).
75 Reserve Bank of Australia (1979, chapter 12.6) .
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social trends evident in many countries towards the protection 
of customers and away from the principles of caveat emptor.76 
There is usually a case for deviating from the caveat emptor 
principle in certain industries. This is especially so where 
it is inherently difficult for the individual or consumer to 
assess the goods or services he is buying or where the 
learning process for society may be judged too costly or 
difficult.
The fact that an institution is supervised may be taken 
perhaps inappropriately, to mean that they have been given an 
official seal of approval. It is as a consequence of this that 
it may be argued that the supervisory authorities carry some 
responsibility towards the members of the public. The belief 
may also grow up that either the authorities will not allow 
the institutions to fail or, where they fail, depositors will 
be compensated.77
Many countries have deposit protection schemes in 
operation. In the UK, the deposit protection Board provides 
protection for only 75% of deposits for total deposits of up 
to £20,000. In the USA, where the bank failures of the 1930s 
proved a more traumatic experience, depositors definitely have 
a better deal: deposits of up to $100,000 are protected in 
full.78 The limitation in the protection of depositors in the 
UK implicitly assumed that even the small man should not be 
fully compensated for losses due to mismanagement. If a
76 Blunden, 1977, p. 325.
77 BOE, March 1984, p.49.
78 Ibid.
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depositor can earn a higher return by placing funds with 
somewhat higher risks, full compensation may be an undue 
incentive to continue in his ways as he will be earning all 
the interest while the risks are borne by another party.79
Banking regulation does not however only aim at 
preventing banking failures. Banks may also be regulated to 
ensure that they carry out their activities in accordance with 
the wider economic and social objectives of the country. For 
instance, it is not unusual for banks, especially in 
developing countries to be given credit policy guidelines
especially on the sectoral allocation of loans, either by
Government or the Central Bank. Banks have also been
instructed by the Government to avoid investments in certain 
sectors of the economy, either by direct ban or by making it 
unprofitable for them to do so.
Another reason for regulating the financial system stems 
from the need to foster the efficiency and integrity of the 
market by minimising the problems that may arise from
conflicts of interest on the part of market participants. 
Here, there are various ways of ensuring that conflicts of 
interests do not arise and, where they do, that they do not
79 A possible solution to the problem is to allow 
privately run insurance schemes to cater for the protection of 
the depositors. But this has its own problems: The possibility 
of a claim does not only depend on systematic risks but also 
on unsystematic risks. The incentive, on the part of 
management, to behave with due care may be reduced if deposit 
insurance can be purchased. Private insurers may tackle this 
problem by varying the premium rates depending on the 
riskiness of the deposit taker (BOE, March 1984, p.49).
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impact on the integrity of the market.80 In Britain, at least 
before the Big Bang (1986), the broking function was separated 
from the Jobbing function.81 In other words, stockbrokers 
could only act as agents to their clients and jobbers could 
not deal directly with the investing public.82 The early bank 
charters in the USA also enshrined the separation principle. 
By 1930, however, such a separation system had been abandoned 
in the USA and commercial banks had become the dominant force 
in the distribution and underwriting of securities.83 Whether 
the banking crisis of the early 1930s was a consequence of the 
abandonment of the separation principle has remained a 
contentious issue among scholars and banking practitioners
80 Fund management and bond issuing, for instance, involve 
potential conflicts of interest, yet UK banks perform both 
activities and are able to maintain the confidence of their 
clients by ensuring that a Chinese wall of silence exists 
between the different activities. An alternative way of 
maintaining market integrity is to ensure full disclosure of 
the activities of the market. This will enable customers check 
that they are getting the going prices. The best approach to 
adopt is open to argument. For instance, it could be argued 
that the abolition of a single capacity could lead, through 
agglomeration, to substantial economies of scale. On the other 
hand, the information required to make the disclosure system 
work could be very expensive both to produce and consume 
(BOE, March 1984, p.47).
81 As a result of the Big Bang, jobbers were replaced by 
market makers.
82 The above regulations changed in 1986. Both 
stockbrokers and market makers are now able to act in dual 
capacity. They can, for instance, deal directly with investors 
(buying and selling securities from their own books), or act 
as agents, putting deals together for clients on commission 
basis. There are however rules in place to ensure that 
investors are not disadvantaged under this dual capacity 
system- See Bank of England (1985b, 1987) .
83 See Dale (1992, chapter 2) for an analysis of events 
leading to this abandonment.
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alike,84 although the advent of the Glass Steagall Act 
implicitly endorsed such a view. At this point, a detailed 
analysis of the development of the bank accounting 
requirements and the entire banking regulatory system in the 
United Kingdom is necessary. This is especially so since 
Nigeria was a British colony and was bound to be heavily 
influenced by developments in Britain.
2.5 Earlier Laws Relating to Bank Accounting Systems
In the United Kingdom, the Bubble Act of 1719 limited any 
form of partnership to six members.85 The development of the 
company in Great Britain was therefore restricted until the 
act was repealed in 1825. By this time, the pressures of 
industrialisation and the ever increasing demand for 
investible funds encouraged a more diffuse ownership of 
business.86 The major problem then, however, was how to 
encourage external investments in private enterprise while, 
at the same time, providing adequate means of protection for 
the investors. It was the above factors that led to the 
initial production of financial reports for shareholders by
84 See also Dale (1992, chapter 2) for a review of the 
debate.
85 The first two decades of the 18th Century witnessed 
considerable speculation with firms beginning to operate on a 
basis of a joint stock raised from the public and often 
carrying on businesses in the Company's name. This 
development, which created enormous opportunities for the 
unscrupulous, led to a series of fraudulent promotions. 
Government responded by outlawing this type of business 
enterprise (Edwards, 1980, p.vi).
86 Lee (1979, p.16) .
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companies.87
The legislation on financial statements however did not 
follow until 1844 when the Joint Stock Companies Act was 
promulgated.88 The provisions of this Act did not relate to 
banks which were covered by separate legislation: the Joint 
Stock Banks Act of 1844. This Act provided for the publication 
of the assets and liabilities of joint stock banks, at least 
once in every month. It also provided for the yearly audits of 
the accounts of such banks by two or more auditors chosen at 
a general meeting of shareholders. Only non directors could 
act as auditors. The report of the auditors plus the balance 
sheet and profit and loss accounts were to be communicated to 
the shareholders yearly.89
Though the Joint Stock Banks Act of 1844 contained a 
compulsory audit requirement, bank audits, at the time, 
remained uncommon. This was mainly because only a few banks 
were formed under this act which was repealed in 1857. Banks 
were subsequently regulated under the general company 
legislation at the time.90 Therefore, for most banks, audit
87 Ibid, p. 17.
88 The provisions of this Act required a balanced, full 
and fair balance sheet to be prepared, by the directors, and 
presented to each ordinary meeting of shareholders. The Act 
did not specify the form or content of the balance sheet and 
also there was no mention of a profit and loss account. The 
Act further provided for the appointment of one or more 
auditors, one of whom at least was to be appointed by 
shareholders at a General Meeting.
89 Section iv of the Joint Stock Banks Act as reproduced 
in Edwards (1980, p.18).
90 At the time, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 had 
been repealed and replaced by the Joint Stock Companies Act of 
1856. Though, the 1856 Act extended the accounting and
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remained optional until 1879 following the collapse of the 
City of Glasgow Bank. Founded in 1839, the City of Glasgow 
Bank failed in 1878. This had disastrous consequences for both 
its creditors and shareholders (who did not have limited 
liability) . The failure of the City of Glasgow Bank led to the 
prosecution of its directors, and it was discovered that 
balance sheets had been falsified as a result of 
misdescription, and by overvaluing assets and undervaluing 
liabilities.91 These events promoted an immediate demand for 
legislation that would prevent such abuses.92 Several bills 
were introduced in Parliament at the time. Those that provided 
for the compulsory audit of the accounts of Joint Stock Banks 
and their publication in a prescribed form were generally 
welcome at the time.93 Though none of the bills was passed, 
they no doubt influenced the provisions of the Banking and 
Joint Stock Companies bill which resulted in the Companies Act 
of 1879. The bill contained provisions for a compulsory and 
independent audit and a uniform balance sheet. The provision 
for a uniform balance sheet was however dropped at the
auditing provisions of the 1844 Act, it relegated it to an 
optional appendix.
91 Tyson (1974) and French (1985, p.10).
92 Walker (1996, pp.313-4).
93 "Many of the points are what a well managed bank might 
not feel any great reluctance to make public; and the power 
proposed to be given to auditors is not more than some banks 
already concede. Publicly, it is the best check against fraud, 
and this would be attained by the measure proposed" 
(Economist, April 19 1879, p.446).
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committee stage.94 The accounting provisions of the 1879 Act, 
which to some extent resembled those of the Joint Stock Banks 
Act of 1844, made audits compulsory for banks with limited 
liability,95 but not for other companies.
The ability of shareholders to inspect company records 
has also been a subject of regulation from the beginnings of 
formal accounting legislation of companies in the United 
Kingdom. For instance, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 
required that the books of joint stock companies be kept at 
the principal place of business of the company. At all 
reasonable times such books were to be open for inspection by 
any shareholder of the company. The Companies Clauses 
Consolidation Act of 1845 contained a similar provision, so 
did the 1862 Companies Act.96 By 1908, the inspection of 
company books by shareholders was no longer automatic.97 This 
1908 provision was retained in the subsequent Companies Acts 
of 1929 and 1948. Because of the confidential nature of the 
banking business, the availability of its records to all
94 See Parker (1980) for a review of the debate at the
time.
95 In 1855, the privilege of limited liability was added 
to the other benefits which are commonly associated with the 
attainment of separate corporate personality. This was not 
however extended to banks until 1858.
96 Parker, 1990, p. 61.
97 "The directors shall from time to time determine 
whether and to what extent and at what times and places and 
under what conditions or regulations the accounts and books of 
the company or any of them shall be open to the inspection of 
members not being directors, and no member (not being a 
director) shall have any right of inspecting any account or 
book or document of the company except as conferred by statute 
or authorised by the directors or by the company in general 
meeting" (Section 105) .
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shareholders is not always desirable. The deeds of settlements 
of such banks, often for the above reason, did not normally 
allow the inspection of the company books by all 
shareholders.98
Apart from the above regulation of bank accounts (and 
regulation through bank accounts) , formal legislation 
regarding the registration, regulation and activities of the 
banking system in the United Kingdom is a recent day 
phenomenon.99 Although the Bank of England Act of 1946100 
conferred on the Bank of England, the powers to define a 
'banker' and authorised the Treasury to issue directions to 
such parties, no such definition or directions were ever 
issued. A bank remained legally undefined with no prescribed 
legal requirement for the setting up of depository
98 Parker, 1990, p. 62.
99 Before the 1979 Banking Act in the United Kingdom, 
there were no specific legal requirements governing the 
setting up of banks in the United Kingdom. There was also no 
legal definition of a bank in the United Kingdom.
100 The nationalisation of the BOE under the BOE Act of 
194 6 brought a formal change in the stature of the Bank. The 
Bank had however, for a long time, regarded its responsibility 
and duty as directed to the national interest and always 
subject to the ultimate authority of Government. Also, 
although the Act provided a statutory basis for the exercise 
of authority over banks, the Bank in practice has continued to 
exercise its authority in this field without any radical 
change in its modus operandi which rests on the long 
established custom and use in acting as central bank and 
controlling money markets. For a long time, the Bank has 
accepted responsibility for the soundness of the financial 
system in Britain. This responsibility developed out of the 
19th century banking crisis. The successful handling of the 
crisis by the Bank demonstrated that it was not necessary to 
have statutory powers in order to make regulation effective 
(BOE, Sept 1978. p.380).
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institutions.101 Other legislation of the time however gave 
some guidance as to which institutions were generally 
perceived as banks by the authorities. For instance, the 
Exchange Control Act of 1947 provided a list of authorised 
banks permitted to deal in foreign exchange. Also, the 
Companies Act of 1948 authorised the Board of Trade to exempt 
banking companies from the obligation to publish accounts in 
full (schedule 8 banks). In other words, they were allowed to 
maintain secret reserves. The criteria for being a schedule 8 
bank were largely subjective. The status was usually offered 
where the Bank of England believed that the bank in question 
would be an acceptable member of the recognised banking 
community.102 It was therefore only banks in these two 
categories, sometimes partly overlapping, that the Bank of 
England maintained regular contact with.103 Such supervision 
was based on custom and acceptance rather than legal authority 
under the Bank of England Act.104 Depository institutions not 
recognised under the Exchange Control Act and the 1948 
Companies Act (fringe banks), were thus outside the scope of 
banking regulation.
101 Norton, 1991, p. 11.
102 Grady and Weale, 1986, P.36.
103 At the time, the British banking system was dominated 
by a cartelized oligopoly consisting of the London Clearing 
Banks and their associates in Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
Together they held 85% of all commercial banking businesses in 
sterling- domestic and foreign. The absence of effective 
supervision over the fringe banks was partly because it was 
wrongly supposed, in Bank of England circles at the time, that 
these institutions would be absorbed by the primary banks 
(BOE, Sept 1983, pp.363-365).
104 Norton, 1991, p. 11.
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In most British Colonies, where British laws were almost 
always transcribed, there was no legal check to the 
establishment of indigenous banks. Unlike in the United 
Kingdom, where the Bank of England at least had the choice, if 
they so wished, to establish contact with the fringe banks, 
there was no such central bank in place in most of the 
colonies. The belief, among the Africans, that the colonial 
banks and indeed the entire colonial structures discriminated 
against them led to widespread mistrust of colonial 
initiatives, thus further reducing the chances of success for 
any informal kind of regulation either from London or from any 
kind of colonial structure within the colonies. It was 
therefore difficult for the United Kingdom to transcribe its 
informal model of regulation to the colonies. Furthermore, the 
Bank of England apparently transcribed its philosophy of 
maintaining contact with only 'club members' to the colonies. 
With most of the indigenous banks too small, in all respects, 
to achieve 'club membership', the Bank of England did little 
to encourage informal regulatory contact with such banks.
Because of the relatively late development of formal 
banking regulation in the United Kingdom, the Colonial 
Government had no ready 'technology' to transfer in the 1940s, 
when they considered regulation for the banking system of 
colonial Nigeria to have become necessary.105 The Colonial
105 It would be foolish to impose the same system of 
banking supervision on countries with diverse banking 
structures. Compare for instance, the UK and the USA: the
former is a small integrated country with fewer than ten large 
domestic banks all with large branch networks and a large 
number of relatively small merchant banks. The USA, on the 
other hand, has a federal structure and contains 14000 deposit
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Government therefore had to take a cue from the banking 
regulation developments at the time in other British Colonies 
especially, India and Pakistan.106
2.6 Conclusion
In subsequent chapters of this thesis an attempt will be 
made to explain the various banking developments in pre- 
independence Nigeria, in the context of the above theoretical 
exposition.
banks all of them confined to particular states or smaller 
areas (Blunden, 1977, p.326).
106 The diffusion of banking regulations and practices 
from these colonies into the Nigerian banking arena will 
become clearer later.
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CHAPTER THREE
FOREIGN BANKING OPERATIONS IN COLONIAL NIGERIA
3.1 Introduction
With the emergence of colonial rule in Nigeria, the
British soon put in place an economic and political system for 
the smooth functioning of this territory. The Colonial
Government then went on to demonetise certain coins then in 
circulation in an attempt to make British coins more 
prominent. By 1880, for instance, formal legislation had been 
put in place in the Lagos colony which provided for the
demonetisation of certain coins. The new regulation recognised 
only British gold and silver coins and a few foreign gold 
coins as legal tender.1
The resultant rise in the use of British coins was
however not without its problems: such coins had to be
transported from London to the West African Coast and then 
carried manually inland. The cost of this transfer was not 
only the transport costs. There were also interest charges 
building up in London even while the coins were in transit and 
also during slack trading periods when the coins were stored 
locally in safes. The predilection of the Africans for silver 
coins did not help matters either as this necessitated the 
regular reordering of the coin stock for the colony.2 The
1 Ekundare, 1973, p.84.
2 It was not unusual, at the time, for such coins to be 
melted for use as jewellery (See Newlyn and Rowan, 1954, 
p.27) .
58
above situation created the opportunity for the establishment 
of some institution like a bank which would reduce the cost of 
importing and distributing the silver coins as well as taking 
them off the hands of the traders during slack trading 
periods.3
This opportunity was first identified in 1871 when the 
Bank of West Africa was incorporated4 in London under the 
Joint Stock Companies Act of 1862 and 1867.5 The bank whose 
head office was located in London was to have its first two 
branches located in Sierra Leone and Lagos. The banks 
prospectus specifically dealt with the need for and prospects 
of such an institution. According to the prospectus:
The establishment of a Bank on the West Coast of 
Africa has long been felt as the only means of 
increasing European commerce and encouraging 
commercial intercourse with the Continent of Africa, 
as well as the only method of introducing additional 
Capital, the want of which is one of the greatest 
obstacles to the progress of the West African Trade, 
and to the development of its immense agricultural 
wealth, while the rapid increase in the commercial 
relations between Great Britain and West Africa, and 
the considerable investment of English capital 
there, as well as the vastly augmented means of 
communication by steam, demand the establishment of 
corresponding financial facilities, more especially 
the introduction of an efficient system of 
Banking.6
3 Fry, 1976, p.10.
4 There appears to be no connection between this bank and 
the Bank of British West Africa which was established later 
on. To the best of my knowledge, this attempt, in 1871, to 
establish a bank in the West African colony has remained 
undocumented in Nigerian banking history.
5 London Guildhall Library, Archive Division (MS 28528) .
6 MS 28528.
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On the profitability of such an institution, the prospectus 
went on to contend that:
NO country at the present day offers a better 
opportunity for establishing a highly profitable 
Banking business than the British West African 
Colonies, where the benefits of a Bank are wholly 
wanting, and the facilities of trade are restricted 
to a few large merchants whose interests are 
naturally adverse to each other but who will gladly 
avail themselves to its advantages when established. 
It is moreover certain that many English Merchants 
have only been deterred from trading with the West 
Coast of Africa by the difficulty which exists of 
obtaining reliable information as to the commercial 
standing of the native and other traders. This 
difficulty once removed, the trader of West Africa 
would be brought into direct communication with our 
home merchants through the medium of the Bank, and 
an immense increase of trade must result by which 
the Bank will necessarily profit largely.7
Despite the above detailed analysis of the opportunities 
existing for a banker in the West African Coast, there is no 
evidence that the bank ever opened for business.8 It was not 
until 1891 that another party capitalized on this opportunity 
thus marking the advent of both commercial banking and foreign 
banks into the Nigerian colony.
This chapter attempts an analysis of the rise of colonial 
banks in pre-independence Nigeria. Emphasis is placed on the 
various forces that impacted on their development and
7 Ibid.
8 Several letters from the Registrar of Joint Stock 
Companies inquiring whether the company was carrying on 
business or in operation were never replied to. The company 
was subsequently dissolved by notice in a London Gazette dated 
5th June 1888- Public Records Office-Board of Trade (PRO/BT 
31/2736) .
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policies. There were, sometimes, conflicts of interests 
amongst colonial banks and even with the Colonial Government. 
It is, for instance, argued that although the Bank of Nigeria 
was set up to prevent the advancement of credits to Africans, 
the Bank of British West Africa (BBWA)9 strove to do so. It 
was however discouraged from doing so by the Colonial 
Government, which perceived the Africans as un-credit worthy. 
Had the BBWA been encouraged to carry out its proposal, a 
credit system adapted to the African environment might have 
been established. This would have expanded the trade done by 
the Africans. It would also have given more Africans the 
opportunity to learn about the rules of bank credit. To 
achieve its aim, this chapter is divided into eight parts, 
including this introductory section. Part two traces the 
origins of the African Banking Corporation which later 
metamorphosed into the BBWA while part three analyses the 
impact of seigniorage, arising from the use of British coins 
in the West African Colony, on the pre-independence banking 
system. Part four traces the origins of the Bank of Nigeria, 
its policies and the events that led to its absorption by the 
BBWA while part five deals with the foreign banks that were 
subsequently established in pre-independence Nigeria. Part six 
analyses the underlying interests that influenced the 
behaviour of the various parties in the pre-independence 
Nigerian banking arena while part seven examines how the 
Africans acquired the image of being un-credit worthy. Part 
eight concludes the chapter.
9 The name was changed to Bank of West Africa in 1957.
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3.2 The African Banking Corporation
The moving force behind the establishment of the African 
Banking Corporation was Mr George William Naville. He was the 
Lagos Manager of the Elder Dempster Company, which was then in 
control of the shipping business in the West African Coast and 
therefore heavily involved in the importation of British coins 
into the colony. With the support of the chairman of his 
company, Sir Alfred Lewis Jones, he convinced the African 
Banking Corporation10 to open an office in Lagos in 1891. Mr 
Naville was appointed its first agent.11 This marked the 
beginning of both commercial banking and foreign banks in 
Nigeria. The bank immediately took advantage of the disorderly 
system of currency supply to the West African territory. By 
January 28th 1892, it signed an agreement with the Crown 
Agents by which the bank was given the right to import new 
silver coins from the mint into Lagos colony free of charges 
for packing, freight and insurance.12 By May 1892, the bank 
further consolidated its position by becoming banker to the 
Colonial Government in Lagos.13 The gains of the bank did not 
go down well with other European traders in the West African 
territory. Protests from these European traders soon flooded
10 Established in 1890 as a British Limited Company based 
in London, primarily to carry out banking business in South 
Africa. The bank was taken over by the Standard Bank of South 
Africa in 1921 (MS 28816).
11 Agreement dated 5th October 1891 (MS 28538).
12 Under this agreement, other interested parties were 
still free to order new coins from the mint with the Crown 
Agents approval but they had to pay a premium of 1%.
13 Fry, 1976, p.20.
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the Colonial Office claiming that its Lagos Manager had an 
undue advantage by virtue of the fact that he was a banker, 
shipper and trader.14 Also within the bank's first year of 
operation, Lagos was hit by a trade recession caused by a 
local conflict between two rival tribes- the Ijebus and the 
Egbas. This hampered trade by making the movements of persons 
and goods very risky.15 It was the combination of the above 
factors that led the African Banking Corporation to develop 
second thoughts about their Nigerian investment. They 
subsequently invited Elder Dempster Company to take over the 
Lagos operations of the bank. Elder Dempster obliged and on 
the 31st March 1893, they took over the business of the 
African Banking Corporation.
The Elder Dempster Company instantly lost its 
preferential treatment over the importation of silver and the 
Governor of Lagos was soon instructed to close the official 
account with the bank.16 The reason given was that the 
Colonial Government wanted such functions to be carried out by 
a public bank and not a trading company like Elder Dempster. 
Perhaps because of the initial protests received, the Colonial 
Government also required that such an institution should be 
absolutely independent and restricted from engaging in any 
business other than that of banking.17
14 Okigbo, 1981, p. 78.
15 Ibid.
16 Fry, 1976, p.23.
17 Evidence of Leslie Couper before the Royal Commission 
on Shipping Rings (1909, q.9117).
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To get around this problem, a 'public' bank named Bank of 
British West Africa was established in May 1894.18 Soon after, 
the 'new' bank entered into an agreement with the Crown Agents 
of the Colonies under which the duties and responsibilities of 
controlling and regulating the silver currency in Lagos were 
transferred from the Government to the bank. This new 
agreement was slightly different from that which the 
Government had with the African Banking Corporation in that it 
conferred on the bank the sole right of silver import. The 
bank swiftly consolidated its hold on the British West African 
territories by entering into similar agreements with the 
Governments of the Gold Coast Colony in 1896, Sierra Leone in 
1898 and the Gambia in 1902.19
The bank enjoyed the privilege of being the sole agents 
for the importation of silver until 1912 when a special silver 
currency was introduced for the West African colony.20 This 
in itself was mainly as a consequence of the disagreements 
over the control, sharing and nature of the seigniorage21 
arising from the importation of silver into the British West
18 The majority shareholder was Sir Alfred Jones. Of the 
3000 shares issued and paid up at the beginning of the bank, 
Jones took up 1733 shares (Fry, 1976, p.26).
19 Evidence of Mr Leslie Couper before the Shipping Rings 
Commission (1907, q.9117).
20 The bank however secured the agency of the currency 
board in West Africa. In this capacity, it continued to deal 
with the movement of British money in West Africa, though 
relieved of control over the supply of it from the mint 
(Milne, 1914, p.48).
21Seigniorage is the profit Governments make from issuing 
coins at a face value higher than the metals intrinsic worth. 
It is the difference between the bullion price and the face 
value of the coins made from it (Rosenberg, 1985, pp.595-6).
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African Colonies.
3.3 The Influence of Seigniorage
The advent of banking, entwined with formal colonisation 
of Nigeria by the British, continued to advance the 
monetisation of the economy and the rapid replacement of the 
other forms of currency by sterling. An expanding volume of 
trade ensured the continued absorbtion of British silver into 
the British West African colonies. These imports, coupled with 
the prospects of further future increases, soon enticed some 
Colonial Governors to suggest that their colonies be allowed 
to share in the profits accruing to the Imperial Treasury from 
the issue of such silver coins in the colonies. On August 4, 
1897, for instance, Sir Harry McCallum, the then Governor of 
Lagos, made his views known on this subject. In a letter to 
the Colonial Office, he asserted that:
16. The Acting Treasurer informs me that, from 
enquiries made by him, the annual absorbtion of 
silver coins in this colony can be taken roughly to 
amount at present to £80,000. A large proportion of 
the coins imported find their way into the interior 
in the way of trade and never reappear. Some are 
buried, some are melted down for jewellery, 
bangles,etc.
17. As these coins are the same in weight and 
fineness as when the market price of silver was 60 
pence per ounce, it does not require any close 
calculation to see what a large annual profit is 
being derived by Her Majesty's Mint by their 
manufacturing this silver for local absorbtion when 
the market price stands at 28 pence.
18. I respectfully claim on behalf of this colony 
that we should at least be allowed to participate in 
this profit.22
22 Quoted in Newlyn and Rowan (1954, p.27)
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The Treasury however did not approve of the above proposal. In 
reply to enquiries about the possibility of sharing 
seigniorage with the colonies, it was asserted that:
My Lords do not view with favour the proposal to 
take advantage of the predilection of African 
natives for silver coins as a means of passing on 
unlimited quantities of imperial tokens into that 
continent. Experience has shown that the possibility 
of ultimate return of such coins to this country is 
by no means remote, as is suggested in the letter 
under reply. They could not view the contingency 
without apprehension as to the effect which might be 
produced upon the currency, and even, it might be, 
upon the finances of the United Kingdom. They are 
not disposed to encourage an undertaking fraught 
with such possibilities of danger out of regard 
either to the immediate profit, with its 
corresponding liability, which would accrue to the 
Imperial Government, or to the share of profit, 
without any corresponding share of liability, which 
is claimed for Colonial Governments. Small as is the 
claim of latter Governments to participate in the 
profit on coinage supplied for their own use, they 
would have a still smaller claim to derive any 
profit from coins which they merely imported for 
transmission to other parts.23
It was therefore concluded that:
If it is desired to obtain for the Colonies and 
Protectorates a revenue from coinage, that end can, 
in the opinion of this Board, be secured only by 
adopting a token coinage of their own. To that 
course, my Lords would have no serious objection to 
offer, though, in view of its being adopted 
primarily for the purposes of revenue, they think 
great care would need to be exercised to restrain 
the several Governments from the temptation to 
overissue, with its consequent dangers in their 
commerce and to their finances.24
It was under the above circumstances that Mr Joseph
23 Ibid, p. 29.
24 Ibid.
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Chamberlain, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
appointed a Committee under the headship of Sir David Barbour, 
in 1899, "to collect information and report on the currency of 
the British West African possessions". The Bank of British 
West Africa followed the proceedings of the Barbour Commission 
closely. In fact, Sir Alfred Jones gave evidence in favour of 
maintaining the existing status quo. He also convinced the 
Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to submit to the Colonial Office 
that the introduction of a special colonial currency would 
harm trade.25 Any change in the existing currency status quo 
in the colony, it was believed, would adversely affect BBWA. 
Any decision in favour of a special colonial silver currency 
would indeed have involved the appointment of a supervisory 
board. This, it was presumed, would have ended the bank's 
silver import monopoly.
Barbour subsequently contended that a special currency 
for the West African Colonies was indeed practicable and had 
several attractions. Given the preference of the merchants for 
the maintenance of the status quo, his report refused to 
recommend the introduction of a new coinage. Instead he 
advised that the Treasury should release half of the profits 
accruing from the issue of silver to the colonies.26 As 
efforts were being made to reconcile the views of the Treasury 
with those of the Colonies, silver imports, which were
25 Fry, 1976, p.39.
26 Though this report was never published, it contents and 
recommendations were at the time widely known. See for 
instance, Emmott Report (1912, p. 5) and Newlyn and Rowan 
(1954, p.30).
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£360,220 in 1900, dropped to £154,730 in 1901.27 This dramatic 
drop questioned the colonies argument that there was no 
likelihood of a relapse in the demand for these currencies. 
This was perhaps one of the main reasons why the Government 
decided to shelve the Barbour Report. It neither introduced a 
new silver coinage nor allowed the colonies to share from the 
seigniorage. The BBWA therefore, continued to enjoy its 
monopoly of silver importation into the territories.
The matter was not however put to rest as the silver 
imports into the West African colonies continued to expand 
rapidly despite occasional fluctuations. In 1906, for 
instance, £506,600 worth of silver was imported into the 
British West African territories while £669,600 worth was 
imported in 19 0 9 . 28 Apart from the pressures from the 
Government in the colonies for the issue to be opened again, 
the Treasury was sufficiently worried about the increasing 
dangers of the system to monetary control in Britain.29 The 
increase in the silver exported to the colony was not just
27 Table 1.
28 Table I.
29 Armitage-Smith, an official of the Imperial Treasury 
once asserted that "From the point of view of the Imperial 
Government, I can only say that in my judgement the sooner the 
change from sterling to local silver currency is made the 
better. I regard the contingent liability connected with a
coinage which is not, strictly speaking, a token coinage,
because it is not submitted to a limit of legal tender, and
which is being absorbed at such an enormous pace by a semi- 
civilised community, as a distinct danger to our currency 
arrangements, and I think that if the interests of the
Imperial Government alone were concerned, so far from forcing 
sterling on the Colonies I should be inclined to move for 
substituting a local system" (Emmott Commission minutes of 
evidence, 1912, q.195).
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rising in absolute terms. It was also rising relative to the 
total amount of sterling silver in circulation in the United 
Kingdom. For instance, in the five years ending with 1890, the 
sterling silver imported into British West Africa was equal, 
on the average, to about 2.7% of the sterling silver placed 
in circulation in the United Kingdom. In the period 1906 - 
1910, this proportion had risen to about 85%.30 Further 
increase in this proportion was anticipated by the Colonial 
Government based at the time on the continued substitution of 
barter by cash transactions, the opening up of vast tracts of 
country still underdeveloped and its attendant increase in 
trade.31 The above factors subsequently led to the appointment 
of another commission, headed by Lord Emmott, to reexamine the 
matter in 1912.32 Despite the preference of the commercial 
community for the silver import system,33 the Treasury had 
their way and the Emmott Commission recommended the 
establishment of a special silver currency for the West 
African Colony, with a caution on the use of seigniorage.34
30 Computed from Table 2.
31 Emmott Report (1912, p.7).
32 Their terms of reference were "To inquire and to report 
as to the desirability of introducing into West Africa a 
special silver coinage common to the five British West African 
administrations, and also add to the desirability of 
establishing a joint issue of currency notes in the same 
territories, and to advise upon the measures necessary for the 
regulation of the special coinage if introduced or for the 
better regulation of existing currency in the event of a 
special coinage not being adopted".
33 Emmott Report, 1912, p. 8.
34 According to the Emmott Report, "after making every 
deduction for cost of coinage and for incidental expenses, 
there will, of course, be a very large "profit" representing
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A west African Currency Board was subsequently set up bringing 
to an end the BBWA7 s monopoly over silver imports into the 
territory. Long before then, in 1899, the Bank of British West 
Africa lost its monopoly on operating in the Nigerian Colony 
with the advent of the Bank of Nigeria.35
3.4 The Bank of Nigeria
By the time the Niger Coast Protectorate came into 
existence in 1893, there was already in existence a community 
of powerful European traders in the territory. At the time 
these European traders had put in place a working agreement 
for the purpose of stifling competition, cutting down their 
costs, maximising profits and reducing to a uniform amount the 
prices paid for their commodities.36 To forestall the BBWA
the difference between the bullion and face value of silver 
currency supplied to British West Africa. That country has 
absorbed over 6 1/2 million pounds (face value) in silver coin 
during the past 26 years and the absorbtion may be expected to 
continue even if not at the same rate. For many years to come 
the profit on supplying additional silver and on substituting 
local silver for silver of the United Kingdom now in 
circulation should be placed to reserve in order to meet any 
possible demand for redemption. It would be premature to 
express an opinion as to the probability that it will be safe 
and practicable at some date hereafter to use any subsequently 
accruing profit for administrative purposes. But we think that 
at a comparatively early date the interest earned by the 
reserve might be so used" (p.8-9).
35 Named Anglo- African Bank when it was established. The 
name was subsequently changed to Bank of Nigeria in 1905.
36 In a letter to the Colonial Office, Sir Ralph Moor 
suggested that "The firms of African Association, Messrs. 
Miller Brothers and Co.and the Niger Company, have at present 
a working understanding. This arrangement, though not 
amounting to a division of profit, is a guarantee that these 
firms respect the interests of one another and do not 
interfere with one another's existing trade. Any enterprise 
in opening up would require by the agreement to be undertaken 
jointly and no one of these firms can move alone. Further, the
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from gaining a foothold in their territory they set up the 
Anglo African Bank37 in 1899 and made a strong bid for the job 
of importing silver into the colony and for the banking 
business of the Government.38 The Colonial Office obviously 
knew that this bank would be of little assistance in the task 
of establishing the British currency in the colony. This was 
so since the companies behind the bank believed that the 
maintenance of the barter system best served their interest.39 
Such an attitude was against the interest of the Colonial 
Government which was pro- monetisation. Monetisation, it was
African Association and Messrs Miller Bros, and Co., who have 
rival trading establishments in all centres of trade in these 
territories, have a working agreement which includes other 
rival firms established at such centres as to the proportion 
of trade to be done by the representatives of each. In 
consequence of this latter agreement, there is a handing over 
of produce when the monthly proportionate division takes 
place. This system is of course a deadly one to the 
development of any enterprise in the territories and tends to 
a cutting off of prices in payments made to the producers" 
(PRO CO/520/15, Moor to C.O., 26th Sept. 1902).
37 Ofonagoro, 1979, p.376.
38 The close link between the bank and the three leading 
European Companies in Southern Nigeria could be seen from its 
interlocking directorships. According to Sir Ralph Moor "it 
will be observed from the prospectus of the Anglo African 
Banking Corporation that while their head offices are n 
London, in Suffolk Street, Strand, near to the offices of the 
Niger Company, there are agencies of the bank in Liverpool and 
Glasgow which are the offices of the African Association and 
Messrs. Miller Brothers and Co., respectively. There can be 
little doubt that nearly the whole interest of the Anglo- 
African Bank is in the hands of the three firms mentioned. The 
directors of the bank represent in England that they are 
anxious to undertake all legitimate banking business and to 
assist in the development of the territories. The directors of 
the three firms in question make the same representations, the 
Bodies representing the bank and the trading companies being 
identical" (PRO CO/580/15, Moor to the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, 26th September 1902).
39 PRO CO/520/8, The Butler Memorandum dated 9th September 
1901, Part A.
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believed, would make both governance and the lives of 
Government employees easier.40 The Bank of Nigeria was 
therefore ruled out and the Colonial Government then 
considered two other options: set up its own bank41 or invite 
an established bank in British West Africa to establish in 
Southern Nigeria. The Government opted for the latter. BBWA, 
which was the obvious choice, was however not very keen to 
accept this offer. Officially Alfred Jones, who for practical 
purposes was the Bank of British West Africa, argued that it 
was not possible to open a branch of his bank in Southern 
Nigeria except at an initial loss which he was not prepared to 
face.42 His main fear may however have been the possible 
repercussions that may befall both the bank and the other 
interests of Elder Dempster should they cross the path of the 
powerful European cartel then operating in Southern Nigeria.43 
These firms at the time practically had the whole of the trade 
of Southern Nigeria in their hands and were apparently 
resolved to prevent, by every means in their power, the 
establishment of a bank there for the fear that the banking
40 "The Niger Company does not do any cash trade, and I 
have had considerable difficulty in arranging for Government 
employees and soldiers who are paid in cash to purchase 
necessaries and requirements at the company's factories for 
cash" (PRO CO/520/1. Sir Ralph Moor to Alfred Jones, January 
30 1901).
41 It was at the time proposed that a Government Savings 
Bank be established. Such a bank was to encourage thrift among 
the African population. A monopoly of the import and issue of 
British silver currency and Government patronage for such a 
bank, it was argued, was sufficient to make such a bank viable 
-Moor to C.O., September 26 1902 (PRO CO/520/15).
42 PRO CO/520/8, p. 280.
43 Ibid.
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facilities would, in the course of time, liberate the native 
traders from the barter system under which the firms benefited 
immensely.44 In fact the expected line of action dreaded most 
by Elder Dempster, should they set up their bank in Southern 
Nigeria, was the possibility that these European firms would 
retaliate by establishing an independent line of steamers to 
West Africa which would have the effect of breaking the 
monopoly enjoyed by Messrs Elder Dempster & Company's line of 
steamers.45 The above view was also deduced from the meeting 
between Alfred Jones and Ralph Moor in England. Mr Butler in 
his report of the meeting concluded that:
it was quite clear that Sir A Jones is not prepared 
to defy the powerful combination of firms which at 
present practically monopolise the trade of So. 
Nig., and to whom the Anglo African Bank belongs, by 
establishing a branch of the Bank of B.W.A. in 
Nigeria. It was equally clear that, if he dare defy 
them, or were forced into open warfare with them in 
other directions, he would gladly open a branch of 
his bank in Nigeria under an agreement identical 
with that which he holds in the West African 
Colonies. Nothing therefore, can be hoped from the 
Bank of B.W.A. at present, unless Sir A Jones ceases 
to fear the combination of the Niger Co., the 
African Association and Messrs Alexander Miller 
Bros, and Co., or unless his activities in other 
directions or a difference of opinion as to shipping 
arrangements or freights lead to hostilities between 
him and the combination.46
The Colonial Government clearly was in a dilemma: the existing 
bank in the territory had no interest whatsoever in monetising
44 PRO CO 520/10.
45 PRO CO 520/10, P. 521.
46 Quoted in Ofonagoro, 1979, p.388.
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the economy while the BBWA feared reprisals from the powerful 
European merchants should they establish in the territory. The 
territorial Governor also realised that the monetisation of 
Southern Nigeria could not effectively take place without the 
co-operation of the powerful merchants.47 He thus urged Alfred 
Jones to come to an agreement with the commercial community.48 
This was not to be, at least not immediately, as the two banks 
had different agendas. It was not until 1903 that the BBWA 
accepted an invitation to become bankers to the Colonial 
Government and to have the sole right of importing silver into 
Southern Nigeria.49 This was done, perhaps, with some form of 
guarantee by the Colonial Government against possible 
reprisals from the powerful European merchants in the 
territory.
The fact that the Bank of British West Africa afforded 
facilities to native traders thus rendering them independent 
of the large European trading firms greatly offended the
47 "At present, a cash system cannot be effectively 
introduced unless supported by the commercial community, for 
the firms trading here can always refuse to do a cash trade 
with the natives.... I should suggest that if possible, your 
bank come to some arrangement with the commercial community as 
represented by the firms mentioned on the lines of giving them 
some interest in the banking business- otherwise, I fear such 
business will only struggle along under difficulties" (PRO 
CO/520/l, Sir Ralph Moor to Alfred Jones, January 30 1901).
48 "..the wisest course would be for the BBWA to absorb 
the Anglo-African Bank by passing over to the share-holders of 
it such reasonable interest in the concern as would be 
represented by the capital which they propose to subscribe" - 
Moor to C.O., January 31, 1900 (PRO CO/520/1).
49 Ofonagoro, 1979, p.389.
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powerful European community.50 This was not surprising since 
credit to the Africans was, at the time, a sore point for some 
of these powerful European merchants.51 This was also one of 
its greatest undoing as the Colonial Office would have nothing 
to do with anything that stood in the way of the rapid 
monetisation of the territory. For instance Montagu Ommanney, 
then a Permanent Under Secretary in the Colonial Office, 
concluded that:
So long as this spirit animates the Anglo African 
Bank, the less the Government had to do with it the 
better.52
The firm's 'report card' in its early days of operation did 
not help matters either. Moor in 1902 noted that:
the agents of the firms referred to out here watch 
the transactions of the bank with great care and are 
prepared to oppose it should any action be taken 
that would amount to the encouragement of any 
competition in trade. I am aware that the 
representative of the bank has already experienced 
such opposition and is subsequently unable to assist 
the natives in becoming shippers of produce or to 
encourage them in any way that would bring them into 
competition with the Europeans.53
He went on to assert that:
The representative of the bank contends that were he 
given the exclusive right of shipping coins to the 
Protectorate and the Government banking account, he
50 PRO CO/466/30 Minute by Sir Montagu Ommanney, April 1
1903.
51 This will be discussed later in section 7 of this 
chapter.
52 PRO CO 446/30, April 1 1903.
53 PRO CO/520/15, Moor to CO, 26th September, 1902.
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would be in a position to disregard the opposition 
of the European agents and be prepared to carry out 
all legitimate banking business. In this view he is 
no doubt accurate and I have no grounds for doubting 
hiss good faith in the matter. He is however bound 
by the policy of his Directors, and I must candidly 
admit I think it likely that the bank will be used 
in preventing competition when I call to mind the 
admission of at least one of its Directors made to 
me personally in the presence of the Board, when the 
Bank was inaugurated, to the effect that its 
initiation was with the interest to protect the 
existing trade interests of the firms that started 
it.54
Moor also claimed that when he chided the bank's local manager
for not encouraging the native traders, he (the manager)
replied that:
I am ordered from home to carry on a legitimate 
banking business but I can not do it; it is 
impossible for me to do it , because if I do it, the 
agents out here will not come to me; if I were to 
make advances to the natives, very well, they will 
not take their cash from me and I shall lose all 
their business.55
He then concluded that the bank was formed by the Miller 
Brothers, Niger Company and African association with:
-there was no blinking the question-with the 
specific object of protecting their own trade and 
preventing any other bank coming in to the area 
where they carried on trade, and fostering rivals 
and assisting rivals in their area.56
The above criticisms of the bank were partly dismissed and 
partly explained by Mr Clifford Edgar, then one of the bank's 
directors. He claimed that Moor's assertion that the bank did
54 Ibid.
55 Shipping Rings Commission p.257-8.
56 Shipping Rings Commission, p.257.
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not grant banking facilities to Africans was baseless since 
more than 400 accounts representing 75% of the total accounts 
of the bank were operated by coloured people. He however 
admitted that the bank was less forthcoming in granting of 
credits to Africans. This he explained was due to the 
provisions of the Recovery of Credits Proclamation of 1900 
which contains the clause:
No court of law in the territory of Southern Nigeria 
shall enforce against a native any obligation 
incurred by him towards any person not being a 
native of Southern Nigeria in respect of a 
commercial transaction so far as it may be based on 
credit.57
This however was certainly not the main reason. The year 
before the above proclamation was made, a key figure in the 
group that later formed the bank, Mr A Miller, made it clear 
that there were other reasons why they did not support the 
granting of loans to Africans. Excerpts of Miller's evidence 
before the Barbour Commission are as follows:
Do you find the system of Barter on the river 
districts suit you, or would you prefer to carry on 
your business by means of cash transactions?- 
Certainly, I prefer it as it is- that is barter.
I suppose you prefer it because it is more 
profitable?- Well, put it this way, we fear that if 
it was the Silver currency it would be less 
profitable.
Well that is the same thing; you think if you used 
silver, the trade would be less profitable?- Yes I 
think it would. That is my reason. It has been 
barter for many many years, century after century,
57 Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, p.417.
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and it answers very well. I quite understand that 
that cannot go on always. It is a very slow 
civilisation on the Niger territories.
Do you consider that the establishment of the Bank 
of British West Africa has been of general advantage 
to the trade of the Colonies?- I should not like to 
say that at all.
You do not think so?- No, I do not think it is an 
advantage to the trade. I think it is the other way. 
In Lagos, for instance, it has played a lot of 
mischief by giving these irresponsible natives 
facilities.
You would advocate that the Bank should only give 
facilities to certain individuals?- They come to 
trade, these natives; they get advances on produce; 
they have made a great deal of trouble in Lagos. We 
do not find that so much on the Gold Coast. It is an 
advantage so far as the real banking business is 
concerned.
You would not propose that your bank at Old Calabar 
should make advances to native traders against 
produce; is not that a legitimate operation?- I do 
not know what my other colleagues' views are. I, 
personally, am very much against it. We might be 
driven to it for self-protection.
Does the Bank of British West Africa engage in 
operations which, in your opinion, are not bona fide 
banking operations?- They give advances and
facilities to native traders.
Just as they do to European traders?- Yes. I know 
that I should get no facilities from them against 
produce.
Is it not merely a question of the bank's capacity 
of forming an opinion of its relative credit of 
customers?- I do not think they could form an
opinion so well as we could; they do not know the
natives as well as we do.
You state that the Bank of British West Africa has 
been in the habit of making advances to
irresponsible people; you think that is detrimental 
to you?- Yes I do.
Do you mean to your own trade or to the trade of the 
colony generally?- To the trade of the colony 
generally. It is not a wise thing.
The result of making these advances is, I presume, 
to enable traders to compete with other traders?- I
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do not know.
Is the result to cut down prices?- I do not think 
it.
What are the effects?- I have been told that the 
bank in Lagos has been responsible for a great deal 
of the breakdown of business there; a great many 
people had to leave it. I am only speaking from 
heresay.
...do you know that the bank is making advances to 
men who, as a matter of fact, do not repay this 
money?- I could not say that, but I know the result 
of it. These people get money, and begin in trade, 
and order things here, and go on for a year or two, 
and then it ends in the Bankruptcy Court.
In the Niger Coast Protectorate, where you would 
have this bank, you would not adopt this system of 
making advances to the natives?- Not with my 
approval; if they were responsible persons, we would 
not mind.
If you had this bank, I presume you would expect to 
have an agreement which would practically prevent 
any other bank coming in on the same terms?- I do 
not know, I am sure. I would not like to say that. 
I could not speak for my colleagues. I do not think 
there would be room for two banks, but if another 
came, we might wind up. I do not think there would 
be room for two.58
His views were obviously taken seriously by the Colonial 
Government. Several years later, it re-echoed as a 
justification for not granting them monopoly over Silver 
import: a Colonial Government Official concluded that:
it is impossible not to remember, in this 
connection, the evidence given by Mr Miller before 
the committee which reported on the question of a 
local currency for W. Africa. He took strong 
objection to the establishment of the Bank of Br. W. 
Africa on the Ground that it afforded facilities to 
the native traders and so rendered them independent
58 Evidence before the Committee on the Currency of the 
West African Colonies - 1899 (Barbour Commission) . See PRO CO 
520/4, Folio 64-66.
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of the large European trading Houses.59
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Government refused to have 
anything to do with the Bank of Nigeria. What was rather 
surprising was the choice of the BBWA despite the fact that it 
arguably had the same monopolistic instincts as the Bank of 
Nigeria and that its ownership structure was extensively 
entwined with that of an established monopoly within the 
territory- the Elder Dempster Company. The bank's majority 
shareholder, Alfred Jones, was a monopolist for all intents 
and purposes. On Joining Elder Dempster as a Junior Partner in 
1879, his first aim was to:
monopolise the whole shipping trade of the West 
African ports and with this object, he absorbed 
competing lines, British or foreign including the 
British and African Steam Navigation Company.60
In accomplishing the above goals, he was more than 
successful.61 Despite the clarity of his business objective
59 PRO CO/446/30, Minutes by Sir Montagu Ommanney, 1st 
April 1903.
60 Dictionary of National Biography (1912, p.379).
61 Before the end of the 19th Century, he had organised 
the West African Shipping Lines Conference which controlled 
all the shipping trade in the British West African Colonies. 
Of the three co-operating lines in the conference, he managed 
two which, under the shipping agreement, monopolised the 
shipping trade between West Africa and the United Kingdom. The 
remaining service to the European Continent was shared with 
the third partner (Ofonagoro, 1979, p.372-373). An interesting 
scheme devised by the West African Shipping Line Conference to 
keep shippers in line was the introduction of the deferred 
rebate system. Under this scheme, shippers paid 10% in excess 
of actual freight charges. This excess was refunded only if 
the company shipped exclusively, for the following six months, 
through a member firm of the Shipping Conference (See evidence
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and the closeness of the BBWA to the Elder Dempster Company, 
the Colonial Government still preferred his bank to the Bank 
of Nigeria which they accused of lacking independence by 
virtue of its connections with the powerful trading combines, 
an offence the Bank of British West Africa was guilty of. The 
reason for this contradiction in policy may not have been 
unrelated to the close relationship that blossomed between 
Alfred Jones and Joseph Chamberlain, then Secretary of State 
for the Colonies.62 Also while the Colonial Government could 
tolerate monopoly when it was in its interest, they could not 
tolerate opposition to the monetisation of the Nigerian Colony 
mainly because it had the potential of hindering their 
operations in these colonies. In other words, the Colonial 
Government frowned at monopolies only when they contradicted 
their interest. This perhaps explains why there was no 
attempt, at the time, to enact an anti trust law to combat the 
'sins' of the powerful European merchants of Southern Nigeria.
Subsequent to the signing of the contract between the 
Government of Southern Nigeria and the BBWA, the Bank of 
Nigeria launched an offensive in an attempt to reverse the 
policy. The Shipping Rings Commission in 1907, for instance, 
provided the bank an avenue to protest against the activities
of George Miller before the Shipping Rings Commission, Q4295- 
4325) .
62 Alfred Jones "gave impressive support to Joseph 
Chamberlain's political campaign, even to the extent of taking 
time off from his business to campaign in person for 
Chamberlain in Cardiff" (Ofonagoro, 1979, p.381).
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of the BBWA and its associated companies.63 Also in May 1908, 
many of the West African merchants petitioned the new 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of Crewe, urging 
him to end the monopoly of the BBWA over the importation of 
silver.64 Concurrent with the protests were also moves to 
merge the two competing banks. From 1906, for instance, Alfred 
Jones had become very interested in a merger. He tried several 
times without success.65 In 1907 Lord Elgin, then the Colonial 
Secretary, also recommended that the two banks should 
amalgamate.66 It was not until 1912, three years after the 
death of Alfred Jones that the Bank of Nigeria was finally 
absorbed by the BBWA.67 The BBWA subsequently enjoyed an 
uninterrupted banking monopoly in the Nigerian colony until 
1916 when another foreign bank, the Colonial Bank, entered the
63 John Holt in his evidence before the Royal Commission 
on Shipping Rings claimed that the "The conference Liners may 
now therefore be regarded as a monopolistic trust embracing 
the business of ocean carriers, traders, bankers etc., with 
all other traders and even the local Governments as feeders 
and completely in their grip. It cannot be a healthy state of 
affairs for the interests of the community and the progress of 
West Africa"- Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, Minutes of 
Evidence (Q4823, April 30th 1907).
64 Petition dated 26th May 1908 (PRO CO/ 520/73/3502) .
65 Fry, 1976, p. 67.
66 Ibid.
67 The agreement provided for the winding up of the Bank 
of Nigeria and for the sale, to the BBWA, of the Goodwill and 
surplus assets over the liabilities of the Bank of Nigeria at 
a price of £63,000 payable in cash together with an option to 
subscribe and have allotted to the Bank of Nigeria or its 
approved nominees, 13,000 Shares of £10 each (£4 paid) in the 
BBWA at the price of £4. 16s. lid. per share. This was subject 
to the guarantee that the surplus assets of the Bank of 
Nigeria amounted to £63,000 in value (Bank of Nigeria Limited, 
Directors Report, Statement of Accounts and Notice of Meeting, 
28th May 1912).
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Nigerian banking arena.
3.5 Other Foreign Banks
The Colonial Bank was established under the Charter of 
June 1st 1836 which authorised it to carry on the "business of 
a Banker in Jamaica and other West India Islands and British 
Guiana, and not elsewhere."68 The restriction on its 
operational geography was removed in 1916 via an Act of 
Parliament.69 Early in 1917, the bank opened two branches in 
British West Africa, including one in Lagos, thus bringing to 
an end the monopoly of the BBWA in the Nigerian colony.70 The 
Colonial Bank soon discovered that West African conditions 
were entirely different from those it was accustomed to in the 
West Indies. For instance, agriculture in the West Indies at 
the time, was in the main conducted on plantation lines by 
persons and companies of European origin who also owned the 
land. In British West Africa, the situation was different: 
there was in general no European ownership of agricultural 
land and cultivation was in the hands of Africans who were 
mainly small scale farmers. Europeans in the West African 
economy were therefore involved mainly in the activity of
68 Barclays Bank, 1938, p.31.
69 Ibid, p. 59.
70 At the time the bank entered the banking arena in West 
Africa, it was of comparable size with the BBWA. For instance, 
the Colonial Bank had at the time an authorised capital of 
£2, 000, 000, of which £300,000 was paid up. It also had a 
reserve of £150,000 while the BBWA had an authorised capital 
of £2,000,000 out of which £560,000 was paid up. The bank's 
reserve was £220,000 (Fry, 1976, p.91).
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buying and selling.71 Also, unlike in the West Indies, where 
banking had an element of prestige and people had been 
familiar with banks and banking for several generations, 
social factors impeded such habits in West Africa. The keeping 
of money in banks in West Africa, for instance, often had the 
disadvantage of making its existence known to the depositor's 
family. This usually left the depositor vulnerable to their 
demands.72 It was the above factors entwined with the Colonial 
Government's perception of Africans as un-credit worthy73 that 
made the Colonial Bank direct its policies mainly towards 
meeting the needs of the European traders.74
The Colonial Bank soon started to compete for clients 
with the BBWA. Apart from winning new clients, it also took 
away clients from the BBWA and by 1919 the Governor of Nigeria 
ordered the equal division of silver coin between the two 
banks. Despite protests by the BBWA, the Colonial Office 
approved the action of the Nigerian Governor.75 The activities 
of the Colonial Bank no doubt posed a threat to the BBWA which 
soon moved to end the rivalry: in 1917, it proposed a merger 
of the activities of the two banks. This was rejected by the 
Colonial Bank.76 By 1926, the Colonial Bank was to become an
71 Ibid.
72 Greaves, 1953, p.41.
73 Evidence of this view will be provided later on in this 
chapter.
74 There is evidence that the banks credit policy for 
Africans was discriminatory. See Chapter 8.
75 Fry, 1976, p. 93.
76 Okigbo, 1981, pp. 79-80.
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even bigger bank via a merger with Barclays Bank, Anglo- 
Egyptian Bank and the National Bank of South Africa. The 
resultant bank was named Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and 
Overseas) .
Competition between both banks remained fierce.77 BBWA 
made two further attempts to merge the activities of the two 
banks in 1934 and 1938. Both failed.78 It was not until 1945, 
when the impact of the newly established indigenous banks, 
mainly in propaganda terms, were beginning to be felt,79 that 
both banks decided to mend fences and sign a co-operation 
agreement.80 The emergence of indigenous banks was therefore 
one of the factors that helped encourage both banks to 
reconcile their differences in order to present a united front 
against them.
77 According to the official history of the Barclays Bank 
(DCO) "Both banks employed a technique which involved first 
spying out the land by an official who remained as unobtrusive 
as possible. Next it would be necessary to negotiate, with 
utmost secrecy, to lease premises for the bank and 
accommodation for the officer in charge. Eventually one of the 
spare branch outfits kept in constant readiness would be sent 
out from Lagos with the prospective manager and a clerk, 
perhaps to win the race by a short head, but sometimes to find 
that other competitors were there a few hours ahead of us. 
These feverish and sometimes undignified struggles came to an 
end in February 1956 when a long-forgotten law was found which 
prohibited expatriate companies from leasing properties and 
opening for business without prior Government sanction" 
(Crossley and Blandford, 1975, p.257).
78 Okigbo, 1981, p. 80.
79 See chapter 4(2) for some evidence of the propaganda 
strategies of the indigenous banks at the time.
80 The agreement titled "Co-operation Between Banks in 
West Africa" was dated 1st January 1945. It existed until 21st 
January 1957 but was replaced later by separate agreements for 
each of the newly independent countries of former British West 
Africa. A minimum of six months notice in writing was needed 
to modify whole or part of this agreement (MS 28538) .
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In general, the 1945 agreement ensured that competition 
between the two colonial banks did not lead to a price war. 
Amongst other things, the agreement provided that: no interest 
be allowed on current account credit balances;81 a maximum of 
1/2% per annum interest was to be paid on fixed deposits of 6 
to 12 months duration and of 1% on fixed deposits of one year. 
Fixed deposits were to be accepted from all Companies only for 
a one year period except during the months of September to 
December.82 No interest bearing fixed deposits was to be 
accepted for less than six months or more than twelve 
months;83 interest on savings account deposit was pegged at 
1% per annum and the maximum amount to earn deposit which 
could be added to the savings account of any one customer in 
any period of six months was also pegged at £50. In total, the 
maximum balance on any one savings account to be allowed 
interest was £500. The agreement further fixed minimum charges 
for overdrafts, loans and local bills discounted;84 minimum 
service charges were also fixed for bank drafts and mail 
transfers, cable transfers85 and the issue of travellers 
cheques.86 This agreement no doubt helped in making the
81 Paragraph 3.
82 The essence of this provision was to "prevent trading 
concerns putting at interest at the end of the produce buying 
season surplus funds which can be drawn out at the 
commencement of the next buying season" (Paragraph 4 [i]) .
83 Paragraph 4.
84 Paragraph 6.
85 Paragraph 17.
86 Paragraph 46.
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interest and service charges in the colony one of the highest 
in the entire British Empire at the time.87
In 1948, the British and French Bank for Commerce and 
Industry was established in Nigeria.88 It subsequently became 
a signatory to the West African Agreement. In 1959, another 
bank with French origins- the International Bank of West 
Africa (IBWA), a subsidiary of Banque Internationale pour 
L'Afrique Occidentale (BIAO) was licensed in Nigeria.89 It 
also became a party to the West African Agreement. No 
indigenous bank had the privilege of joining this agreement 
until 1960 when the Bank of the North was admitted with great 
reluctance.90 The reluctance to admit indigenous banks in 
Nigeria as signatories to the bankers agreement was perhaps 
because such banks were perceived, by the foreign banks as 
being poorly capitalised, poorly staffed and having little or 
no external alliances to pose any threat to these European
87 See for instance, Trevor (1951, paragraph 123), IBRD 
Report (1955, p.155) and Greaves (1953, p.47).
88 This bank had French origins: The Banque Nationale pour 
le Commerce et 1'Industrie (BNCI) had formed a London company 
which, following the nationalisation of the parent company in 
1945, became in London the British and French Bank for 
Commerce and Industry. In 1956, it dropped the 'Commerce and 
Industry' from its name (Okigbo, 1981, p.83).
89 Brown, 1966, p. 24.
90 A letter from an Assistant General Manager of Barclays 
Bank to an Assistant General Manager of the Bank of West 
Africa, dated 28th September 1960, asserted that "...although 
the Bank of the North signified their willingness to sign this 
Agreement several months ago, it appears they are aware that 
the draft offered to them is a reduced version of that agreed 
between the other parties and it seems that they are enquiring 
why they have not been offered the opportunity of joining the 
full agreement between the banks" (Barclays Bank Archives 
11/853) .
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banks. Allowing such banks to become signatories to the West 
African Agreement would have resulted in the subsidising of 
such indigenous banks by the foreign banks. Such subsidies 
were imminent since the likely benefactors of the agreement 
provisions, such as free Commission on Turnover (COT) for 
inter-bank accounts would have been such indigenous banks.91 
Once it was felt by the foreign banks that an African bank had 
prospects for being a threat to the agreement, by undercutting 
their rates for instance, such a bank was usually invited to 
join. A case in point is the Ghana Commercial Bank.92
No attempts in the form of regulation were made by the 
Colonial Government to control the monopoly rates charged by 
foreign banks at the time. This was possibly because the 
foreign banks were the sole benefactors of the status quo and 
such policy did not contradict the interest or perceptions of 
the Colonial Government, which was not always similar to that 
of the colonial banks.
91 See 'Private and Confidential' letter dated 11th 
January 1960, from Assistant General Manager of Barclays Bank 
to Assistant General Manager of Bank of West Africa (BBA 
11/853) .
92 In an internal memo of Barclays Bank dated 14/7/58 and 
titled 'West African Agreement', it was contended that "Now 
that Ghana is independent, has its own Central Bank together 
with its associated Bank, the Ghana Commercial Bank, and its 
own currency, it seems the time has arrived when we should 
consider having a separate agreement for Ghana, the 
subscribers to be the B.W.A., the Ghana Commercial Bank and 
ourselves. The British and French Bank are not at present 
established in Ghana. It might be desirable for us to 
endeavour to reach such an agreement as soon as possible 
before the Ghana Commercial Bank achieves wider representation 
than it has at present.... Otherwise, if we wait until the 
Ghana Commercial Bank has a competitive branch system they may 
decide to undercut us which could vitally affect the B.W.A. 
and ourselves" (BBA 11/853).
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3.6 The Politics of Conflicting Interests
The various foreign banks and the Colonial Government, to 
some extent, had different perceptions of the Africans and 
different agendas as to how to treat them. The Bank of 
Nigeria, for instance, was set up to keep other banks out of 
the territory of Southern Nigeria in order to perpetuate the 
trade by barter which gave them enormous control over the 
Africans and their commodities. The Bank of British West 
Africa was a 'Free Standing Company'93 set up to carry on 
banking business in the west African colony. With no specific 
banking experience to rely on, the bank kept an open mind and 
was only interested in exploiting the vast untapped African 
market. The key, it was believed, was not to shut the Africans 
out, but instead to devise a system that promoted safe credit 
lending to the Africans. In 1905, for instance, Alfred Jones 
wrote to the Under- Secretary of State for the Colonies with 
regards to the question of the:
establishment of some form of Agricultural bank in 
West Africa for the purpose of making advances to 
natives to enable them develop the agricultural 
resources of the territories in the most expeditious 
and efficient manner.94
His letter went a step further to identify the main impediment 
to such a scheme as the:
93 This has been defined by Mira Wilkins as a company 
registered in England or Scotland to conduct business 
overseas, most of which did not grow out of the domestic 
operations of existing enterprises that had headquarters in 
Britain (1988, p.281).
94 Quoted in Cowen and Shenton (1991, p.29).
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existing native system of land tenure which in most 
agricultural districts does not recognise any 
individual private property in land.95
This made it impossible for such land to be pledged in any way 
as security by individuals having use of them when seeking 
advances. Given the above circumstances, Jones concluded that:
the only lien which the native would in all 
probability be able to create would be on the crop 
which could not be regarded as sufficient security 
for pecuniary advances for the lender could not 
control the expenditure, and would have no guarantee 
that the moneys advanced were employed to advantage 
on the crop on which he might hold a lien.96
To counter the above obstacle, Jones recommended that such 
credit should be extended through tribal chiefs who should be 
empowered to stand surety for the individual cultivator who 
sought the credit. He further insisted that though:
tribal chiefs in council probably have not under 
native law and custom the right to alienate tribal 
land. . . legislation could no doubt create this power 
if for a good purpose.97
After all, he further argued, Chiefs had the right to collect 
certain tolls on behalf of the Government and were in receipt 
of Government subsidies which may be forfeited in the event of 
a default and in fact as a last resort, could impose some form 
of tribal tax in the event of a default by a member of the
95 ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 ibid.
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tribe. The above suggestions was dismissed by Olivier of the
Colonial Office who asserted that:
any prospects for lending money to cultivators in 
West Africa is extremely premature.98
He went on to suggest that:
Banking... depends on security and security upon 
local institutions and circumstance.... In West 
Africa... security cannot be taken on the land 
because there is no private right in it, and because 
it is worthless without the cultivator and because 
cultivation is not continuous but shifts from season 
to season.99
He further argued that even the crops could not be used as
security since:
Even if the cultivator can be trusted to harvest 
it,he cannot be trusted not to make away with it, or 
to let his friends do so.... And the person is not 
security because we have abolished slavery, the 
primitive security for debt.100
The matter did not however end here. There is evidence that 
the Colonial Office sought the opinion of the Governors of 
the West African Colonies on this matter. The Governors in 
turn sought the views of residents and district Officers in 
their respective Colonies. The replies from the district 
Officers in Nigeria included that from one William Wallace who 
concluded that such a scheme was unworkable because:
very few could be trusted to utilise the loan for
98 Ibid, p.30.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
the purpose for which they were intended.101
The residents of Ilorin were also of a similar opinion
claiming that:
the Natives would never dream of employing the money 
so obtained to improve their farms but would without 
doubt use it in purchasing gorgeous cloth to deck 
themselves with.102
Based on the submissions of the district officers, Lord 
Lugard, then Governor of the Northern Province, similarly 
advised very strongly against the establishment of such a bank 
arguing that however laudable its aims were, such a bank could 
only encourage the inherent extravagance of the Africans, lead 
to ceaseless litigations and irreversibly wreck the finances 
of small chief doms.103 Following these assertions, the 
Colonial Office again shelved the proposal.104
Ofonagoro (1979) broadly agrees with the above arguments 
but asserts that there was a change in policy as regards the 
BBWA'a policy of 'aiding' Africans after the 1912 absorbtion 
of the Bank of Nigeria. This he suggested was likely to have 
been part of the 'unstated terms of the amalgamation 
agreement' arguing that:
101 Ibid, p.31.
102 Ibid.
103 PRO CO 583/25, Folio 42.
104 The uniform opinion that the Colonial Officers held 
about the Africans may be explained by the existence of a 
homogenous bureaucracy at the time. This imposed a coherent 
set of values among Colonial Officers (See Ehrlich, 1973, 
p.650) .
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given the interests of directors of the Bank of 
Nigeria and their policies regarding the 
availability of credit facilities to African 
traders, it is not unreasonable to assume that their 
wishes in this matter were to be respected as a 
matter of policy.105
The above Ofonagoro's view may not be very correct. There is 
evidence to show that even after the amalgamation in 1912, the 
BBWA still went ahead to press for the establishment of an 
Agricultural bank to help native farmers. In 1914 for 
instance, the 1905/1906 debate on Agricultural credit to 
Africans was resuscitated by the management of the BBWA in a 
letter to the Nigerian Colonial Governor, dated 22nd December 
1913.106 Before replying, Lord Lugard consulted the regional 
Governors of the Northern and Southern provinces of Nigeria 
for their views on the matter. Both advised against the 
establishment of such a bank. According to Mr C L Temple, the 
Lieutenant Governor of Northern Nigeria:
...an Agricultural Bank would not serve any useful 
purpose in this country. I think that they would 
rather foster the tendency, naturally very strong in 
the African, to borrow money. The only security 
which the agriculturist would give would be his 
Right of Occupancy, or customary legal title. At 
present, in this country he does not realise that a 
Right of Occupancy or such title has an exchange 
value and it is not at all desirable that he should 
realise this. Farming... in this country does not 
require a great deal of capital as neither paid 
labour nor elaborate implements are employed. On the 
whole, the natives seem to be quite able to till the 
soil, and till the soil remarkably well, without the 
assistance of foreign capital.107
105 1979, p.390.
106 PRO CO 583/25.
107 Lugard to Couper, 18th February 1914 (PRO CO 583/25) .
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A G Boyle, the Lieutenant Governor of the Southern Province 
argued along similar lines asserting that:
I consider there is no demand for an Agricultural 
Bank in the Southern Provinces. The natives are, 
generally speaking, quite well off to be able to 
develop their lands without assistance from a bank. 
I should also much deprecate them being allowed to 
mortgage their lands to a bank and, as far as crops 
go, the competition between the merchants for 
produce is so keen that they would have no 
difficulty in getting an advance against their 
crops, if they wished it. As a rule, however, they 
like to hawk their produce from one to another until 
they feel sure that they are getting the top 
price.108
Based on the above feedback Lord Lugard, who was now the 
Governor General of Nigeria, once again refused to sanction 
the plan for the establishment of an agricultural bank.109 It 
was this frustration from the Colonial Government on the 
grounds, right or wrong, that Africans could not be trusted 
witth bank credit that prevented the proliferation of credit to 
Africans rather than the so called unstated terms of the 
amalgamation agreement between Bank of Nigeria and the Bank of 
British West Africa. The bank was again forced to slump into 
inaction as regards the lending to Africans project.
It was therefore the lack of co-operation from the 
Colonial Government, which held a stereotypical view of the 
Africans, that discouraged the Bank of British West Africa 
from extending credit to Africans. This negative stereotype of 
Africans by the Colonial Government may have also influenced
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
Barclays Bank (DCO) in their adoption of a discriminatory 
credit policy against Africans. With no experience in the West 
African banking arena, such a bank was bound to be influenced
by the thinking in Colonial Government quarters. At this stage
it becomes important to examine how the Africans acquired this 
image of being un-credit worthy.
3.7 Africans and Credit
Prior to the advent of banking in colonial Nigeria, 
credit (trusts) was highly developed in several parts of 
Southern Nigeria.110 In transactions amongst Africans, for 
instance, it was not unusual for people to be used as security 
for debt and debt slavery was recognised in the customary law 
of several African tribes.111 Credit was also well developed 
in Afro-European trade. It was, for instance, the norm for the 
European traders to use African middlemen in order to get 
their goods into the African hinterlands as well as to bring 
African products out to the coastal areas.
By the later part of the 19th century, some of these
African middlemen had become extremely powerful, to the 
detriment of the interest of European traders. An example was 
King Ja Ja of Opobo, who had a commercial organisation which 
stretched over considerable areas and which employed several
110 Ofonagoro, 1979, p. 97.
111 Such practices have long been abolished. For instance, 
in 1912, Chief Ologbosheri of Benin accepted two people as 
security for a loan of two pounds. The Colonial Administration 
ruled this transaction to be similar to slave trading and 
sentenced him to six months imprisonment (Igbafe, 1967, 
p.706) .
95
thousand people in various capacities such as canoemen, 
traders, labourers, warriors and local buying agents.112 By 
the 1880s, Ja Ja and some middlemen from Brass and New Calabar 
were attempting to break into the export trade, hitherto a 
preserve of the European firms. In fact, Ja Ja succeeded in 
arranging to ship his palm oil to a Birmingham firm.113 Ja 
Ja's entrance into the export trade, until then a preserve of 
the European firms, may have precipitated his subsequent 
deposition by the Colonial Government in 1887.114 By entering 
the export trade, Ja Ja obtained:
a higher price for his produce than he could have 
done from the firms in Opobo, and at the same time 
paid less for his mannillas than would have been 
possible, again, in Opobo itself. In the 
circumstances of the African trade at the time, 
Europeans thus faced a double loss: not only did Ja 
Ja take produce away from them; he also left them 
with stocks of trade goods unsold. Also in competing 
with them in the export trade, he had what appeared
112 Gertzel, 1962, p.362.
113 Ibid, p.365.
114 Officially it was claimed that, in the main, Ja Ja was 
deposed in order to help ensure the practice of free trade as 
contained in the Berlin Conference agreements. There is 
however evidence that the British Colonial Government promoted 
free trade only when it was in its interest to do so. For 
instance, Lord Lugard defended the amalgamation of interest in 
the circumstances of the Royal Niger Company on the grounds 
that it was "necessary for the purposes of mutual defence, and 
to overcome foreign State- aided competition" (Lugard, 1965, 
p.480) . Similarly, in its final report, the United Kingdom 
committee on Industrial and Commercial Policy, under the 
chairmanship of Lord Balfour, similarly suggested that "every 
encouragement should be given by the Government to the 
formation of combinations of manufacturers and others 
concerned to secure supplies of materials, and that, where it 
appears expedient that the control of mineral deposits in 
foreign countries should be obtained, all practicable support 
should be given" (1918, p.37).
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to them as a most unfair advantage, since he paid 
none of the commercial dues to which they were 
subject in Opobo. It was this competition in their 
own sector of the trade. . . which made them receptive 
to the idea that Ja Ja should be deposed.115
Despite the deposition of Ja Ja, his hierarchy of middlemen 
remained in place.116 The continuing squabble amongst the 
European traders further strengthened their position.117 The 
advancement of credit to Africans remained a tool for 
competition amongst the European traders. The German traders 
in particular saw the use of credit as a tool for colonizing 
the middlemen and subsequently achieving trade monopoly with 
the hinterland. As noted by Lord Lugard:
Liberal credit was a feature of German methods of 
trade, and added greatly to their popularity with 
the natives as traders.... These credits were 
regarded rather as an advance of capital for trading 
purposes than as a mere loan and their object was to 
exclude competition and create monopolies.118
Such liberal credit policies sometimes led to some arguably 
unjustifiable credits being granted the Africans.119 Some
115 Gertzel, 1962, p.365.
116 This was so because the European merchants "refused to 
penetrate inland, partly for fear of their lives and partly 
because they were not sure that moving their firms into the 
interior would necessarily enhance the principal aim of their 
coming to the coast of West Africa- profit" (Nwabughuogu, 
1982, p.367).
117 While there were frantic efforts to unify the British 
trading interests in the region (see Flint, 1960, chapter 5) , 
the same could not be said of the German trading interests.
118 Lugard, 1919, p.41.
119 "A prominent West African Merchant remarked to me that 
the abuse of the system of giving credit to native middlemen 
was the curse of South Nigeria. He had been present in court
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European traders also used the opportunity to introduce some 
"loan sharking" techniques into their transactions with the 
Africans. For instance, the agents on a given river sometimes 
combined to insist on paying a low and uniform price for the 
produce brought by the middlemen from the hinterland. With 
inadequate storage facilities and the risk of losing goods to 
rodents and pests, prolonged resistance was certainly not a 
viable option. The agents would further take advantage of the 
middlemen by giving them goods on credit repayable in produce 
at the dictated price for, in some cases, upwards of two 
years.120 Such tactics often proved counter-productive since 
the middlemen often reneged on their promises, selling their 
produce to other European merchants instead. Such European 
buyers were usually tempted to break with their friends by the 
prospects of securing for their firms a much larger share of 
the trade.121
The proclamation by the British Government of the Oil 
Rivers Protectorate led to the establishment of consular 
courts for the territory. This brought most credit disputes 
under the jurisdiction of the consular courts. Faced with 
limited manpower, it became convenient for the Consular 
Government to discourage credit sales in order to reduce the 
court cases arising from such transactions. Subsequently in
when a case was heard in which a native with a borrowed canoe 
and labour, who on his own showing had never possessed £5, was 
found to be owing four different firms a sum of about £700 for 
goods supplied without any guarantee whatever" (Lugard, 1965, 
p.480) .
120 Ofonagoro, 1979, p. 99.
121 Ibid.
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1894, the protectorate Government, urged on by the British 
trading interests in the territory,122 adopted a credit 
policy aimed at discouraging the granting of credit to 
Africans:
1. No assistance will be rendered by the Consular 
courts of the protectorates in recovering trusts 
issued by the European traders to the natives after 
1st December, 1894.
2. Proceedings may be taken in the Consular Courts 
for the recovery of "Trusts" issued by European 
Traders to Natives prior to the dates above 
mentioned and each case shall be dealt with on its 
merits.
3. Such proceedings must be taken before 1st July, 
1895, after which no "Trust" can be recovered 
through the Consular Courts of the Protectorate.123
This was followed by the Recovery of Credit Proclamation of 
1900. The above regulations were supported by the British 
Colonial Government on the grounds that:
It was considered that "trust" was given out to such 
an extent, and so recklessly, that legitimate trade 
was being seriously damaged by it: and with the
small staff at the disposal of the Administration, 
it was found impossible to collect these "trusts" 
through the consular courts and it was also deemed 
advisable to discourage the giving out of "trust" in 
every way possible.124
It is however unlikely that the pressure being put on the
122 See Ofonagoro (1979, p.101).
123 The coming into force of this law as well as the 
statutory limitation of the prosecution of cases entered into 
between 1891 and December 1894 was extended to December 1 1895 
(Quoted in Ofonagoro, 1979, p.101).
124 Moor to Colonial Office, PRO CO 444/2, October 30,
1899.
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consular court staff was the main reason for the proclamation. 
Prior to the declaration of the Southern Nigeria Protectorate, 
the European and African traders had put in place an effective 
and efficient way of settling such trade disputes: Courts of 
Equity. On the inception of such a court at Bonny, a 
commentator noted that:
A commercial or mercantile association was... 
formed, the members being the chief white and black 
traders in the place, and the chair is occupied by 
the white supercargoes in monthly rotation. All 
disputes are brought before the Court, the merits of 
the opponents are determined, and with the consent 
of the King, fines are levied on defaulters. If any 
one refuses to submit to the decisions of the Court, 
or ignores its jurisdiction, he is tabooed, and no 
one trades with him. The natives stand in awe of it 
and readily pay their debts when threatened with 
it.125
With such a system in place, the Consular Courts did not need 
to inherit such trade disputes in the first place. If indeed 
the workload of the consular courts was an issue, one would 
have thought that the Courts of Equity should have been 
encouraged to continue dealing with such cases with some 
occasional supervision from colonial officers. It is therefore 
more likely that the protection of the British trading 
interests was the main reason behind the recovery of credit 
legislation. The British trading companies in the territory, 
not surprisingly, quickly moved to exploit the new scenario 
employing the African middlemen more as commission agents than 
as independent brokers.126 In effect these African middlemen,
125 Quoted in Dike, (1956, p.126).
126 Ofonagoro, 1979, p. 107.
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who in the late 19th century possessed enormous powers and 
were even beginning to challenge the European merchants in 
export trade, were gradually but continuously reduced to mere 
commission agents totally dependent on the Europeans merchants 
for their survival.
It is therefore clear that the Colonial credit 
legislation in no small way assisted in breaking the back of 
the African middlemen, who were seen as all powerful, and in 
entrenching the supremacy of the British in Anglo-African 
trade. The initial discouragement to granting credit to 
Africans was therefore a trade motivated ploy aimed at curbing 
the independence of the African middlemen. It had little to do 
with un-credit worthiness on the part of the African. 
Unfortunately, the trademark stuck and became the popular line 
of defence for most of the colonial banks. For instance the 
official history of the Bank of British West Africa, defended 
the unhelpful attitude of British Banks to Africans on the 
grounds that Africans:
did not as a rule, stick closely to the terms on 
which bank credit was granted. It was a frequent 
experience that the bank lent working capital to an 
African for his business, but the owner would divert 
the cash into buying or building houses as a private 
investment. The bank would then find, when it came 
to repaying the debt, that the business had been 
'milked7 of capital and the loan could not be 
recovered.127
Had the study been non-partisan, perhaps Fry would have made 
a real attempt to unravel the origins of this stigma.
127 Fry, 1976, p. 116.
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3.8 Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the recovery of credit 
policies, adopted by the Colonial Government in 1894 and 1900, 
were simply a ploy aimed at entrenching the supremacy of the 
British in Anglo-African trade. In other words, the Colonial 
Government, urged on by British commercial interests in the 
colony, used such regulation to promote the interest of 
British traders. Furthermore, the 1945 agreement between 
Barclays Bank (DCO) and the BBWA robbed Africans of any 
benefits competition may have brought. In fact, the agreement 
helped to make interest and service charges in the colony one 
of the highest in the entire British Empire at the time. The 
Colonial Government did little to regulate such high interest 
charges arguably because foreign banks were the sole 
benefactors of the status quo.
Since the colonial banks either did not aim to satisfy 
the needs of Africans or were discouraged from doing so by the 
Colonial Government, Africans had no choice but to set up 
their own banks. The next chapter will examine the operations 
of these indigenous banks.
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TABLE 1
IMPORTS OF SILVER INTO BRITISH WEST AFRICA (1900-1910)
Year
1900
1902
1904
1906
1908
1910
Amount
£
360,220 
398,750 
363,025 
506,600 
194,000 
1,259,450
Year
1901
1903
1905
1907
1909
1911
Amount
£
154,730
253,625
143,300
700,400
669,600
874,850
Source: Emmott Report, 1912, Appendix III, Table 1.
TABLE 2
Analysis of British Sterling Silver Issued for Circulation in 
West Africa, in the United Kingdom and in other Sterling Using
Territories (1886-1911)
Average for 
the Period 
Territories
West Africa United Kingdom Other
1886-1890 24,426 920,088 255,939
1891-1895 116,323 761,039 124,461
1896-1900 257,090 796,425 367,233
1901-1905 262,786 234,150 231,504
1906-1910 666,190 781,073 325,347
1911 874,850 1,219,766 286,575
Source: Emmott Report, 1912, p.6.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INDIGENOUS BANKING IN COLONIAL NIGERIA
4.1 Introduction
Nigeria was the only country in British Africa that 
developed an indigenous banking system1 alongside the colonial 
banking system.2 Other Colonies were either overwhelmed by 
colonial legislations which made it impossible for the 
indigenes to establish banks,3 or their economies provided an 
inadequate base for such commercial banking.4 The reasons for 
the advent of indigenous banks in Nigeria were not altogether 
unselfish and their nurturing process was fraught with risks. 
For instance the first attempt to establish an indigenous bank
1 Banks incorporated within the Country and owned and 
managed by Africans.
2 Newlyn and Rowan (1954, p.96), Brown (1966, p.24). Such 
a banking system, "exhibits a paradoxical and potentially 
dangerous dichotomy. One group of banks possesses ample 
reserves, highly skilled executives, and long experience. It 
maintains, however, a restricted branch system, provides 
finance only for the most respectable and conventional 
borrowers, and tends to engage in capital export. The other 
group of banks, lacks capital, controls a small volume of 
deposits, specialises in the finance of relatively risky 
undertakings, and has no contact with a lender of last 
resort... the result is not only a maldistribution of finance 
but also a dangerous distribution of risks." (Rowan, 1952, 
p.174). Note that some African Governments established 
commercial banks in the dying days of colonialism. For 
example, the National Bank of Ghana which was 100% owned by 
the Government, was established in 1952.
3 In the Gold Coast (Ghana) for instance, the Companies 
Act of 1906 prevented the establishment of any local Company 
to carry out any form of banking operation and it was not 
until 1950 that it was repealed via Ordinance Number 36.
4 Onoh (1982, p.95).
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in Nigeria failed mainly due to mismanagement, accounting 
incompetence, embezzlement5 and the non co-operative attitude 
and denigration of colonial banks.6 Despite this set back, 
further attempts were made and by 1960, at least 27 local 
banks had been established of which 21 had failed.
This chapter examines the socio economic conditions that 
led to the rise of these banks, the management of these banks, 
the various challenges faced by these pioneer indigenous 
institutions and the survival strategies adopted by them. 
Other extraneous forces that worked in favour of some of these 
indigenous banks, especially the political support from the 
African run regional governments, will also be examined.
4.2 The Motivation for Indigenous Banking
Until Nigeria became independent in 1960, the Colonial 
Government did very little to encourage neither the granting 
of credit to Africans nor the development of indigenous banks. 
Several ways of encouraging such indigenous banking and 
promoting banking habits amongst Africans were public 
knowledge at the time. A United Nations report in 1950, for 
instance, recommended measures such as deposit insurance 
schemes, rediscounting facilities and provision of guaranteed 
Government or other public securities. As for the existing 
foreign banks, the report further recommended that they should 
be encouraged to reinvest profits which would otherwise go
5 Newlyn and Rowan (1954, p.98).
6 Azikiwe (1956, p.3). See also National Bank Advert 
(Daily Times 30 September 1961, p.11).
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abroad.7 Even the Paton report of 194 8, which was specifically 
directed at the Nigerian banking system, recommended that the 
Government give grants to the staff of these Indigenous banks 
to enable them to acquire training abroad.8 Few, if any, of 
the above recommendations were implemented in pre-independence 
Nigeria.9 The inadequacies of the colonial banking structures 
towards the goal of attainment of economic freedom by 
indigenes, was not unique to Nigeria. In Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 
for example, the Banking Commissioners, in their report of 
1934, concluded that:
It was considered essential for the attainment of 
this goal of economic freedom that the public should 
have adequate financial assistance, so as to enable 
indigenous capital and enterprise to participate 
more actively in the trade and industries of the 
country and, in particular, to cultivate and expand 
the home markets in preference to the export 
markets. The prevailing banking system primarily 
designed to foster economic development by 
requisitioning the aid of non-indigenous capital and 
enterprise proved to be ill adapted, by the very 
nature of its structure, to offer such 
facilities.10
The above inadequacy was also implicitly noted in the Gold
7 United Nations (1950, p.2-3).
8 Paton (1948b, p.17).
9 Interestingly, the policies of these expatriate banks 
received support from unexpected quarters. A prominent 
traditional ruler (the Emir of Kano) , when told by a visiting 
Barclays bank delegation that the bank was to open a second 
branch in Kano, expressed the opinion that the bank had lent 
too much money not just to the to the Lebanese but also to the 
Nigerian people. He also doubted the ability of the bank to 
recover all its loans. This was understandably, "unexpected" 
by the delegates (BBA 11/2272) .
10 Report of the Ceylon Banking Commission (1934, para 4) .
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Coast: In recommending the establishment of a National bank, 
the Trevor report advised that such a bank:
should, as far as possible, be managed and staffed 
by Africans and be created out of African capital. 
Its object should be to meet the needs of residents 
of the Gold Coast and to operate for the benefit of 
African industry, agriculture, commerce and 
trade.11
Europeans were not seen as the only benefactors of the 
status quo (pre-independence colonial banking). Accusing 
fingers were also pointed at the Asiatic and Levantine 
communities. A prominent Nigerian Parliamentarian12 once urged 
the Finance Minister to withdraw all government money from the 
BBWA on the grounds that the bank:
finances the Syrians and the Syrians use all this 
money to buy goods and go to the rural areas and 
undersell our people. And when our poor people go to 
this bank, they will not give them the same sympathy 
that is given to the Syrians.... The Syrians come 
here with no beds. Somebody took them to this bank 
for advances and they began to acquire property in 
Lagos here, and many of our people are loosing their 
land to Syrians just because they have no financial 
backing.13
In the Gold Coast, the feeling was also prevalent that the 
Colonial banking system favoured the European, the Levantine 
and Asiatic communities to the detriment of the Africans.14
Part of the reason for the unhelpful attitude of the
11 Trevor (1951, para 155) .
12 Mr Jaja Wachuku.
13 House of Representatives debate (10 August 1959, 
p.1670).
14 Trevor (1951, para 46) .
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colonial banks to Africans may be found in the history of 
these banks. As noted in the previous chapter, the advent of 
colonial banking in the Nigerian Colony was aimed initially at 
providing banking services for the British commercial 
enterprises then in existence.15 It was therefore not 
surprising that they seldom established operations in 
territories without British commercial interests.16 The banks 
therefore did not aim at satisfying the needs of the 
Africans.17 The widespread belief that Africans were, in 
general, uncredit-worthy was also a contributory factor to the 
lack of interest of colonial bankers in their affairs. 
Africans, not surprisingly, criticised the attitude of the 
colonial banks.
Protests by African traders against the colonial banks 
was first documented in 1912. Subsequent to the absorbtion of 
the Bank of Nigeria by the BBWA, a pamphlet was published in 
Lagos titled "an appeal from the native traders of Lagos to 
the Financiers of Great Britain." The document alleged that 
BBWA charged "rates which were excessively high... even... 
exorbitant" and displayed "intolerance in business matters." 
It argued that the amalgamation of the two banks had produced
15 Rowan (1952, p.161) .
16 Around 1950, for instance, the two British banks, which 
controlled 90% of the bank deposits in Nigeria, operated only 
23 branches in 17 towns of the territory (ibid, p.163).
17 Lack of interest in developing internal markets and in 
assisting indigenous enterprise is a common feature of 
expatriate banks in under-developed territories, particularly 
in those possessing racially heterogenous societies- see 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (1951, Chapter 
3) .
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"consternation." It then concluded that "the crying need of 
Southern Nigeria in the present stage of development of the 
country is for banking facilities-for the establishment of two 
or three banks."18 According to Fry:
The real grievances of the African traders were not 
concerned with the British bank or banks as such but 
with two aspects of the financial system. First, 
African savings, private and public, were already 
substantial in the inter war period, but the greater 
part was held or invested in London rather than 
converted into lending in West Africa. This was true 
of private deposits in the banks as much as the 
reserves built up by the West African Currency 
Board, and after the war of the surplus funds of the 
produce boards. Secondly, the great bulk of the 
lending activity in West Africa, was carried out not 
by the banks but by the European trading companies 
which naturally lent to their produce buyers and 
distributors rather than to independent African 
competitors. In any case, lending was largely done 
on the security of produce in store or in transit; 
the problem of obtaining collateral security from 
African traders was a real obstacle to change.19
Protests against the monopolistic nature of British banks 
continued unabated. In 1916 Samuel Duncan20 led a delegation 
of African traders to London where they protested against the 
monopolistic position of the British Bank of West Africa. 
Their protest was coldly treated and they were referred back 
to the Colonial government in Nigeria.21 On his return, 
Duncan published a pamphlet asserting that:
18 Cited in Newlyn and Rowan (1954, p. 119).
19 Fry (1976, p.216) .
20 Duncan was a Gold Coast (Ghana) Politician and 
Business man organising anti bank protests rather than a 
banker (Ayida, 1960, p.29).
21 Ajibola (1986, p.36) .
109
Wealth is a potential factor governing all 
departments of life among the civilised nations of 
the earth today and the powers that be. If 
therefore, we wish our claims for political freedom 
to command attention, our educational progress and 
attainments may serve us to some extent, but the 
surest road for us to achieve success in this 
direction is the accumulation of wealth. And the 
only way in which we can best accomplish this is by 
combination and co-operation by unity of interests 
in our business relationships and transactions in 
the various spheres and activities of commercial 
enterprise.22
The roots of the monopolistic instincts of British firms 
in general could be traced to the granting of a Charter to the 
North Borneo Company in 1881 by the Gladstone Government in 
Britain.23 Challenged in the House of Commons the following 
year on this surprising return to seventeenth century 
chartered company colonialism, Gladstone refused to rule out 
the possibility of granting similar charters to British 
entrepreneurs in other colonies.24 The opportunity created by 
the Gladstone statement was immediately identified by George 
Watts- a British trader based in Calabar. In a letter to his 
Partner, John Holt, he stressed that Gladstone's:
speech would fit admirably, any one wishing to 
acquire power and territory on the West Coast- will 
you please read the debate over and think of the 
matter carefully as we could easily secure some good 
places - there is the Rio del Rey- go in with Yellow 
Duke and take sovereign rights over this place- the 
Ada River, branching off the Old Calabar river on 
the left bank going up- go in here with Henshaw 
Toby- and other places I could mention. With the aid 
of the principal man who trades there, there would
22 Cited in Azikiwe (1956, p.2) .
23 Ofonagoro (1979, p.307).
24 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (17 March 1882, 
p.1195) .
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be but little difficulty in securing the country: 
and then go to Gladstone for a Royal Charter, to 
limit our powers, and at the same time to confirm 
it.25
Though this unique opportunity to "acquire power and 
territory on the West Coast" had been identified, it was the 
results of the Berlin Conference on West Africa in December 
1884 that made it an urgent necessity.26 Thus what had begun 
as an excellent opportunistic idea for monopoly and profits- 
based on Gladstone's willingness to give the sovereignties of 
non European people in Africa and Asia-away to British 
commercial interests, had become, after Berlin, an urgent 
necessity for satisfying the "effective occupation" 
stipulation of that conference, as well as for British 
commercial survival on the Niger Coast.27 It was under these 
circumstances that the BBWA entered the banking arena in the
25 Quoted in Ofonagoro (1979, p.307-308).
26 In 1884, Germany seized Cameroons and Togoland 
stimulating fears of competition from German firms amongst the 
Delta Merchants. The decision of the subsequent Berlin 
Conference to emphasize effective occupation as a criterion 
for respecting prior claims to spheres of economic influence 
did not help matters.
27 This was aptly summed up in a letter by Alexander 
Miller of Messrs Miller Brothers and Co. to John Holt, dated 
December 14 1884: "it is now abundantly clear that the Germans 
are preparing to take a share of the trade, unless we lay our 
plans to frustrate them; and the best way to do so is to put 
shoulder to shoulder and prepare to deal with them singly as 
they appear on the scene. In this way, we shall have the 
benefit of (1) Occupation and (2) of Organisation. Another 
advantage is that the delegates who went to Berlin have now 
returned, and from what I hear they are satisfied that 
something must be done for mutual protection and at once"- 
Cited in Ofonagoro (1979, p.308). It was therefore not 
surprising that the Niger Company was granted the Charter in 
1886. This charter applied to the Lower Niger District only. 
See also Ofonagoro (1979, chapter 7) for a detailed discussion 
of the circumstances surrounding the issue of the Charter.
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Nigerian Colony. It was therefore not surprising that the bank 
soon developed monopolistic instincts. The bank, at the time, 
also had considerable support from the Colonial Government.28
Although it had become clear by the late 19th Century, 
that monopolies stifled trade expansion, the British 
Government supported them when it was in their political and 
economic interest to do so. It was in this context that Lord 
Lugard argued that the amalgamation of interests of the Royal 
Niger Company was necessary for purposes of mutual defence and 
to overcome foreign State-aided competition. With such an 
attitude, it is therefore not surprising that the Colonial 
Government did not see any need in regulating banking 
monopolies in Nigeria. This is not to say that the Colonial 
Government's interest in preventing the growth of 'wild cat' 
banks was not genuine and of benefit to the Nigerian economy. 
Rather, the Colonial Government is indicted on its inability 
to appreciate the fact that Africans, no matter how backward 
they may appear by British standards and no matter how
28 See two internal letters of the BBWA dated 25th June 
1954 and 5th July 1954 (reproduced in Azikiwe, 1956, pp. 9-10) . 
BBWA's closeness to the Colonial Government was hardly 
surprising as several prominent British Politicians and 
Administrators were in various ways connected with the bank. 
For example, In 1916, Lord Milner was the Chairman of the 
bank. Before this he was the Governor General of South Africa 
(a British Dominion Territory) and after his tenure in the 
bank, he became the Secretary of State of the Colonies (1920) . 
Lord Milverton was once a Director of the BBWA Also Sir Frank 
Baddeley, a one time Chief Secretary of Nigeria once sat on 
the Board of the bank. Finally, Lord Harlech who was the 
Secretary of State to the Colonies between 1922 and 1924 and 
Post master General in 1931, ended his career as Chairman of 
the bank in 1956 (Ajibola, 1986, p.35).
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unprepared they may have appeared for self rule,29 needed a 
banking system to support them in their level of development. 
A task the British banks were unable to perform and the 
indigenous banks, despite all their deficiencies, were in a 
better position accomplish, at least in some respects.30
This belief by Africans that colonial banks discriminated 
against them became both the driving force behind the 
establishment of Indigenous banks and a propaganda tool to 
ensure their survival. For instance, the Nigerian Trust Bank 
was established to "champion the cause of Nigerian Economic 
freedom" by ensuring that "the African Businessman is not 
prevented from making a success in business by want of capital 
and to see that the economic security is no longer the 
exclusive right of the few but a common heritage of all 
people."31 Similarly, a National bank prospectus of 1946 
aimed at attracting shareholders to invest in the additional 
shares of the company asserted that:
With the cessation of hostilities, the post war 
trade requires larger resources and the African must 
make sure he takes his own share of the post war 
trade which will be immense. The bank, therefore, 
requires all the capital it can get to enable it to 
finance African business and enterprises. More and
29 J B Loynes, a one time Adviser to the governors of the 
Bank of England, concluded after his visit to the West African 
territory that "In the four British territories which in 
varying degrees, are all extremely backward by western 
standards and ill equipped for modern methods and techniques, 
a political transition is taking place at a rate which 
threatens to break the administrative, social and economic 
continuity so essential to progress" -Bank of England Archives 
(London) File Number (BEAFN OV67/2, Folio 81c, p.3).
30 Rowan (1952, p.173) .
31 West African Pilot (2 August 1952).
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more foreign firms and entrepreneurs are arriving in 
Nigeria to take advantage of opportunities which 
Government development plans will provide and the 
African must not allow himself to be left behind in 
the race. With a big financial backing, his chances 
are sure and certain.32
In a newspaper advert by the same bank, this time aimed at 
soliciting deposits from Africans, the bank claimed that:
By a concerted and well planned process of 
discrimination, the African merchants were gradually 
eliminated from the position of middlemen between 
the big european firms and the African consumer and 
in their place was substituted the alien immigrants. 
The Africans, according to plan, became small retail 
traders and civil servants. This economic 
strangulation could not have been possible if the 
African had a strong financial institution of his 
own. Patronise the National Bank of Nigeria and 
retrieve your lost birth right.33
There is unanimity of opinion among scholars that 
Colonial Banks were unhelpful to the Africans in the entire 
British West African region. What is in dispute, however, is 
the reason behind such an unhelpful attitude. A detailed 
analysis of this dispute will be undertaken in Chapter eight. 
For now it will suffice to state that given the difficulties 
the African traders had trying to raise capital, they had 
little choice but to turn to money lenders who, as a source of
32 Cited in Azikiwe (1961, p.210).
33 Quoted in Newlyn and Rowan (1954, pp.118-119). It was 
perhaps against this background that the bank set for itself 
the following objectives: (a) see that every Nigerian who is
likely to benefit from loans, advances and overdrafts is 
encouraged by the bank; (b) help small-time as well as big 
time businessmen to hold their own in the commercial fields; 
(c) help Nigerians to establish industries and own properties, 
and (d) operate and help in a way which will give Nigerians 
confidence to dare in both the commercial and industrial 
fields (Daily Times, 30 September 1961, p.11).
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capital, were both uncertain and expensive,34 particularly the 
later.35 This ultimately led them to establish their own 
banks.
4.3 The Indigenous Banks
The first indigenous bank in Nigeria commenced operation 
in 1929 with the acquisition by some Africans businessmen36 
of the Industrial and Commercial Bank, which was originally 
established as an Overseas bank in London with the aim of 
carrying out banking business overseas, but was still born 
because of the outburst of world war one.37 The philosophy 
which animated the founding of this bank was summed up by one 
of its founding members as follows:
it is evident that there is no law to prevent the 
African from disposing of the efforts of his labour; 
therefore, provided with an international business 
link, he can market his own products, exchanging the 
proceeds there-from for the purchase of foreign 
merchandise he may require. These are facilities 
that as a race we cannot expect these corporations 
organised for the purpose of exploitation to supply; 
but it is obvious that the opportunity exists for 
mutual organisation. It is the foundation for that 
organisation that the Industrial and Commercial Bank
34 Though many African Countries had money lending 
legislations by the 1940s limiting interest rates chargeable 
(Nigerian Ordinance Number 49 of 1949; Kenya Money lenders 
Ordinance of 1933; Ugandan Ordinance Number 31 of 1951 and 
Ghana Money Lenders Ordinance of 1940), most money lenders 
usually found a way around it- See Trevor (1951, para 44).
35 This was one of the main complaints in Ceylon. It also 
recurs in the Gold Coat report (para 49).
36 They include W Tete Ansah (Gold Coast), Candido de 
Rocha, A A oshodi, P H Williams and D A Taylor (Nigerians) .
37 Ayida (1960, p.29) .
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Limited with its affiliations have brought....38
This bank was however short-lived and went into liquidation in 
1930. Very little was known of the internal operations of this 
bank as indeed of most early indigenous banks.39 Though the 
liquidators established that the authorised share capital was 
£100,000, the state of the company's record was so chaotic 
that they could not determine the proportion of the share 
capital that was paid up.40 It was further claimed that:
the managing Director of the so called bank was a 
man with a very shady past. The prospectus 
originally issued by the "bank" was a highly 
misleading document. It gave prominence to the names 
of the company's solicitors, auditors and secretary, 
who were leading London firms. Those firms had never 
been informed that their names would appear on the 
prospectus and when their attention was drawn to it, 
they ceased to have any dealings with the 
company.... The liquidators found it impossible to 
produce anything approaching the accurate statement 
of the position. The liabilities (some of which 
related to trading operations) were estimated at 
£25,000. Of book debts estimated at £12,000, only 
£4 0 was collected. Included in the book debts were 
two substantial loans to the managing director and 
a company under his control- not a penny of which 
was recovered. It was also disclosed that the 
company was a share pushing establishment of the 
most blatant description; the accounts of many 
illiterate depositors were found to have been 
debited with monies due on application and allotment 
of shares in respect of which no formal application 
could be traced. A petition submitted to H.E the 
Governor by shareholders and creditors stated that 
there were 3,570 depositors with claims amounting to
38 Cited in Azikiwe (1956, p.3).
39 BEAFN OV68/2 (Folio 42, p.l).
40 Paton (1948b, p. 7) .
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€13,225. None of the depositors received 
anything.41
The second indigenous bank that came into operation (the 
Nigerian Mercantile Bank) also had a short and chequered 
lifespan. Established in 1931, it had a share capital of 
€10,000 of "which €909 seems to have been paid up in cash
initially." Here again, the main activity of the company
appears to have been "share pushing".42 According to Newlyn 
and Rowan, the establishment of this bank was an important
pointer to the credulity of the African public in banking
matters. This was so since the new bank had as one of its 
original subscribers and managing director, the ex-managing 
director of the collapsed Industrial and Commercial Bank.43 
Perhaps because of the above reason:
the bank found great difficulty in attracting either 
deposits or capital from the public, despite the 
very high rates it was prepared to pay upon the 
former. If the figures revealed by its annual 
reports are accurate, the gross rate of return 
(defined as gross profits as a percentage of loans 
and advances) , which in one year exceeded 80 
percent, makes it plain that it was engaged in 
highly speculative money lending transactions with 
what little funds it possessed. Despite this high 
gross rate of return, the bank recorded losses in 
each year of its existence.44
By 1936, the bank had failed.
41 Ibid, p.8. Newlyn and Rowan (1954, p.97) claimed that 
at the time of the bank's winding up, in 1930, its deposit 
liability was estimated at €11,735. This was later raised to 
€13,000.
42 Paton (1948b, p. 8) .
43 1954, p.99.
44 Ibid.
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In 1933/ the National Bank became the first successful 
indigenous bank to be established.45 In its prospectus, its 
Directors made a nationalistic appeal for patronage by 
asserting that:
No people can be respected or regarded as a nation 
unless it has its own national institutions and the 
greatest of all national institutions is the 
financial institution in the form of a bank. This is 
therefore an appeal to one and all who have the 
interest of her country at heart and are prepared to 
work for her progress.46
This was followed by the Nigerian Penny Bank which was short­
lived.47 It had an authorised share capital of £5,000 of which 
£287 was paid up in cash. By 1946, the bank had failed. The 
Official Receiver reported that "neither... (the promoter) nor 
any of his associates had even a rudimentary idea of banking 
or company practice and the bulk of the so-called assets will 
prove to be unrealisable" .48 Also, the Director of Audit 
referred to the "fantastic way in which the affairs of the 
company were managed."49
In 1947, two other banks (African Continental Bank and 
the Nigerian Farmers and Commercial Bank) were established. 
Worried by the spate of establishment of such indigenous banks
45 Lack of support and lack of profit led to a split among 
the directors of the Mercantile Bank. T A Doherty, Dr A Maja 
and H A Subair subsequently resigned from Mercantile Bank and 
founded National Bank (Hopkins, 1966, p.146).
46 Quoted in Azikiwe (1961, p.209).
47 The exact year of its establishment is not known.
48 Quoted in Paton (1948b, p.8).
49 Ibid.
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and not unmindful of past banking failures, the Federal 
Government, in 1948, appointed Mr G D Paton, a Consultant of
the Bank of England who had banking experience in Pakistan, to 
"enquire generally into the business of banking in Nigeria and 
make recommendations to the Government on the form and extent 
of control which should be introduced.1150 Paton's report 
culminated in the 1952 Banking Ordinance.51
Preceding the enactment of the 1952 law, Africans, 
fearing the imminent clampdown on the establishment of 
commercial banks following the setting up of the Paton 
inquiry, had rushed to establish more banks before the advent 
of regulation.52 The result was that by 1952, at least 24 
local banks had been established.53 It was evident that the
50 The divergence in the literature as to the 
circumstances surrounding the setting up of this Commission 
will be examined in chapter 5(2).
51 In summary, the Ordinance required banks operating in 
the Nigerian colony to: (1) have a nominal share capital of at 
least £25,000 of which not less than £12,500 should be paid 
up; (2) be licensed by the Financial Secretary in order to be 
able to carry on banking business; (3) abstain from granting 
loans and advances on the security of their own shares and 
granting unsecured loans and advances in excess of £300 to any 
one or more of its directors or to a business in which it or 
any one or more of their directors had any interests; (4) 
maintain adequate cash reserves; (5) maintain a reserve fund 
out of net profit of each year of not less than 20% of such 
profits until the reserve fund equals the share capital; (6) 
refrain from paying dividend until all their capitalised 
expenditure not represented by tangible assets had been
written off and (7) make periodic returns to the Financial
Secretary. See chapter five for a detailed analysis of the 
provisions of the ordinance.
52 Brown (1966, p.26).
53 See table 3. Several of them were notorious for their
poor capitalization (see table 4) , rapid expansion and 
incompetent management. Little wonder most of them were 
usually referred to as 'wild cat' or 'mushroom' banks.
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majority of these indigenous banks were bound to fail, 
especially with the advent of regulation.54 It was against 
this background that a motion was moved in the Federal House 
of Representatives for the immediate establishment of a 
central bank.55 one of its main aims being to strengthen the 
existing African banks.56 This motion did not go down well 
with the Colonial Government appointed Financial Secretary, 
who argued that Nigeria at "its stage of development" was 
better served by a currency board than a central bank. He was 
however prepared, perhaps due to the immense support the 
motion received from the African parliamentarians, "to 
reconsider the matter." This culminated in the revision of the 
motion by the Government. The final version of the motion 
approved by the House read as follows:
That as practical means of marshalling the financial 
resources of this country for the purpose of aiding 
Economic Development in all its phases, the 
Government should examine the possibility of 
establishing a Central Bank and report to this House
54 It was then noted by a Nigerian Legislator, E 0 Eyo, 
that "the moment this bill is passed into law, all the African 
banks in this country will find themselves in a very tight 
corner" (Nigeria House of Representatives Debates, 1952, 
p.1127).
55 The motion was moved by K 0 Mbadiwe, a private member 
of the house. Apart from being a "student of banking and 
finance", the author is unaware of any evidence that Mbadiwe 
had personal interests in any of the indigenous banks.
56 The full motion read as follows "as a practical means 
of consolidating the financial resources (including regulation 
of Gold and Currency) of this country for the purpose of 
rapid economic development in all its phases, as well as 
strengthening the existing African Banks the Government should 
initiate, organise and establish a Central Bank of the Nation 
within two years of the passage of this motion"- See Nigeria 
House of Representatives Debate (March 21 1952, Col 377).
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as soon as possible.57
In essence, the Colonial Government did not consider it 
important that such a central bank, if established, should 
concern itself with helping and strengthening of the existing 
African banks. Mass failure therefore followed with 16 of the 
indigenous banks failing in 1954 alone.58
4.4 Reasons for the Indigenous Banking Crisis
Contrary to the view of the Bank of England, the main 
reason for the mass failure of the indigenous banks was the 
enactment of the 1952 Banking Ordinance.59 The very fact that 
banks were given three years to meet with the conditions of 
the Ordinance or face liquidation must have sent a warning 
signal to the depositors of these unlicensed banks. This must 
have subsequently led to a run on these unlicensed indigenous
57 Nigeria House of Representatives Debate (April 9 1952, 
Col 1181) . This motion was described by the Nigerian 
Government in a letter to the Colonial Office dated 1st July 
1952 as "cumbersome and ambiguous." Indeed the Government was 
forced to compromise on the motion instead of putting it to 
vote because the motion had considerable support from both the 
Government and non Government benches in the Legislature. "The 
mover was therefore induced to amend his original motion but 
naturally insisted in retaining as many of the original words 
as possible. Consequently, like many compromises, the 
resolution has succeeded in attracting to it the worst of both 
parties" (BEAFN OV68/12).
58 See table 3.
59 According to the Bank of England, most of these bank 
failures "cannot properly be attributed to the requirements of 
the banking legislation or to any positive action on the part 
of the Financial Secretary. Such action as has so far been 
taken has been limited to the collection and scrutiny of the 
statutory returns and to the issue of licences to five banks 
to which no official publicity was given" (Undated Commentary, 
BEAFN OV68/2, Folio 43E, p.2).
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banks. In the case of the Nigerian Farmers and Commercial 
Bank, for instance, it was noted that:
From the moment the Licence was refused us, it meant 
we had to close down either immediately or 
gradually... the importance attached to the Banking 
Licence made customers to doubt the continuity of 
our Bank. They embarked on withdrawal and 
withdrawal... that no licence was being granted to 
the farmers bank was always being pointed to. Even 
no time was allowed for fixed deposits to stay for 
the specified period: yet it was impossible for the 
bank to recover the money given out as overdrafts 
immediately. . . . Were it that we had a Banking 
Licence, nothing could have made the customers 
withdraw their money in thousands as they did.. . .60
Several other reasons have been adduced for the failure 
of indigenous banks. For instance, the Banking Examiner at the 
time identified the two chief contributory causes of bank 
failure to be:
(1) bad management and the lack of accounting and banking 
experience particularly noticeable in the 'mushroom banks 
established in anticipation of the imminent regulation of the 
industry61 and;
60 Quoted in Newlyn and Rowan (1954, p.239).
61 This lack of experience and bad management was usually 
reflected in the over branching practices of some of the 
failed banks. For instance, the Nigerian Trust Bank Limited 
with a Paid Up Share Capital of £10,000 established 25 
branches within one year of its inception (see table 4 and 
West African Pilot, August 2 1952). The report of the Banking 
Officer on the Nigerian Trust Bank in October 1953, noted that 
the "Managing Director... has made every possible mistake. He 
opened no fewer than 26 branches of which six were closed by 
February 1953 and 17 during the last seven months. There now 
remains only three branches operating... The reasons given for 
the closing of the branches were lack of patronage, heavy 
withdrawals, high overhead costs and dishonesty on the part of 
the staff. Original proceedings have been taken against 5
122
(2) fraudulent practices by some directors especially with 
regards to goods sent by companies abroad to be surrendered 
against the payment of bills for collection. These goods were 
sometimes cleared and surrendered or otherwise disposed of 
counter to the instructions of the contracting parties and 
without proper remittances being made.62
The above causes were not unrelated to the general 
difficulties faced by most indigenous banks. These 
difficulties, as articulated by a veteran indigenous banker 
and one time Chairman of the National Bank, included:
(1) The inability of most indigenous bankers to 
understand the limitations of the ability of the 
banker to create money by loan deposit. Many writers 
have regarded this failing as a derivative of the so 
called inherent dishonesty and lack of integrity of 
the African businessman. This is far from the case. 
When a Managing Director gives a loan or an advance 
to his wife or other nominees and buys an American 
car with the proceeds, he obviously cannot 
distinguish between income and capital- a 
distinction which is not all that easy even for the 
sophisticated minds of economists. Dishonesty should 
be based on self interest, not obvious self 
destruction.
(2) Lack of capital, management personnel, technical 
and operating staff: the problem is very acute in 
banking because the highest standards are required 
for efficient banking operations- there is the story 
of a "one man" bank whose owner-Director is his own 
Managing Director, Chief Accountant, Auditor and 
General Manager, etc. Gilbert and Sullivan could not
members of the staff, 4 of whom have received terms of 
imprisonment. The banking returns for the quarter ending 30th 
June 1953 are long overdue. The manager has been given some 
latitude on the grounds that fraudulent practices at the 
branches have necessitated the rigorous checking of the branch 
accounts and the institution of criminal proceedings by the 
Police against various members of the staff have resulted in 
the books being put in the custody of the court" (BEAFN 
OV68/2, Folio 110).
62 BEAFN OV68/2 (Folio 43e, p.2).
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have improved on the situation. When the authorities 
forced him to fill these posts, nominees were 
appointed on meagre nominal salaries- a Chief 
Accountant who never saw the ledger, an Auditor who 
only signed on the dotted lines.
(3)..the fierce and intense competition the 
indigenous banker now faces from the foreign banker 
with his immense capital resources and first-class 
management personnel and technical know-how....63
Though the National Bank Chairman may have in some cases 
been right about his suggestion that bank failures of the 
indigenous banks were due to lack of experience and reasons 
other than fraud,64 to suggest that this was mainly the case 
was certainly an overstatement. The argument of ignorance 
certainly does not hold in a situation where the Management 
clearly takes actions with the intentions of deceiving a third 
party. A case in point was the frantic attempt by the African 
Continental Bank to meet the liquidity ratio requirements of 
the 1952 Banking Ordinance.65 Similarly, in the case of the 
Standard Bank of Nigeria, which went into liquidation on 20th 
September 1952, the Bank Examiner reported that:
63 Cited in Ayida (1960, pp.31-32) .
64 The 1952 voluntary liquidation of the Union Bank of 
British Africa Limited was, for instance, not caused by 
fraudulent activities (BEAFN OV68/2, Folio 43e, p.2). Also the 
Banking Examiner in 1955, while reporting that all was not 
well with three banks (The Cosmopolitan Commercial Bank 
Limited, The Onward Bank Limited and the Pan Nigerian Bank 
Limited), acknowledged that no "fraud is suspected in 
connection with any of the above named banks, but they are so 
under capitalised that their losses to date make them 
insolvent and I have advised them to liquidate their debts and 
to get out while the going is good as they have neither the 
capital nor the experience to carry on the business of 
banking" (BEAFN OV68/2, Folio 45b).
65 See Chapter Six.
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An investigation into the accounts of the Bank 
revealed a very serious state of affairs. The 
directors are now facing four charges of stealing 
and along with the Auditor, a further charge of 
concurring in the making of a false balance 
sheet.66
The above view of the Bank Examiner was further corroborated 
by the bank's winding up notice which asserted that the bank:
cannot by reasons of its liabilities, persistent 
stealing, bad management, inexperienced accounting 
and other difficulties carry on its business.67
The case of the Industrial Bank of West Africa Limited 
was not dissimilar. The December 1954 Banking Officers report 
intimated that:
Two directors of the bank were sentenced to terms of 
imprisonment for falsifying the books. . . . Since then 
the bank has ceased to operate and it will formally 
be refused a licence on the 22nd May, 1955, if it 
has not by then gone into liquidation.68
Allegations of fraud and embezzlement were also in the 
forefront of the winding up of the Provincial Bank, Afroseas 
Credit Bank and the United Commercial Credit Bank.69
However, not all the indigenous banks failed. Of the 24 
or so banks established between 1929 and 1952, four survived
66 BEAFN OV68/2 (Folio 43e, p.l).
67 Daily Times (24 September 1952, p.l).
68 BEAFN OV68/3 (Folio 23, p.3).
69 See report of the Banking Officer on the Banking 
position in Nigeria as at 31st October 1953 (BEAFN OV68/2, 
Folio 110).
125
at least till I96070. Their survival have in most cases been 
Government aided and not 'Market' driven.
4.5 Indigenous Banks and Government Support
Government support was a conspicuous factor in most of 
the indigenous banks that survived in pre-independence 
Nigeria. Arguing that foreign banks did not aim to satisfy the 
needs of the locals, indigenous banks modelled themselves as 
protest institutions determined to reverse the status quo. it 
was not surprising that these banks sought help from Regional 
Governments especially when they came under the control of 
Nigerian Politicians.71 The Politicians on their side were not 
unsympathetic to the dilemma of the local banks.72 Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo, then Premier of the Western Region, once 
declared that:
I believe that it is generally known that one of the 
cardinal policies of the Government is the studied 
encouragement of indigenous banking institutions... 
the Government intends to pursue vigorously its 
policy of giving financial assistance to indigenous
70 National Bank of Nigeria, African Continental Bank, 
Agbonmagbe Bank and Merchants Bank.
71 Brown (1964, p.3).
72 Since most of these indigenous banks were protest 
institutions, their inherent characteristics not surprisingly 
differed from those of the Colonial Banks. One such 
characteristic was the policy among African banks to mobilise 
African savings and re-lend to African borrowers who for 
various economic and legal reasons normally lacked the 
collateral necessary in attracting loans from British banks 
(Rowan, 1952, p.171). This trend was sanctioned by Sayers who 
argued that though the underdeveloped territories do not want 
wild-cat banks, they did however want banks which would lend 
to persons who did have ability but lacked collateral (1947, 
p.301) .
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banks so that they may be better able to provide 
credit facilities to Nigerian business men and women 
and others who have profitable projects on which to 
invest the funds thus provided them....73
The NCNC which then controlled the Eastern Region apparently 
thought along similar lines and made the nationalisation of 
all banks, upon attaining self government in Nigeria, one of 
their party policies.74
Not all indigenous banks were however supported. Indeed, 
in most cases, the indigenous banks that received Government 
assistance all had some form of connection with the regional 
governments. The African Continental Bank, which was the only 
indigenous bank that received the support of the Government of 
the Eastern Region, was established by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe who 
was the Premier of the Eastern Region at the time the support 
was offered.75 Likewise, the decision, by the Western Region 
Government, to support Agbonmagbe Bank76 was made at a 
personal meeting between the bank's Chairman and the Premier 
of the Region. This decision to assist Agbonmagbe Bank was
73 Western Region House of Assembly Debates (December 21 
1956, p.51).
74 This policy was based on the following principles: (a) 
to discourage monopoly of monetary transactions by any one 
bank; (b) to liberalise credit facilities for Nigerian 
entrepreneurs; (c) to encourage the development of indigenous 
Nigerian banking and {d} to plan for the eventual 
establishment of a state bank.
75 See chapter six for a detailed analysis of the African 
Continental Bank case.
76 In 1955, the Western Region Production Development 
Board made a long term deposit of £25,000 (three years) with 
the bank. In 1959, the bank also received £200,000 as a fixed 
deposit from the Western Region Marketing Board. Of the 
£200,000, £80,000 was converted into shares in the bank in
1960 (Brown, 1964, p.12).
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made:
before Executive Council approval was obtained. 
Although the purpose of the deposit was to help 
' indigenous banking' no investigation was made to 
determine whether in fact the deposit would help the 
bank.77
Government support programmes did indeed help some 
indigenous banks. It was, for instance, the investment of the 
Eastern Regional Government in the African Continental Bank 
that saved the bank from imminent collapse.78 Government 
assistance was also instrumental to the survival of the 
National Bank. A National Bank advert explicitly acknowledged 
this as follows:
But the big brake (sic) came in 1952 when the first 
Action Group Government, led by Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo, was installed in Western Nigeria. Conscious 
of the difficulties which had retarded the growth of 
indigenous banks in the country for many years, the 
Regional Government was instrumental in getting the 
Regional Marketing Board and other Corporations and 
agencies run by the Government to bank with the 
National Bank. This was followed in 1953 by the 
Marketing Board buying Preference Shares in the 
bank. This was a turning point in the life of the 
bank. It enabled it to enjoy some new advantages. As 
part owner through the Marketing Board, the Regional 
Government was not only interested in seeing that 
the bank was run on proper lines but it was 
determined to help in providing training in banking 
for its personnel. Furthermore, the banks 
association with the Regional Government contributed 
in no little measure to the rapid growth of the 
banks branches both in nigeria and abroad. This 
happy relationship existed until the Federal 
Government asked the Regional Government to take 
over the bank early this year.79
77 Ibid, p. 15.
78 See chapter 6.
79 Daily Times (30 September 1961, pp.11 & 17).
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Government support did not however always ensure the 
survival of indigenous banks. A classic example was the 
Merchants Bank which failed despite extensive support from the 
Western Regional Government. Established in January 1952, the 
Merchants Bank apparently had a very good start80. Within one 
year, it was licensed by the Financial Secretary under the 
1952 Banking Ordinance. Up till October 1953, the Banking 
Officer was obviously very satisfied with the general conduct 
of the bank- In his report, he noted that the Merchants Bank:
retains the services of a firm of Chartered 
Accountants, Messrs. Sale, Stewart and Company, who 
audit their accounts. In general, the bank appears 
to be consolidating its position. There has been a 
very gradual expansion in the current and deposit 
accounts and the banking methods adopted appear to 
be above reproach. No complaints have been received 
against this bank either from the public, the other 
banks or the police. The Merchants Bank maintains 
only one branch in Lagos; it has withstood the 
temptation to venture into branch banking.81
As time went by various Government Parastatals patronised the 
bank heavily especially with deposits. As the Government 
deposits grew the Bank's Management became reckless, turning 
all the favourable assertions of the Banking Officer in 1953 
on their head. They displayed a total disregard for the 
provisions of the 1952 Banking Ordinance. For instance the 
Bank's Managing Director, P J Osoba, was convicted and
80 Of all the banks established in the 15 months from 
February 1951 to May 1952, it was the only bank to be licensed 
and indeed the sole survivor after 1954 (see table 3).
81 BEAFN OV68/2 (Folio 110, pp.1-2).
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sentenced to prison for stealing £35,000 being part of a 
£100,000 deposit by the Western Region Production Development 
Board.82 A 1959 report of the Banking Examiner also found that 
Chief Osoba and his Companies owed the bank over £67,000. This 
contravened both Sections 7 (1) (a)83 and 7 (1) (c)84 of the
1958 Banking Ordinance. Also the Chairman of the Bank M A K 
Shonowo operated three accounts which contravened the 25% 
limit. Based on the above actualities, the Banking Examiner 
noted that:
the Bank is in a very precarious state owing to the 
Osoba position in the large number of dormant 
overdrafts. If it were wound up now, it is almost 
certain that its assets would not realise sufficient 
to cover its liabilities to the public.85
Despite the above problems, the Banking Examiner concluded 
that:
if present difficulties can be overcome, it has the 
nucleus of a sound banking system.86
82 He used the money for the 10% down payment on a private
ship.
83 This prevented any licensed bank from granting to any 
person credit facilities or advance of more than twenty five 
percent of the sum of its Paid Up Capital plus Reserves. The 
December 31st 1958 Balance Sheet of the Bank showed a paid up 
Capital of £12,650 and reserves of £431 making a total of just 
£13,103. The maximum permissible advance was therefore about 
£3,275 (Brown, 1964, p.40).
84 Prohibited any bank from granting unsecured advances 
in excess of £500 to any director or companies associated to 
such directors.
85 Quoted in the Report of the Coker Commission of Inquiry 
(1962, pp.16-17).
86 Ibid.
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This was not to be as the Bank's licence was withdrawn on 
September 23 1960 and it subsequently went into liquidation.
4.6 Conclusion
Since the colonial banks did not aim to satisfy the needs 
of the Africans, poorly capitalised, poorly staffed and 
sometimes fraud infested indigenous banks soon emerged on the 
platform of aiding Africans, the Colonial Government reacted 
with regulation which subsequently led to the failure of many 
of these indigenous banks. Regulation was defended, by 
Colonial Government and Bank of England 'experts', on grounds 
of public interest.87 Yet schemes like deposit insurance and 
training facilities for indigenous bankers, which may have 
served the public interest even more were not put in place. 
The fact that the United Nations and some other banking 
experts recommended such schemes did not change this fact.88 
The damage of this colonial policy failure on the banking 
habits of Nigerians was no doubt enormous.
The next chapter will attempt a detailed analysis of the 
various forces that shaped the provisions of this 1952 premier 
banking ordinance in the British Nigerian colony.
87 According to the Bank of England, the 1952 banking 
Ordinance was designed to achieve the stability of existing 
banks and to prevent the growth of 'wild cat' banks (BEAFN 
OV68/2, P.42).
88 See chapter 4.
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TABLE 3
INDIGENOUS BANK REGISTRATION IN NIGERIA 
1929-1960
Indigenous Commercial Banks Year of
Establishm
ent
Remarks
The Industrial and Commercial Bank 1929 Failed in 1930
The Nigerian Mercantile Bank 1931 Failed in 1936
National Bank of Nigeria 1933
Agbonmagbe Bank 1945 Now Wema Bank
Nigerian Penny Bank ? Failed in 1946
Nigerian Farmers and Commercial Bank 1947 Failed in 1953
African Continental Bank 1947
Pan Nigerian Bank 1951 Failed by the 
end of 1954
Standard Bank of Nigeria 1951 II
Premier Bank 1951 It
Nigerian Trust Bank 1951 II
Afroseas Credit Bank 1951 II
Onward Bank 1951 It
Central Bank of Nigeria 1951 It
Provincial Bank of Nigeria 1952 II
Metropolitan Bank of Nigeria 1952 II
Merchants Bank 1952 Failed in 
1960.
Union Bank of British Africa 1952 Failed by the 
end of 1954
United Commercial (Credit) Bank 1952 II
Cosmopolitan Credit Bank 1952 II
Mainland Bank 1952 II
Group Credit Bank 1952 II
Industrial Bank 1952 II
West African Bank 1952 II
Muslim Bank 1958
Bank of Lagos 1959
Bank of the North 1959
Sources: Brown (1966, Table 1)
Central Bank of Nigeria
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TABLE 4
DETAILS OF INDIGENOUS BANKS OPERATING IN NIGERIA ON THE 22ND MAY 1952 
(the date of the commencement of the banking Ordinance 
_________COMPILED FROM THE FIGURES OF 30TH SEPTEMBER 1952__________
Date of 
Incorporation
Name of Bank Authorised
Capital
£
Paid Up 
Capital
£
Reserve Funds 
£
Total Deposits 
£
Cash in Hand 
and at Bank
£
Advances
£
Investments
£
7/4/33 National Bank of Nigeria Limited 250,000 76,559 35,996 960,190 92,406 793,349 96,492
2/5/45 AgbonMagbe Bank 25,000 13,410 . 19,565 16,626 6,393 -
7/2/47 Nigerian Farmers and Conmercial Bank 
Ltd
300,000 13,853 660 581,645 110,818 380,695 -
17/11/47 African Continental Bank Ltd 50,000 23,883 6,422 653,710 92,406 246,814 253500
24/2/51 Pan Nigerian Bank Ltd 100.000 5,016 _ 33,952 6, 618 8,259 _
21/6/51 Standard Bank of Nigeria 25,000 14,627 . . - . _
8/8/51 Premier Bank Ltd 4,000 1,125 . 8,804 4,943 4,658 .
28/8/51 Nigerian Trust Bank Ltd 10,000 10,000 _ 38,365 20,488 9,572 _
30/11/51 Afroseas Credit Bank Ltd 10,000 1,000 . . . - _
4/12/51 City Bank Ltd 10,000 105 _ 1,667 212 - _
4/12/51 Onward Bank Ltd 10,000 410 _ 154 365 - _
6/12/51 Central Bank Ltd 50,000 3,560 . 904 762 271 _
15/1/52 Provincial Bank of Nigeria Ltd 5,000 4,500 200 565 1,088 193 _
23/1/52 Metropolitan Bank of Nigeria Ltd 25,000 1,000 . . - . _
25/1/52 Merchants Bank Ltd 50,000 12,650 . 18,664 8,248 6,967
5/2/52 Union Bank of British Africa Ltd 10,000 5,100 _ 6,387 2,428 543 _
4/3/52 United Commercial Credit Bank Ltd 10,000 3,000 . 153 154 1,748 _
24/3/52 Cosmopolitan Commercial Bank Ltd 10,000 1,220 _ 3,943 2,013 69 _
5/4/52 Mainland Bank Ltd 5,000 5.000 _ 2,173 1,743 79 _
5/4/52 Group Credit and Agricultural Bank 
Ltd
5,000 1,395 - 128 138 - -
9/4/52 Industrial Bank of West Africa Lid 10,000 10,000 . 708 11,076 22 _
14/5/52 West African Bank Ltd 25,000 2,648 - 462 26 38 -
Source: Bank of England Archives ( OV68/2, Folio 43p ).
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE 1952 NIGERIAN BANKING ORDINANCE
5.1 Introduction
Before the banking ordinance of 1952, banking in Nigeria 
remained largely unregulated.1 The only provisions that 
existed for the control of banks could be found in two 
sections of the companies ordinance of 1922 and section 34 of 
the Stamp Duties Ordinance Number 5 of 1939.2 Under Section 
2(1) of the Companies Ordinance:
No company, association or partnership consisting of 
more than ten persons shall be formed for the 
purpose of carrying out the business of banking, 
unless it is registered as a company.
Section 108 further required each limited banking company to 
prepare a half yearly statement of its liabilities and assets 
and a copy of this statement had to be exhibited in a 
conspicuous place in all the offices of the company.
Section 34 of the Stamp Duties Ordinance prohibited the 
issue by bankers of bank notes other than the notes of the 
bank of England and the West African Currency Board. Under the 
above regulations, it was therefore possible for a partnership 
of less than ten persons to be formed for the purpose of 
carrying out banking business without the need to be
1 Uzoaga (1986), Nwankwo (1990) and Teriba (1986).
2 Paton (1948b, p.9).
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registered as a company.3 However, no such partnerships appear 
to have been formed.4
On 7 September, 1948, the Chief Secretary to the Nigerian 
Government, in a letter with the reference number 52413/99, 
appointed G D Paton to enquire into the Nigerian banking 
system with the view of introducing legislation.5 Mr Paton 
submitted his report which was accompanied by a draft 
Ordinance on 28 October, 1948. Extensive criticism of the 
Paton recommendations, mainly by the local banks led the 
government to produce its own report6 (Barriff Report).7 This 
culminated in the 1952 Banking Ordinance. Unlike several other
3 A similar situation existed in the UK at the time. For 
instance, prior to the 1979 Banking Act, any partnership, 
company or individual could take money on deposit. No licence 
was needed and no undertaking had to be given about the assets 
of the business or the way in which the business was conducted 
(Horton and Macve, 1996, p.8).
4 Paton (1948b, p.9). Note that under the 1922 Companies 
Ordinance, every company was required to appoint an auditor 
who reported to the shareholders on whether, in his opinion, 
the accounts represent a true and correct view of the state of 
the company's affairs.(Sections 112-113). The Ordinance also 
empowered the Registrar, under certain circumstances, to 
appoint inspectors to investigate the affairs of a company 
(see section 109). A company, by special resolution, could 
also appoint inspectors to investigate its affairs (Section 
110) .
5 Mr Paton was also requested to examine the possibility 
of creating an agricultural bank and/or a co-operative bank 
(Bank of England Archive File Number OV68/1, p.165) .
6 Financial Secretary's statement in the House of 
Representatives debate (1952, p.1111).
7 Named after Mr R A Barriff who prepared the report. He 
was then the Assistant Director (Commerce), Department of 
Commerce and Industries, Lagos Nigeria.
135
ordinances in Colonial Nigeria8 the 1952 Banking Ordinance had 
some degree of originality in the sense that it took into 
account some local factors. This was perhaps due to the fact 
that there was no equivalent legislation in the United Kingdom 
at the time. The Ordinance however borrowed provisions from 
other British colonies, like Pakistan and India, which by that 
time had already introduced banking regulation.9 This chapter 
examines the various factors that influenced the provisions of 
this pioneer banking ordinance in Colonial Nigeria.
5.2 The Paton Enquiry
There is some divergence in the literature as to the 
reasons that led to the appointment of Mr Paton to investigate 
the business of banking in Nigeria and as to whether indeed 
the Paton enquiry was the cause or consequence of the 
indigenous banking boom of the time. Nwankwo (1986) argued 
that it was the sudden burst of registrations in 1947 added to 
the potential and actual threat to the public of 'wild cat' 
banks which stirred up some concern in the Government that 
subsequently led to the setting up of the Paton enquiry in 
1948.10 Nwankwo (1990) also argued that:
8 See for instance, the Nigerian Companies Ordinance of 
1922 which was literally copied from the British Companies Act 
of 1908 and the Nigerian Stamp Duties Ordinance which bears 
a striking resemblance to the British Stamp Duties Management 
Act of 1891.
9 The Banking Companies (Control) Act was introduced in 
Pakistan in 1948 while the Banking Companies Act was 
introduced in India in 1949.
10 p. 24.
136
...the spate of these banking establishments and the 
collapse of many of them, moved government to set up 
an enquiry (the Paton Commission) in September 1947 
to enquire generally into the business of banking in 
Nigeria and make recommendations on the form and 
extent of control which should be introduced.11
Brown (1966) argued, on the contrary, that it was the fact 
that the recommendations of the Paton report were well known 
in Lagos that led to the indigenous banking boom. He suggested 
that:
it therefore appeared likely that any one even 
vaguely interested in banking rushed to register his 
bank before the Ordinance could be passed and the 
capital requirements take effect.12
Newlyn and Rowan also argued on similar lines. They assert 
that:
the principal reasons for this sudden burst of 
registrations is to be found in the prevailing state 
of expectations with regard to the Government's 
intentions.13
Teriba (1986) evidently relying on Newlyn and Rowan (1954), 
argued that though the recommendation of the Paton report with 
regards to a minimum paid up capital of £12,500 and 'adequate' 
cash reserves were aimed principally at remedying the defect 
of under-capitalization and iliquidity in indigenous banks, it 
was misconstrued in indigenous banking circles as an attempt 
to stifle native banking development. Teriba then concluded
11 pp.17-18.
12 p.26.
13 1954, p.108.
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that it was the foreknowledge and premature disclosure in 
Lagos Business circles of the above provisions that led to the 
spate of the beat the Law registrations of indigenous banks 
culminating in the abortive banking boom.14
The above diverging interpretations are based on 
different statistics relied upon by the authors. For instance 
Nwankwo, citing the Financial Secretary of Nigeria asserts 
that between 1947 and 1952 a total of 185 banks were 
registered in Nigeria, of which 145 banks were registered in 
1947.15 Brown (1966), Newlyn and Rowan (1954), Teriba (1986) 
and even the Central Bank of Nigeria (1986) all assert that 
between 1933 and 1963, 26 indigenous banks were registered of 
which 1816 were registered in the 15 months period between 
February 1951 and May 1952. The figures by Newlyn and Rowan et 
al are likely to be nearer the truth than that by Nwankwo for 
several reasons. Firstly, in the 1950s, Rowan was apparently 
regarded as a competent source of information about Nigerian 
Banking especially by the Bank of England.17 Secondly, though
14 p. 13.
15 According to Nwankwo, this was a 'statement by the 
Financial Secretary to the Federal Government during his 
address to the House of Representatives on the urgency of 
banking legislation in Nigeria' . We have not been able to 
access the said speech in order to verify the correctness of 
this citation. It is however important to note that even 
Nwankwo, in a later writing, expressed some reservations about 
these statistics given by the Financial Secretary- See Nwankwo 
(1990, p.17).
16 Though 18 banks are quoted, seventeen banks are 
actually listed. See for instance Brown (1966, p.25).
17 For instance in a letter dated 19th December, 1952 
addressed to the Overseas and Foreign office, Mr Jackson of 
the Bank of England, while admitting that information about 
'native' banks was not easy to come by, extensively relied on
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the Colonial Government may not have been unmindful of 
previous bank failures in Nigeria, it was unlikely to have 
been a major factor in setting up the Paton enquiry. Indeed 
the three indigenous banks that had previously failed were 
fairly well spaced out.18 Thirdly, if indeed there was a high 
risk of bank failure, at least as perceived by the government, 
and if thus it was the intention of the government to curtail 
the proliferation of these indigenous banks, then it was 
unlikely that the government would have allowed four years to 
elapse between the submission of the Paton report (1948) and 
the passing of legislation (1952).
Perhaps an authoritative view with regards to the 
thinking of the government at the time could be deduced from 
a statement by the Governor of Nigeria in 1950. He asserted 
that:
in the boom conditions which have existed in Nigeria 
over the past few years, there have been no banking 
failures but it is highly problematical whether some 
of our indigenous banks would be capable of 
weathering a trade recession.19
Also Paton's report of 1948 threw more light on the 
actual position of the time. Paton asserted that by 1948:
roughly 120 existing companies... have been
Rowan (1951, 1952) in analysing the Native banking position in 
Nigeria (Bank of England Archive File OV68/2 P.42).
18 These banks and their dates of failure were (1) The 
Industrial and Commercial Bank (1930), (2) The Nigerian 
Mercantile Bank (1936) and (3) The Nigerian Penny Bank (1946) .
19 See letter dated 18th August 1950 (BEAFN OV68/2, p.4).
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registered with banking as one of their objects. At 
present any of these companies can commence to carry 
on banking business if it so wishes.20
The Paton report however went on to defend its recommendation 
that banks be licensed on the grounds that it would help check 
these companies which had been registered with banking as one 
of their objectives. Finally, perhaps the Financial Secretary 
made himself clearer in another speech to the House of 
Representatives in 1952. He asserted that:
In 1947, the Registrar of Companies reported that 
there were 145 registered companies in this country 
using the word 7banking' or 'bank' in their titles.
Since then, another forty companies have been 
registered and, while most of these are ordinary 
commercial firms, at least fourteen are known to be 
operating as true banks and many of them have 
branches throughout the country.21
We therefore conclude that, though between 1947 and 1952, 
185 companies were registered with 'bank' in their title or 
one of its objectives there were actually much fewer banks in 
existence. Also, the appointment of the Paton Committee was 
more the cause, than the consequence, of the indigenous 
banking boom. It was its cause in the sense that it led to a 
spate of 'beat the law' registrations. At least seventeen 
indigenous banks were registered in 1951 and 1952. This 
represents more than 40% of the total number of registered 
banks in the country from the commencement of banking in the
20 p. 15.
21 House Debates (1952, p.1113).
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colony (1891) to Independence (19 6 0).22 We shall now examine 
in detail the various forces that influenced the provisions of 
the 1952 Ordinance.
5.3 Provisions of the 1952 Ordinance 
5.3a Defining a Bank
Under section 33 of the stamp duties ordinance of 1934, 
a banker is defined as:
any person carrying out the business of banking in 
the United Kingdom or in Nigeria.
The provision of this act was criticised in the Paton report 
on the grounds that it did not go ahead to define banking 
business. Paton while admitting that the manifold activities 
of modern banking make it difficult to define, went ahead to 
define such banking business as the business of receiving from 
the public on current account which is payable on demand by 
cheque and of making advances.23 Paton claimed that such a 
definition which places the issue of cheques and the making of 
loans as the main theme of banking business has proved 
satisfactory in practice.24 This definition was adopted in the
22 This represents the total number of both indigenous and 
foreign banks registered in the country during the period. 
Failed and merged banks are included in this total- See 
Central Bank of Nigeria (1986, pp.65-66). Note also that no 
new bank was registered between 1952 and 1958 when the Muslim 
Bank was registered.
23 BEAFN OV68/1, p.177. This definition is similar to that 
in the Indian Banking Companies Act of 194 9 (section 5).
24 1948b, p.10.
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Barriff draft Ordinance.25
The Secretary of State for the Colonies on the advice of 
the Bank of England,26 suggested that such definitions should 
be ad-hoc. He argued that:
experience elsewhere has shown that it is extremely 
difficult if not impossible to contrive a 
satisfactory definition of "banking7.... Unless you 
have special reasons for doing otherwise, I suggest 
that it is necessary to say no more than that 
banking means the business carried on by a bank and 
a bank is an institution doing banking business. The 
effective decision can be made ad-hoc and 
administratively by the time a new comer to the 
profession is to be licensed.27
The Bank of England later shifted its position as regards the 
ad-hoc definition of banks mainly on political grounds. They 
asserted that:
in the special circumstances of Nigeria, some form 
of definition for the limited purposes of the 
ordinance might still be necessary . Desirable as it 
may be to avoid a definition and to leave the 
interpretation of banking to the authority granting 
the licence, this may not now be acceptable in the 
political background of Nigeria. A possible 
compromise would be a slight variation of the 
interpretation used in the South African Banking Act 
which still leaves some discretion to the licence 
issuing authority, viz., "banking business" means 
"business of which a substantial part consists of 
the acceptance of deposits of money repayable on 
demand by means of cheque, draft or order",28
25 BEAFN OV68/1, P. 177.
26 See letter dated 10 October, 1950, from W J Jackson of 
the Bank of England to the Colonial Office (BEAFN OV68/2, 
p.14).
27 BEAFN OV68/2, p. 16.
28 BEAFN OV68/2, p. 9.
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The definition in the draft Ordinance finally put forward to 
the legislature was along the line of the Paton
recommendation.29 This was passed by the legislature
unamended.
5.3b Restriction of the use of the word Bank
Section six of the Paton report empowered the Governor, 
after consultation with the 'Advisory Committee',30 to order 
a company to delete the word 'bank' from its name and to cease 
to carry on 'banking business.'31 Paton explained that this 
was an essential safeguard against the use of the word 'bank' 
and was necessary given the 'present' structure of Nigeria. He 
argued that:
the application of the provisions of this section 
will put the public on its guard against the 
activities of a company which may be holding itself 
out as a bank and whose main business is something 
very different from any accepted connotation of 
banking business.
The report also noted that:
29 See Section 2 of the 1952 Nigerian Banking Ordinance 
(reproduced as appendix 1 in this thesis).
30 Section 5 of Paton's draft Ordinance recommended the 
establishment of an Advisory Committee to advise the Governor 
on banking matters. This recommendation neither appeared in 
Barriff's draft Ordinance nor in the 1952 Banking Ordinance.
31 This is similar to the provisions of section 7 of the 
1949 Banking Companies Act in India which stated that "no 
company, other than a banking company, shall use as part of 
its name any of the words "bank", "banker" or "banking" and no 
company shall carry on the business of banking in any province 
of India, unless it uses as part of its name at least one of 
such words."
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the application of the section will not force a 
company into liquidation. The company would merely 
be required to cease to be a bank as defined and be 
at liberty to pursue its main activity (e.g. money 
lending).
The report went on to argue that:
experience in Nigeria and elsewhere has shown it to 
be desirable to restrict the use of high sounding 
titles by banks.... Small firms sometimes give 
publicity in their letter headings and 
advertisements to their authorised capital without 
mentioning the authorised and paid up capital, 
prominence may also be given to the names of large 
banks of international standing as agents and 
correspondents. Objectionable practices of this 
nature could be curbed by threat of application of 
this section.32
At the time of the report, the indiscriminate use of the word 
bank was quite perverse in Nigeria. Barriff, while agreeing 
with the general principles and logic of the Paton report, 
recommended that the Financial Secretary should petition the 
court where it seemed expedient to delete the word 'bank1 from 
a company's title and to restrain banks from receiving public 
money withdrawable by cheques or orders.33 This provision was 
part of the Barriff recommendations deleted from the final 
draft Ordinance apparently at the recommendation of the 
Colonial Office.34
Though most of the provisions of this section of the
32 1948b, pp.12-13.
33 Section 12 (3) of the Barriff draft Ordinance. See Bank 
of England Archive File Number OV68/1, P.177.
34 See letter from the Secretary of States for the 
Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of 
Nigeria dated 5 December, 1950 (Bank of England Archive File 
Number OV68/2, p.16).
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draft ordinance put forward to the legislature were generally 
acceptable to the Nigerian legislators, it was however opposed 
by K 0 Mbadiwe who proposed an amendment that would transfer 
the powers of the Financial Secretary to a 'Nigerian Banking 
Board'. The motion was not debated mainly on technical 
grounds35 and the section was therefore passed unamended.36
5.3c Minimum Paid Up Capital
Section 3 of the Paton report recommended that banking 
business be transacted only by companies. No such company 
could be registered unless it had a subscribed capital of at 
least twenty five thousand pounds of which not less than 
twelve thousand five hundred pounds had to be paid up in cash. 
For companies registered outside Nigeria a paid up capital of 
one hundred thousand pounds was to be required. Paton 
explained that the fixing of a minimum paid up share capital 
was a method of safe guarding the public against 'mushroom 
banks' . The low minimum paid up capital required for local 
banks was justified by Paton on the grounds that it was 
suitable considering the reigning local conditions at the 
time. Paton explained that:
By the standards of the outside world, the minimum
35 In the words of the Chairmen of the legislature: "My 
trouble is that I cannot find any reference to the Nigerian 
Banking Board in this ordinance nor can I find the 
constitution of it in his proposed amendment and if that is so 
I cannot call the amendment because it would be out of order 
to discuss it in connection with the Banking Bill" (House 
Debates, 1952, p.1131).
36 See section 4 of the 1952 Nigerian Banking Ordinance.
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capital requirements which I suggest for local banks 
may appear inadequate but in fixing a low minimum I 
have had special regards for local conditions, in 
particular the low average income of the people and 
the need to avoid creating undue obstacles to the 
formation and development of Nigerian banks by 
Nigerians.37
The Barriff report adopted the above recommendation.38 This 
was subsequently approved by the Bank of England which stated 
that:
the capital provisions appear adequate (the actual 
amount of the prescribed minimum is a matter to be 
determined by local experience) and should not be 
politically objectionable; they do not discriminate 
against the native banks in any way.39
However the above recommendation received some opposition in 
the legislature. K 0 Mbadiwe argued that while the amounts 
recommended might be appropriate in some cases, a general 
application of this minimum paid up capital across all 
categories of banks was improper. He suggested that:
...there could be no quarrel whatsoever with the 
minimum requirement of £12,500, but I think to apply 
it generally to all African banks is not fair 
because they should be agricultural banks , and we
cannot expect each to raise a figure of £12,500.
There could have been differentiation between
commercial banks and farm banks because if we are 
going to develop agriculture in this country , we 
must have farm banks and the capital of £7,500 would 
be adequate to ensure the existence of agricultural 
banks, but since this provision has not been made, 
I have no quarrel and accept the minimum
requirement. . . when the minimum requirement has been
37 1 9 4 8b, p.11.
38 See Bank of England Archive File Number OV68/1, P.177.
39 Bank of England Archive File Number OV68/2, P.10.
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accepted. . . to lay any other condition I consider is 
an effort to stifle the honest activity of African 
banks, that step is not progressive, but going 
backwards.40
However, no amendment was proposed and the draft ordinance as 
put forward to the legislature was passed into law.41
5.3d Licensing of Banks
Section 9 of the Paton report recommended that companies 
obtain licence from the Governor before commencing banking 
business. The need for this provision was explicitly explained 
in the report, which suggested that:
As a further measure of control and in view of the 
important influence which banks may exert over the 
financial and economic life of a country I do not 
consider that mere registration as a company in 
accordance with the provisions of the proposed 
section 3 should entitle a company to commence to 
carry on the banking business. In addition to 
complying with the minimum capital requirements,.. 
it is highly desirable that a bank should be under 
competent management. This section is also necessary 
to cover the cases of roughly 120 existing companies 
which have been registered with banking as one of 
their objects. At present, any of these companies 
can commence to carry out banking business if it so 
wishes.42
The Barriff report generally adopted the above view but with 
some slight variation.43 The Colonial office was also in
40 House Debates (1952, p.1119).
41 See Section 3 of the 1952 Nigerian Banking Ordinance.
42 1 9 4 8b, p.15.
43 Mr Barriff recommended that such a licence should be 
obtained from the Registrar of Companies. Bank of England 
Archive File Number OV68/1, P.177.
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general agreement with the need for banks to be licensed. It 
however called for the ordinance to be more specific. In a 
letter to the officer administering the colony of Nigeria, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies stated that:
I have been advised that it is desirable to provide 
in the Ordinance if possible for the powers of the 
Financial Secretary in deciding whether to grant a 
licence or not and for the principles to be followed 
in this connection.
He concluded that:
... it would be better if the ordinance itself could 
be more specific.44
This call was apparently heeded as the final draft bill that
was introduced for legislative debate in 1952 explicitly spelt
out the powers of the financial secretary in deciding whether
to grant a licence or not and the principles to be followed.
The need for this licensing provision in the banking
ordinance was explained by the Financial Secretary as being in
the interest of depositors. He argued that:
If you are a Banking Company in existence at the 
commencement of this ordinance, you have to get a 
licence within three months.45 If you start after 
the commencement of the ordinance, that you have to 
apply to the financial secretary for such a licence 
and the Financial Secretary is given the power to 
make sure that the company is carrying on a banking 
business- or rather, is not carrying on a banking 
business-that is to the detriment of the interests 
of its depositors; but the Financial secretary is
44Bank of England Archive File Number OV68/2, p.16.
45 This was a slight misrepresentation of the draft 
Ordinance. Already established banks were just required to 
apply for a banking licence within three months of the 
Ordinance coming into effect.
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not as has been represented in the local press, some 
local dictator who can do what he likes when an 
application is made to him. In point of fact, he has 
in section 6, to have regard to certain factors. He 
must look at the bank's liquid resources, the amount 
of its issued and paid up capital, the amount of its 
reserves and such other matters which in his opinion 
are relevant.46
The need for and/ or the powers heaped on the Financial 
Secretary by this licensing section of the draft ordinance 
were challenged by some Nigerian legislators. Some rejected it 
based on ignorance while others did not trust the Financial 
Secretary's competence and political neutrality. S L Edu, 
while calling for the entire banking bill to be rejected, 
argued that:
there is no where in the world were licences are 
issued for banking.47
This was certainly incorrect. As at that time similar 
provisions existed in the banking regulations of India and the 
United States of America.48 The competence of the financial 
Secretary to monitor the licensing procedure was also 
questioned by Edu. He asserted that:
I wouldn't like the House to be misled that because 
the Financial Secretary said something about 
banking, he is an expert on banking. He knows 
nothing about banking. I see no reason why every 
power should be given to the Financial Secretary.49
46 House Debates (1952, p.1112).
47 House Debates (1952, p.1115).
48 Nwankwo (1986, p.25).
49 House Debates (1952, p.1115).
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D T Akinbiyi argued on similar grounds. He suggested that 
instead of heaping so much power on the Financial Secretary 
who was not a banking expert, a banking committee should be 
set up as suggested by the Paton Report. He argued that the 
Financial Secretary:
...is not a banker himself and therefore, is not 
experienced in banking. Paton who was appointed by 
the Government of this country to go into the
problem of banking did recommend that a committee
should be set up to supervise the control over
banks. Paton was an expert.
He went on to suggest that:
If that recommendation has been heeded, certainly 
there should have been representatives of bankers, 
both African and European, and from the Government 
Service. That would have ensured balanced views of 
the committee and would have been responsible for 
the running of banks in this country and would have 
been able to ensure to some extent that banks would 
be made efficient and safe for the people of this 
country.
He then concluded that:
the Financial Secretary forgetting that the old days 
are gone, still arrogates to himself, the sole 
authority of commanding and supervising the banks. 
We have it on the authority of the sages of old that 
two heads are better than one. Certainly a committee 
composed of bankers and Government experts as well 
must be far better than the Financial Secretary 
alone.50
K 0 Mbadiwe specifically attacked section 6 (2) of the draft 
Ordinance, which gave the financial Secretary powers under 
certain conditions not to licence banks existing prior to the
50 House Debates (1952, pp.1115-6).
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coming into force of the Ordinance. He stated that:
I can summarise this section, that after three 
years, the Financial Secretary can still direct that 
a bank already in existence before the legislation 
is passed could be closed.... [T]hat clause or that 
provision is a negative provision. When a bank is 
already in existence, if it fulfils its requirements 
of necessary paid up capital, and maintains an 
adequate reserve, and the word 'adequate' we have 
come to know what adequate really means, it is left 
solely at the discretion of the Financial Secretary. 
Now that again is bad-he could use his information, 
and that is not banking, it is a make shift 
arrangement, and in no way constitutes banking 
arrangements.
He concluded that:
a company already in existence should in no way be 
stopped or a licence refused by the Financial 
Secretary if once it could meet this required 
capital... and the appointment... of a sole person 
who has the entire say on banking activity is 
wrong.51
An amendment was then proposed to leave out 'Financial 
Secretary' and insert 'Council of Ministers' in its place. 
This was put to vote and negatived52 and the draft Ordinance 
put forward to the legislature was passed unamended.53
5.3e Restriction of Loans and Advances to Directors
Though the Paton report was silent on this issue, Barriff 
thought it appropriate to incorporate it into the draft
51 House Debates (1952, p.1119).
52 House Debates, 1952, p. 1134 ).
53 See section 6 of the 1952 Nigerian Banking Ordinance.
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Ordinance.54 The general provisions of the Barriff report, in 
this regard,55 was described by the Bank of England as 
'necessary and adequate.'56 The essence of this draft bill 
provision as explained by the Financial Secretary was to:
prohibit loans to directors of a bank without 
security or loans to a company of which the bank 
directors are also directors without security.57
He then went on to support this section with the story of an 
unidentified company A which wanted an overdraft and:
went to the bank and got a loan. On the first 
occasion it got £10,000 and later it was extended 
until it reached £70,000. Fortunately for that bank, 
company A did not go into insolvency, but let us see 
what happened. The money used for the loan was the 
depositors money and when the company took it, it 
had favourable facilities with which to expand its 
business and try to make a profit. In this case, I 
believe it did make a profit, but who got the 
profit? The directors got the profit. But let us 
assume it made a loss. Who would have got the loss? 
Not the directors but the depositors.58
When pressed by a Nigerian legislator to reveal the names of
54 Similar provisions were contained in section 20 of the 
1929 Indian Companies Act and section 7 of the 1948 Banking 
Companies (Control) Act in Pakistan.
55 The only amendment passed by the legislature was in 
line 2 of 7(1) where the words 'in excess of £300' were 
inserted after the word 'advances.' All other parts of the 
Barriff's proposal, in this regard, were replicated in Section 
7 of the 1952 Nigerian Banking Ordinance.
56 See Bank of England Archive file number OV68/2 P.10.
57 House Debates (1952, p.1112).
58 Ibid.
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the people concerned, he answered to the negative 
categorically stating that:
I am not prepared to reveal the name of this bank. 
All the profits go to the borrowing company and all 
the losses go to the depositors in the bank; to 
avoid which is the object of section 7.59
The above assertions were challenged by K 0 Mbadiwe on the 
grounds that the section discriminated against bank directors. 
He argued that:
if on the one hand, a bill will empower a bank to 
grant a loan to companies or individuals that are 
unsecured and on the other hand says that a member 
or a director of the bank or company can never get 
any loan unless it is secured I feel that it is 
discriminatory, either that we could say that no 
bank should grant loans unless those loans are 
secured. I will accept that but once a provision has 
been made to grant unsecured loan I think it should 
be made all round.60
He then went on to propose that loans worth up to forty 
percent of the directors stake in the bank be granted such 
director unsecured arguing that:
it is very fair that where a director of a bank has 
£200 and he wants money very badly for a commercial 
undertaking which will be of interest to the bank 
and will enrich it by interest, that he has 
sufficient amount and forty percent of that should 
be granted him without any security.61
The above proposed amendment was not further discussed mainly
59 Ibid.
60 House Debates (1952, p.1136).
61 Ibid.
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on technical grounds.62
Section 7(1) of the proposed banking Act was again 
challenged on the grounds that it seemed to suggest that 
security was needed irrespective of the amount of the loan the 
director or his associated company wanted. A Enahoro with the 
apparent permission of the Financial Secretary proposed an 
amendment which would ensure that only loans to directors and 
related companies in excess of £300 need be secured. He argued 
that the draft clause was rather funny because:
what it amounted to was that if a bank director 
wanted a loan of £5 from his bank, he would have to 
leave his belt or shoes behind as security. I think 
there should be a limit to the size of a loan, and 
I understand the Financial Secretary will not oppose 
the addition of the words 'in excess of £300 after 
the word 'advances'.63
With the backing of the Financial Secretary already secured, 
the amendment was instantly agreed to by the legislature.
Section 7 (3) of the draft banking ordinance was opposed 
by some Nigerian legislators again on the grounds that it 
granted unlimited powers to the Financial Secretary. S L Edu 
proposed that the entire sub-section 7(3) be deleted from the 
draft banking ordinance on the grounds that unlike in the case
62 K O Mbadiwe proposed that the word 'unsecured' be left 
out. The Financial secretary however pointed out that this 
would make section 7(1) of the draft bill read: 'No banking 
company shall make any loans and advances on the security of 
its own shares or grant loans or advances to any one or more 
of its directors or to a firm or private company. . . .' This 
would have meant that a director could not get a loan from a 
bank be it secured or unsecured (House Debates, 1952, p.1136).
63 House Debates (1952, p.1137).
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of the issue of licences, where aggrieved parties could 
petition the decision of the Financial Secretary to the 
Council of Ministers, there was no such provision here.
S 0 Gbadamosi also called for the deletion of the entire 
sub section from the draft ordinance describing it as a 
'dangerous proposition' . Arguing by analogy, he suggested that 
Nigeria:
is undergoing today what I would call a political 
revolution and in the carrying out of the 
aspirations of the people of the country, it might 
be necessary to establish institutions like, for 
instance, a Press which would devote a great deal of 
its activities to removing the imperialistic grip on 
this country. If such a Press is established and 
there is a bank owned entirely by Africans in this 
country who felt that it was useful and gives it a 
loan of £50,000 the Financial Secretary seeing the 
item on the balance sheet of the bank may close it 
down.
He further asserted that:
If we allow this sort of bill to pass, it will be 
very dangerous indeed for this country. In our 
political struggle, the time may come when we need 
to fight the government of this country and in doing 
so we might go to the extent of borrowing money from 
the bank. Where the Government of the country is in 
a position to say "No. [Y] ou can't have that money" 
I think we shall be endangering ourselves if we 
allow the bill to pass. We know that the banks in 
the world have financed wars between one country and 
another. Well there is not such a provision in 
banking law anywhere in the world as this.64
D T Akinbiyi also supported the deletion of the sub-section. 
He argued that:
64 House Debates (1952, p.1137).
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Too much power is being vested on our Financial 
Secretary. Mr Paton who is an expert and who was 
especially paid by the Nigerian Government did 
recommend a committee, I wonder why there should be 
a departure from the recommendations of that 
commission , that the Financial Secretary could be 
taken for a 'Know-all' who could thwart the 
aspirations of the nationalism of this country, that 
the Financial Secretary should be constituted an 
authority over the banks and properties of the 
people of this country savours of tyranny.65
A Enahoro also argued on similar lines asserting that :
the greatest fault that this sub-clause proposes is 
this. Here is a man who is not a business man. He is 
not a banker and yet... when returns are submitted, 
if it appears to him that unsecured loans are being 
granted to the detriment of depositors, in his 
inexpert opinion, then he may not only order that 
such loans be not granted in the future, but he may 
also order that the banking company should recover 
existing loans within the period specified by him in 
his absolute discretion.... I suggest that these 
powers would be better exercised by a committee or 
an expert banker.66
E Njoku however spoke in support of the clause on the grounds 
that deleting it would be against the spirit of clauses 7(1) 
and (2) already agreed on by the legislature. He asserted that 
by virtue of the earlier amendment on clause 7(1) which 
prevents unsecured lending to directors and related parties in 
excess of £300:
we have accepted the fact that we ought to limit the 
amount of unsecured loans which a bank may make to 
its directors. I take it that we all agree that a 
bank should not make a large number of unsecured 
loans. In sub-section 2 we ensure that the bank
65 Ibid, p. 1138.
66 Ibid, p. 1140.
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shall furnish such particulars as will enable us to 
know whether it has in fact gone against sub section 
1 .
He then concluded that:
All section 3 is trying to bring out is, suppose a 
person has gone against what is laid down, what 
should be done? After laying down that unsecured 
loans should be limited, how can we propose to do 
nothing if somebody goes on giving a large amount of 
unsecured loans? Deletion of sub section 3 leaves 
this matter hanging in the air. Why should we go to 
the trouble of limiting the amount of unsecured 
loans and calling for necessary information if we 
are going to do nothing if the limit is exceeded?67
The question that sub-section 3 of clause 7 be left out was 
then put to vote and negatived.
The Bank of England later expressed some doubts in the 
amendment passed by the legislature as regards section 7 (1) 
of the Ordinance.68
5,3f Inspection of Banks and Minimum Cash Ratios
Section 8 of the Paton report recommended the appointment
67 Ibid, p. 1139.
68 In a letter to the Colonial Office, Mr Atkinson of the 
Bank of England, stated that "We have some doubts about the 
insertion of the words 'in excess of three hundred pounds' in 
sub-section 7(1) of the Ordinance. It is not clear to us 
whether the limit of £300 applies to the aggregate amount of 
such loans that can be made by any one bank or to each 
individual loan or advance.If the former is the case, there 
can be no cause for complaint; if, however, the later is the 
correct interpretation there would appear to be nothing to 
prevent a director of a bank obtaining several such loans 
through the agency of a number of private companies or firms, 
and it may be remembered that it would not take many bad debts 
of £300 to swallow up the minimum amount of paid up capital as 
laid down in section"- letter dated 1st July 1952 (BEAFN 
OV68/2, p.37).
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of a Bank Examiner who should be an Officer of the Government. 
He should have power to call for and examine the books of 
these banks in addition to the returns the banks will be 
making to the Financial secretary, the main purpose being to 
satisfy himself as to the liquidity of each bank. The report 
went on to further explain that:
if the degree of liquidity is found to be 
insufficient, the Government Officer would advise 
the bank as to the policy it should adopt with a 
view of improving its liquid position. The degree of 
liquidity which banks should maintain (which will 
vary according to the changing financial conditions, 
local and international) would be a matter for 
consideration by the advisory committee.69
A minimum cash ratio was not recommended by the Paton Report 
which stated that:
a system of supervision primarily designed to ensure 
the maintenance of an adequate degree of liquidity 
is the most effective method of reducing the risk of 
banking failures. In many countries there is a 
legislation providing for a minimum cash ratio, but 
the cash reserve of the bank is no criterion of the 
general liquidity , particularly in less advanced 
countries where liquid local assets may not be 
available and where small banks may be under 
incompetent management.70
The above claim that the cash reserves of a bank is no 
criterion of its general liquidity at first was taken with 
some scepticism by officials of the Bank of England. They 
argued that:
69 1948, p.14.
70 Ibid, pp. 14-15.
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this sentence seems to involve a non sequitur. A 
minimum cash reserve is admittedly no criterion of 
general liquidity but at least it would prevent the 
sort of situation disclosed in his report where a 
bank's only realisable asset included a bicycle and 
a sewing machine.71
By 1950, however, the bank had shifted its position in support 
of the Paton report. It argued that:
it is questionable whether provisions for minimum 
cash reserves are desirable in simple legislation or 
in the conditions of Nigeria where a cash ratio 
would not necessarily be a guarantee of liquidity. 
The advances made by a bank operating in the 
territory might not be so easily callable nor the 
collateral so readily realisable as in a more 
advanced country and it might show a perfectly 
satisfactory cash position according to local law 
but still be in a poor state of liquidity.... It is 
a very moot point whether the advantages of fixing 
minimum cash reserves by law are not outweighed by 
its disadvantages. The keeping of the right amount 
of cash against liabilities calls for experience and 
skill and what may be right in one country may be 
quite inappropriate elsewhere.
The bank went on to suggest that:
the danger here is that the inexperienced or bad 
bank may regard the extremely low percentage in the 
law as its maximum and may shelter behind the law 
when it gets into trouble. I would far rather see a 
section in general terms which required the banks to 
maintain a proper liquidity and to hold at all times 
an adequate cash reserves against their 
obligations.72
While the Barriff report implicitly adopted the above view of 
not fixing the minimum liquidity ratio, it went ahead to
71 Bank of England Archive File Number OV68/1, P.189.
72 See Bank of England Archive File Number OV68/2, P.14. 
The bank in question was the Nigerian Penny Bank which went 
into liquidation in 1946.
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expunge the provisions relating to the appointment of a bank 
examiner and an advisory council. This was replaced with a 
rather extensive set of provisions73 which were described by
73 Clauses 7 to 14 of the Barriff draft Ordinance related 
to this area. Their contents are summarised as follows;
7. On application of 200 shareholders or holders of 'one tenth 
of the issued shares,' the Financial Secretary shall appoint 
one or more inspectors to investigate the banks affairs. Such 
applicants may be required to give security of up to £100 for 
cost of investigation.
8(a) . On request from company or order by court, the Financial 
Secretary shall appoint inspectors to investigate and report. 
b. The Financial Secretary may appoint inspectors to 
investigate and report if it appears to him that there are 
circumstances suggesting that :
i. a bank's business is conducted with intent to defraud or in 
a manner oppressive of its members.
ii. a bank's management is of doubtful integrity.
iii.information has been withheld from members of a bank.
9. Inspectors under 7 and 8 above may investigate related 
companies.
10 (i). Obligations of banks to produce books etc. and assist 
inspectors.
ii.Inspectors may examine bank officials on oath.
iii. Non compliance with 10 (i) to be treated as contempt of 
court.
iv. Inspector may apply to have persons whom he has no power 
to examine on oath examined on oath by court.(a), (b) and (c) 
detail legal procedure for such examinations.
v. Definitions of terms 'officers' and 'agents' used in this 
section.
11(i) . Provisions for interim and final report by inspectors, 
ii. Financial Secretary -
a. shall send a copy to bank.
b. may supply to other interested parties on payment of fee.
c. shall furnish copy to applicants under section.
d. shall furnish copy to court.
e. may cause report to be printed and published.
12 (i) Financial Secretary shall draw attention of the Attorney 
General to any criminal offence which appears to have been 
brought to light in investigation.
ii. Attorney General shall prosecute if necessary and bank's 
officials are to assist.
iii. if it seems expedient, Financial Secretary may petition 
court
a. to delete 'bank' from company's title.
b. to restrain bank from receiving public money withdrawable
by cheques or orders.
iv. if it appears in public interest, proceedings may be 
brought against management in name of bank in the light of any 
fraud etc. which emerges from an inspector's report.
v. Government shall indemnify banks against costs of
160
the Bank of England as:
some rather vague provisions for inspection of 
banks, on application from members or at the 
discretion of the financial secretary.74
The Bank of England report went ahead to state that:
in view of the fact that no minimum cash ratio is 
provided in the draft, some continuing control and 
supervision of banks is, in the circumstances of 
Nigeria, clearly necessary. This is very necessary 
from the situation disclosed in the Paton's report, 
and I think that we should ask Barriff the reasons 
why a Controller and an advisory committee were 
repugnant to Nigeria and put it into his mind that 
if these reasons were not very cogent, it will be as 
well to reconsider Paton's suggestion which seems 
not only necessary but also very sensible and 
flexible.75
On the issue of banking inspection, the Bank of England later 
adjusted its position, suggesting that:
In Nigeria, there are a number of reasons for not 
attempting to legislate for full scale inspection. 
Firstly, conditions there are quite unlike those in 
India and South Africa; even in Palestine, the 
organisation was relatively simple. Secondly, over 
90% of the banking business is conducted by two 
powerful British banks who need no control; no 
system of full audit or inspection could ignore any 
particular bank and both these banks would therefore 
rank equally with the weakest. With the present 
state of political feeling in the colony, it might 
even be dangerous to place such a measure before the
proceeding under iv above.
13. Inspectors expenses to be defrayed by government but the 
later is not precluded from suing for recovery where 
equitable.
14. Authenticated report may be accepted in court of law as 
evidence (Bank of England Archive file no. OV 68/1, P.179-80) .
74 Bank of England Archive File Number OV68/1, P.189.
75 Ibid.
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legislative council and so precipitate a demand for 
complicated banking control which might be 
objectionable and cause undesirable and unnecessary 
interference with the two chief banks. Finally,.. 
even if they did legislate, it seems quite certain 
that they would for a long time to come be unable to 
operate a full audit- there are no competent 
examiners.76
Despite this recommendation not to legislate bank inspection, 
the Bank of England still believed that unsound banking 
practices could be prevented. Measures such as licensing, 
minimum capital requirements, reserve provisions and the 
examination of returns should afford sufficient safeguards and 
prevent the growth of mushroom banks. If, despite these 
precautions, a close inspection of a bank became necessary, 
administrative action should then be taken under plenary 
powers embodied in the Ordinance, rather that through the slow 
complicated machinery of the courts.77
The final draft bill put forward to the legislature did 
not therefore provide for bank examination. Section 8 of the 
draft Ordinance however provided for banks to maintain 
'adequate' cash reserves as recommended in the Paton report. 
This was passed by the legislature unamended78 but not without
76 See letter from W J Jackson of the Bank of England to 
W Hulland of the Colonial office dated 22 May, 1950 (Bank of 
England Archive File Number OV68/1, p.193).
77 Bank of England internal memo by J B Loynes, dated 
15th February, 1957. Bank of England Archive File Number 
OV68/4, P.47.
78 See Section 8 of the 1952 Nigerian Banking Ordinance. 
Both the Indian Banking Companies Act of 1949 (section 24) and 
the Pakistan Banking Companies (Control) Act of 1948 (section 
8) provided for banks to maintain at least 20% of their total 
demand liabilities in cash, gold or other unencumbered 
approved securities.
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the protest voice of A Enahoro who wondered whether it was 
indeed right for the Financial Secretary to have powers to 
decide whether or not bank reserves are adequate, even if his 
opinion conflicted with those of expert bankers.79
5.3g Reserve Funds and Restriction of Dividend Payments
Section nine of the draft banking Ordinance presented to 
the legislature in 1952 stated that:
1. Every banking company incorporated in Nigeria and 
operating solely within Nigeria shall maintain a 
reserve fund, and shall, out of the net profits of 
each year and before any dividend is declared, 
transfer a sum equivalent to not less than twenty 
percentum of such profits to the reserve fund, until 
the amount of the said sum is equal to the paid up 
capital.
2. The provisions of sub-section (1) of this section 
shall also apply to banking companies incorporated 
outside Nigeria unless it is proved to the 
satisfaction of the Financial Secretary that the 
aggregate reserves of the company fulfil the 
requirements of that sub-section.
The provisions of this section were neither recommended by the 
Paton report or the Barriff draft Ordinance. They were 
borrowed from section 17 of the Indian banking act. Its 
introduction into the Nigerian Banking Ordinance was initiated 
by the Bank of England. In a letter dated 22nd may 1950 to the 
Colonial Office, they suggested that:
There is a useful provision which appears in the 
Indian Act but not in neither the Nigerian nor 
Uganda drafts, viz., the building up of a reserve 
fund by an appropriation from profits before the
79 House Debates (1952, p.1141).
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declaration of a dividend; such reserves could not 
of course be drawn upon to pay a dividend in any 
year in which there were insufficient or no profits 
available for this purpose.80
The Bank of England however acknowledged the possibility of 
such a provision being misconstrued by the legislature as 
discriminating against indigenous enterprise given the 
political climate of the time.81 This advice was subsequently 
passed on to the Government of Nigeria by the Colonial 
Office.82 It was then incorporated into the draft ordinance 
which was passed by the legislature unamended.83
Section ten of the draft Ordinance presented to the 
legislature stated that:
No banking company shall pay any dividend on its 
shares until all its capitalised expenditure 
(including preliminary expenses, organisation 
expenses, share selling commission, brokerage, 
amounts of losses incurred and any other item of 
expenditure not represented by tangible assets) has 
been completely written off.
The provisions of this section was recommended not by the
80 See Bank of England Archive File Number ov68/l, p. 193.
81See Bank of England Archive File Number ov68/2, p.9.
82 See letter from the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
to the Officer administering the Government of Nigeria dated 
5th December 1950 (Bank of England Archive Reference number 
OV68/2, p.16). The relevant excerpt of the letter reads; 'You 
may wish to consider the insertion of section 17 of the Indian 
Act which provides for the building up of a reserve fund by 
appropriation from profits before declaration of a dividend, 
such reserves, of course, not being used simply to provide the 
means for a dividend in any year when profits are 
insufficient.7
83 See Section 9 of the 1952 Nigerian Banking Ordinance.
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Paton report but by the Barriff draft Ordinance. This clause 
was borrowed from the section 15 of the Indian Banking Act of 
1949 .84 This section was also passed by the legislature 
unamended.85
5.3h Returns Submitted to the Financial Secretary
Section 10 of the Paton report recommended that banks 
furnish to the Financial Secretary, a quarterly statement of 
their assets and liabilities and a half yearly analysis of 
loans and advances. The report went ahead to suggest such a 
statement of assets and liabilities as the basic feature of 
the system of supervision of banks by a bank examiner. The 
report concluded that since banking statistics provide 
essential material for the comprehensive survey of economic 
conditions of a country, such figures should be published in 
aggregate form for the information of the public. In reference 
to the above Paton recommendation, the Bank of England 
commented that it is a:
basic requirement of Colonial Banking Legislation as 
recommended.... Provision is made for a statement of 
assets and liabilities and a breakdown of advances 
to be submitted quarterly. Paton recommended that 
the later be submitted half yearly but if the local 
administration do not consider quarterly submission 
unreasonable, so much the better. These provisions 
apply to all banks indiscriminately.86
84 See Bank of England Archive File Number ov68/2, p.9.
85 See section 10 of the 1952 Nigerian Banking Ordinance.
86 See Bank of England Archive File Number ov68/2, p.9.
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This provision that banks submit returns to the Financial 
secretary was aptly explained by him as necessary in order 
that:
he can find out, or probably find out, what they are 
doing.87
While the need for banks to file returns was generally 
perceived to be desirable by the legislature, the frequency of 
these returns was perceived by some as too high. K 0 Mbadiwe, 
while proposing an amendment that returns be filed twice 
yearly, argued that:
the four returns-balance sheet returns-is far too 
much for this young country, because you are fully 
aware here that the technical skill here is woefully 
lacking and once you want a young bank just 
beginning to submit four returns plus other returns 
to the Registrar of Companies and other forms to be 
made, that bank will just spend its time compiling 
those reports.88
He then concluded that:
reports submitted two times a year are quite 
adequate, once this country grows and we begin to 
have more technical skill, there is no reason why 
that more periodic returns should not be adopted but 
at this particular period of our development,... I 
feel that the Financial Secretary wishes to have the 
co-operation of the banks and not to put them under 
great disadvantage and handicap, that a method be 
devised whereby, for the meantime, half-yearly 
returns are submitted.89
87 House Debates (1952, p.1113).
88 Ibid, p.1141.
89 Ibid.
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This proposed amendment was supported by A Enahoro on the 
grounds that it would be too much of a financial burden on 
banks especially those with many branches. He asserted that:
It has been suggested to me that in some cases it 
might cost as much as £500 and in other cases it 
might be £100 or £200.... You have to employ a 
Chartered Accountant and qualified people like that. 
What would happen in the case of a bank which has 
say, like the Continental Bank or the Farmers bank, 
twenty branches, and which has to prepare this 
return every quarter, if it has to pay £100 or £200 
to prepare one for each branch? You find that they 
have to spend at least £10,000 to £50,000 every year 
on these returns. I think that this is certainly 
discouraging to African Banks.90
S L Edu also supported the amendment arguing that the 
quarterly production of reports by banks was bound to be 
expensive and could lead to either an increase in the 
percentage of interests or a call on the Government to bear 
the relevant expenses.91 M Aboderin while supporting the 
motion cited section 433 paragraph (1) of the 1948 Companies 
Act of England.92 He went on to assert that:
I am also informed that throughout the civilised 
world, these returns are submitted twice annually 
and not quarterly.93
90 Ibid, pp. 1141-2.
91 Ibid.
92 This states that: Every company being a limited banking 
company or an insurance company or a deposit, provident or 
benefit society shall, before it commences business and also 
on the first Monday in February and the first Tuesday in 
August in every year during which it carries on business make 
a statement in the form set out in the thirteenth schedule to 
this act or as near thereto as circumstances admit.
93 Ibid, p. 1143.
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The Financial Secretary, while stating categorically that the 
Government would not accept such an amendment, argued that:
It is on the basis of these returns that the 
Financial Secretary or any one else will know what 
action to take when a bank is going wrong. . . the 
whole object of this ordinance is to try and stop 
banks going wrong. It is not to find out when it is 
too late that they have gone wrong because these 
advances or reserves have got out of line.94
On the suggestion that the schedule would impose a heavy cost 
on the banks, he argued that:
these schedules are what any ordinary bank should 
fill in every week for its own information. The 
manager must keep this information up to date to 
know how to run his bank and to see that every thing 
is secure.95
On the issue of the clause being repressive, the Financial 
Secretary suggested that it was not. He then went on to assert 
that:
There are at least two Nigerian Banks who send me 
the information set out in the first of these 
schedules every quarter and they don't have to do 
it. They do it just because I ask for it. I think 
that if they can do it voluntarily, others can do it 
without repressive measures.96
94 Ibid, p. 1142.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid, PP.1142-3.
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The question that quarter be left out was then put to vote and 
the result was negative. The provisions of this section of the 
draft ordinance were therefore passed by the Legislature 
unamended.97
5.3i Exhibition and Publication of Balance Sheet
Section 11 of the Paton Report recommended the exhibition 
and publication of bank balance sheets. According to the 
report, most banks of standing already published such reports 
whether or not they were required by law to do so. The report 
went on to justify its recommendation of publishing and 
exhibiting such reports on the grounds that:
the man in the street should be given an opportunity 
of forming his own opinion of the financial 
condition of any bank in which he may meditate 
depositing his money.
The report went on to suggest that:
several private companies are operating as banks. 
Under the provisions of section 27 (3) of the 
Companies Ordinance, a private company is not 
required to file a copy of its balance sheet and as 
far as I have been able to ascertain, the private 
companies which are carrying on banking business at 
present do not publish their balance sheets.98
97 See section 11 of the 1952 Nigerian Banking Ordinance. 
At the time, monthly returns were required in both Pakistan 
and India (see sections 10 and 27 of the 1948 Banking 
Companies (Control) Ordinance of Pakistan and 1949 Banking 
Companies Act of India respectively).
98 Paton (1948b, p.16).
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The above views were endorsed by Barriff7s draft" and then 
the Bank of England which described it as 7 another basic 
requirement. 7100
When the relevant section of the draft Ordinance was 
tabled at the legislature, Mr Enahoro pointed out that this 
was unnecessary as a related provision was in existence under 
existing laws. He suggested that:
under section 108 of the Companies Ordinance, the 
banks are already obliged to exhibit throughout the 
year particulars of their balance sheet as per 
schedule of the Companies Ordinance.101
He then went on to conclude that the provisions in the 
Companies Ordinance was quite adequate and that there was no 
need to compel the banks to incur extra expenses by preparing 
and publishing these balance sheets in newspapers. The motion 
to exclude this section from the banking Ordinance was then 
put to vote and negatived.102
5.3j Provisions Relating to Directors
Clause 13 (1) of the draft Banking Ordinance presented to 
the Legislature related to the publication of names of 
directors, it stated that:
99 See Bank of England Archive File Number ov68/l, p.177.
100 See Bank of England Archive File Number ov68, p. 9.
101 House Debates (1952, p.1143).
102 See section 12 of the 1952 Nigerian Banking Ordinance. 
Section 33 of the 1949 Indian Banking Companies Act contained 
a similar provision which applied only to banks incorporated 
outside the province of India.
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After the expiry of three months from the 
commencement of this banking Ordinance, every 
banking company shall, in all circulars and letters 
issued or sent by or on behalf of the company in 
connection with its business, cause to be set out in 
legible characters the full and correct names of all 
persons who are directors of the company.
Clause 13 (2) went on to specify a penalty of not more than 
one hundred pounds for non compliance. There was no objection 
raised to this clause when presented to the legislature and it 
was passed unamended.
Clause 14 of the draft banking Ordinance addressed the 
conditions under which directors may be disqualified.103 This 
section had its origins in the Paton Report which recommended 
that certain individuals should not be eligible to become 
directors or managers of banks. The Paton Report while 
justifying the need for such a provision argued that:
From past experience in Nigeria, the need for the 
proposed section is evident.
103 The full text of this clause 14 of the draft Ordinance 
read as follows:
1.Without Prejudice to anything contained in section 74 of the 
Companies Ordinance, no person-
a. who has been a director of, or directly or indirectly 
concerned in the management of, a banking company which has 
been struck off the registrar of companies under the 
provisions of this Ordinance; or
b.who has at any time been adjudicated bankrupt or has 
suspended payment, or has compounded with his creditors, or 
who is or has been convicted by a criminal court of an offence 
involving dishonesty or has not received a full pardon for the 
offence of which he is convicted, shall, without the express 
authorization of the Governor act or continue to act as a 
director of, or be directly or indirectly concerned in the 
management of, any banking company.
2. Any person acting in contravention of sub-section (1) of 
this act shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding two years or to a fine not exceeding five 
hundred pounds or both such imprisonment and such fine.
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The report went on to explain that:
The wording 'an offence involving moral turpitude' 
is intended to exclude the case of a man who may 
have undergone a term of imprisonment as the result 
of a criminal offence not involving dishonesty, 
fraud or misfeasance (e.g. manslaughter following a 
road accident) .104
The above provision was adopted by the Barriff report, on 
which the Bank of England's comments read:
Follows Paton's recommendation and the Palestinian 
Ordinance. A necessary provision in Nigeria.105
At the legislature, Enahoro moved for the words 'who has at 
any time been adjudicated bankrupt or' in clause 14 (1) (b) to 
be left out on the grounds that it was unfair. Arguing by 
analogy, he asserted that:
if I were bankrupt five years ago and have recovered 
from that misfortune, it should not haunt me for 
life and that is no reason why I should not now be 
a bank director.106
His argument was accepted by the Financial Secretary with a 
minor synchronising correction.107 The amendment was then
104 Paton (1948b, pp.16-17).
105 See Bank of England Archive File Number ov68/2, p. 9.
106 House Debates (1952, p. 1144).
107 The Financial Secretary while noting that there was no 
bankruptcy Ordinance in Nigeria at the time argued that it did 
not make sense to leave out the words 'who has at any time 
been adjudicated bankrupt or' and leave the words 'has 
suspended payment or has compounded with his creditors, or'. 
Based on this advise Enahoro subsequently amended his motion.
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agreed on by the legislature.108
5.3k Commencement of the Banking Ordinance
The arguments in the legislature concerning the 
commencement date of the banking ordinance further elucidate 
the suspicious environment under which the banking ordinance 
was promulgated and perhaps the limited understanding of the 
contents of the draft Ordinance by some members of the 
legislature including the Financial Secretary. J A Wachukwu 
proposed an amendment that would allow the bill come into 
effect six calendar months from the date of passing the 
Ordinance. This he explained was to be a compromise position 
in order to allay the fears of the opponents of the bill and 
also give these 'interested parties' an opportunity to put 
things right.109 This point was further explained by another 
Nigerian legislator, E 0 Eyo, who argued that:
the moment this Bill is passed into law, all the 
African banks in this country will find themselves 
in a very tight corner, and I suggest that in 
fairness to them, we should allow them some time to 
tidy up.... [I]f we have already passed one or two
Bills and Government has urged us to agree to the 
law being made with retrospective effect, it will 
not be asking too much if we turn round in this case 
and ask the Government, in view of the strong 
feelings of some people outside this House against 
the Bill, to allow the passing of this law to have 
effect six months hence.110
Another Nigerian legislator, K 0 Mbadiwe supported the
108 See section 14 of the 1952 Nigerian Banking Ordinance.
109 House Debates (1952, p.1127).
110 Ibid, pp.1128-9.
amendment arguing that discretion was the better part of 
valour and taking a middle stance was always a better course 
to follow in any delicate issue.111 The need for the
amendment was however arrogantly, but naively rejected by the 
Financial Secretary. He stated categorically that "the 
government cannot accept this amendment".112 This he
explained was against the philosophy of the banking ordinance 
which he explained was to get some control into the banking 
system and prevent more mushroom banks from springing up. The 
debate was however brought to an end when another Nigerian 
legislator, E Njoku, pointed out that under the draft 
ordinance, existing banks were allowed three years within 
which to fully comply with the provisions of the
ordinance.113
111 Ibid, p. 1130.
112 Ibid, p. 1128.
113 Clause 5 of the draft Banking Ordinance presented to 
the legislature which was unchallenged in the house and 
therefore passed unamended read as follows:
1. Any company lawfully carrying on banking business in 
Nigeria at the date of the commencement of this Ordinance 
which has not on that date a nominal capital of not less than 
twenty five thousand pounds of which not less than twelve 
thousand five hundred pounds has been issued and paid up in 
cash shall , within a period of three years from the date 
aforesaid, increase its nominal capital to an amount not less 
than twenty five thousand pounds of which not less than twelve 
thousand five hundred pounds shall have been issued and paid 
up in cash.
2. Where any banking company fails to comply with the 
requirements of sub-section (1) of this section, it shall at 
the expiry of three years from the date of the commencement of 
this ordinance-
a. cease to carry on banking; and
b. cease to use the word 'bank' or any of its derivatives in 
the name under which it is carrying on business:
Provided that the cessation of banking shall not affect the 
rights of any creditors of the company.
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5.4 Conclusion
The poor capitalization, poor management and sometimes 
fraudulent nature of some of the indigenous banks made 
regulation, on grounds of public interest, plausible. Such 
regulation was however not always compatible with the need for 
the development of a financial system aimed at promoting the 
economic and developmental interest of Africans, which was 
also in the public interest. The Colonial Government therefore 
had to balance the goals of deterring bad banking practices 
and of encouraging a financial system conducive to the 
developmental and economic needs of the Africans. The fact 
that the bill had to be passed by a legislative council 
dominated by Africans did not make their task any easier. 
Accusations that the legislation was simply a tool to deter 
the setting up of local banks while protecting the interest of 
foreign banks were rife.114 These suspicions were not all 
together unfounded. For instance, one of the main reason given 
by the Bank of England for not advising on full scale 
legislation of banking inspection was because "it might 
precipitate a demand for complicated banking control which 
might be objectionable and cause undesirable and unnecessary
114 This pioneer banking ordinance also applied to foreign 
banks except for the fact that while the indigenous banks were 
required to maintain a paid up Capital of £12,500, foreign 
banks were required to maintain £100,000. Unlike most local 
banks, foreign banks did not have much difficulty in complying 
with the provisions of the Ordinance since their headquarters 
were usually abroad and they had better capital base. For 
instance, by 1948, the Bank of British West Africa (BBWA) and 
the Barclays bank had a paid up share capital of £1,200,000 
and £7,121,500 respectively while that of the African 
Continental Bank was only £5,000 (Paton, 1948b, pp.4-6).
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interference with the two chief banks." The provisions of the 
Ordinance were therefore aimed at preventing, rather than 
curing, any unsound banking practices.115 The Ordinance 
therefore did very little to assist the existing indigenous 
banks which were the main culprits of unsound banking 
practices. Rather it threatened their existence. These 
indigenous banks accordingly had to explore other means of 
survival. One such bank was the African Continental Bank.
The next chapter will examine the impact of the 1952 
ordinance on the African Continental Bank and the various 
tactics employed by the bank to ensure that it survived.
115 Bank of England to Overseas and Foreign Office, 15 
February 1957 (OV68/4, folio 47a).
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CHAPTER SIX
THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL BANK CRISIS
6.1 Introduction
As can be deduced from the last chapter, the passing into 
Law of the 1952 Banking Ordinance extensively altered the 
playing field for indigenous banks in the British West African 
Colony of Nigeria. Sections 5(2) and 6(2) of the Ordinance 
gave the existing banks three years within which to comply 
with the provisions of the Ordinance or discontinue banking 
business. The African Continental Bank (ACB) was one of the 
indigenous banks that was already in existence and therefore 
had to comply with the above provisions in order to be 
licensed. This chapter examines the various tactics employed 
by ACB to meet the requirements of the Ordinance, the various 
political issues intertwined with the compliance process, the 
regulatory issues that arose from the compliance process and 
how these issues were tackled by the relevant authorities.
6.2 History of the ACB
The African Continental Bank was originally incorporated 
as Tinubu Associates Limited under the Companies Law Ordinance 
on 15th February 1937.1 On 30th March 1944, the company was
1 Azikiwe, 1956, p.4. The bank's original capital was 
£250 divided into fifty ordinary shares of £5 each- see Report 
of the Tribunal Appointed to Inquire into Allegations 
Reflecting the Official Conduct of the Premier (Foster-Sutton 
Report, 1957, p.3).
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bought by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe (Zik)2 from Mr Rasmussen, his
Swedish friend, and its name was subsequently changed by 
special resolution to Tinubu Bank Limited on 9th February 
1946. The nominal Capital of the Bank was also raised to 
£5,000 by the creation of 950 ordinary shares of £5 each.3
During his speech at the inauguration of the bank, 
Azikiwe made it explicit that he was setting up the bank 
because of the discriminatory attitude of the BBWA towards him 
and his business and his subsequent realisation that political 
freedom without economic freedom, was, at best, not very 
helpful.4 Not surprisingly, therefore, the Azikiwe family and 
the Zik Group of Companies were well represented in the share 
holding,5 board of directors6 and loan portfolio of the
2 A Nationalist and then the leader of one of the 
Political Parties in Nigeria: The National Council of Nigeria 
and the Cameroons (NCNC) . According to Dr Azikiwe, the real 
reason for buying the Company was because one of the objects 
of its memorandum was 'generally to act as bankers to 
customers and others'- See Report on Banking and Finance in 
Eastern Nigeria (1956, p.13). Zik was perceived by the 
Colonial Government as being "anti white" - Richards to Hall, 
9 August, 1946 (PRO CO 583/277/30658).
3 Foster-Sutton Report, 1957, p.3.
4 Azikiwe, 1961, pp.211-3.
5 It has not been possible to access the breakdown of the 
bank's share-holding relating to the period of the 1940s. As 
at March 31, 1955, however, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe and the members 
of his family had the following shares in the bank:
1. Dr N Azikiwe 28,000 £1 Ordinary Shares.
2. Mrs C E Arinze (his sister) 4,000 £1 Ordinary Shares.
3. Miss E O Arinze (a niece) 4,000 £1 Ordinary Shares.
4. Mr O C Azikiwe (his father) 4,000 £1 Ordinary Shares.
5. Mr J O Nwosisi (a cousin) 100 £1 Ordinary Shares.
The following shares in the bank were also held by the Zik 
Group:
Zik Enterprises Limited 49,900 £1 Ordinary Shares.
African Book Co. Ltd. 2,000 £1 Ordinary Shares.
Nigerian Commodities Limited 4,000 £1 Ordinary Shares.
Nigerian Paper Co. Ltd. 2,000 £1 Ordinary Shares.
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bank.7 In being controlled by one individual, the ACB was 
merely following examples set by the pioneer British banks in 
the colony. As noted in chapter 3, at the inception of the 
Bank of British West Africa in 1894, Alfred Jones, then 
Chairman of the Elder Dempster Shipping Company, owned almost 
58% of the bank's share capital.8 The bank, for several years, 
also maintained close links with the Elder Dempster Shipping 
Company.9
In 1953, Dr Azikiwe's party (NCNC) won the general 
elections in the Eastern Region of Nigeria. In January 1954 Dr 
Azikiwe, as leader of the party, was appointed 'Leader of 
Government Business and Minister of Local Government' by the 
then Lieutenant Governor of the Region, Sir Clement Pleass, 
and was invited to form a Government. In accordance with the
Nigerian Printing Supply Co. Ltd. 2,000 £1 Ordinary Shares. 
Dr Azikiwe held substantial interests in all the above 
Companies. He had 44.9% in Zik Enterprises Limited, 45% in the 
African Book Company Limited, 45.4% in the Nigerian Paper Co. 
Ltd., and 63% in the Nigerian Printing Co. Ltd. The total 
number of Ordinary Shares of the bank at the time was 115,935 
(Foster-Sutton Report, p.7).
6 At the end of 1953, apart from Dr Azikiwe who was the 
Chairman, the bank had four other directors: three of them 
were Zik's relatives.
7 In 1951, the following advances were made to the Zik 
Group of Companies by the Bank:
Zik Enterprises Limited £135,000
Comet Press Limited £5,000
Nigerian Printing Supply Company Limited £15,000
Nigerian Real Estate Corporation Limited £50,000.
These were described as investments in the Balance Sheet. In 
addition to these investments, the Zik Group of Companies was 
further indebted to the bank to the tune of £112,173 out of 
the bank's total loans and advances of £471,874 (See Foster- 
Sutton Report, p.8 & appendix E).
8 Fry, 1976, p.26.
9 Baster, 1977, Chapter iv.
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regulations of the time,10 Dr Azikiwe fully disclosed the 
directorships and other interests held by him in the African 
Continental Bank and in the Zik Group of Companies, and 
subsequently resigned from the offices of Chairman and 
Governing Director of the African Continental Bank11 and from 
his Directorships in the Zik Group of Companies.
6.3 Complying with the 1952 Banking Ordinance
Section 6(2) of the 1952 Banking Ordinance, stipulated 
that "every banking company in existence at the time of 
commencement of this Ordinance shall before the expiry of 
three months from such commencement,.. apply in writing to the 
Financial Secretary for a licence...." On August 20, 1952, the 
African Continental Bank applied to the Financial Secretary 
for a banking licence12 in compliance with the above section 
of the Ordinance. On October 13, 1953, the Financial Secretary 
replied, declining to grant the licence. The bank was advised
10 The regulations of the time with regards to the 
disclosure obligations and conduct of Government Ministers 
were spelt out in a dispatch from the Secretary of State of 
the Colonies with reference Number WAF/39/3/05 dated December 
1, 1951 and addressed to the Officer administering the 
Government of Nigeria (Foster-Sutton Report, 1957, p.5) .
11 In his resignation letter Dr Azikiwe appointed Mr A 
Kofi Blackson, who was also a director of the bank, to act in 
his place and to "exercise all powers and enjoy all privileges 
appertaining to these offices excepting that of shareholder 
until your company has had opportunity to make necessary 
arrangements in accordance with your memorandum and articles 
of association." Blackson was described in an internal memo of 
the Bank of England as "an African stooge of Dr. Azikiwe and 
reputed to be hopelessly incompetent"- Loynes to Parsons, July 
16, 1956 (BEAFN OV68/3, folio 93).
12 Letters with reference Numbers HO/58/5/52. This was 
followed up with a second letter with reference number 
HO/58/9/52 dated 6th October 1952 (Foster-Sutton, 1957, p.5).
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that before the request could be reviewed, it would be 
necessary for the ACB to follow up the following points: (i)
increase the ratio of cash reserves to time and demand 
liabilities to a minimum of 30% within the next six months; 
(ii) provide adequate information as to the current value of 
the investments by the bank including the latest audited 
balance sheet of the companies in which the bank holds shares 
or debentures; (iii) provide a copy of the latest audited 
balance sheet of the bank in accordance with section 12(c) of 
the banking Ordinance and (iv) complete the reconciliation of 
the inter-branch accounts.13
The conclusions of the Financial Secretary were 
consistent with an October 1953 secret report, by the Banking 
Officer, on the banking position in Nigeria.14 The report 
frowned at the unhealthy economic climate of the bank, 
stressing widespread staff embezzlement, loss of deposits, low 
liquidity ratio and under-capitalization.15 Also, the bank's 
total cash reserves of £58,000 (30th June 1953) were seen as 
too slender to withstand any abnormal demands by its 
depositors.16 A subsequent report in 1954, by the same Banking 
Officer was consistent with the 1953 report and concluded that 
the position of the bank was "dubious and unsatisfactory in
13 Foster-Sutton Report, 1957, p.6.
14 Under the Banking Ordinance of 1952, a Banking Officer 
was appointed in the Ministry of Finance to monitor the 
enforcement of the Ordinance. He was responsible to the 
Financial Secretary.
15 BEAFN OV68/2, folio 110.
16 Ibid.
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the extreme".17 Given the above circumstance, it was unlikely 
that the bank could meet the three years deadline for 
compliance with the new ordinance. The threat of a run on the 
bank was even more immediate.
In an apparent attempt to meet some of the conditions set 
by the Financial Secretary for the granting of a Banking 
Licence, especially that relating to the ratio of cash 
reserves to the time and demand liabilities, the General 
Manager addressed a memo to each of the fourteen branches of 
the bank,18 its main purpose being to draw their attention to 
the absolute need for conserving sufficiently large reserves 
in liquid assets (cash) at the end of March, particularly on 
the 31st March (1954), so that the bank's overall percentage 
of cash on hand to the total of Current, Deposit and Other 
Accounts would, if not conform to the requirements of the 
Banking Ordinance, at least meet them halfway. To this end, 
branches were advised to conduct vigorous house to house 
campaigns for cash deposits by customers against the end of 
the month. The understanding was that depositors should be 
free to withdraw their deposits after the 31st March target 
date.19
This cajoling of depositors and debtors into placing 
their funds with the bank for a single day at the end of the 
accounting period so that these monies could be counted as
17 BEAFN OV68/3, folio 23, p. 2.
18 The memo which was dated 19th March 1954, was marked 
'Strictly Confidential' and titled 'Reserve of Liquid Assets' .
19 Memo reproduced in Foster-Sutton Report, 1957, p.6.
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liquid in order to achieve legal compliance with the Banking 
Ordinance, at least as interpreted by the Financial Secretary, 
were mere palliatives. What actually saved the bank was the 
decision of the Eastern Region Finance Corporation in May 1955 
to invest £877,000 in the bank's equity.20
6.4 The Role of the Eastern Region Finance Corporation
The ability of indigenous banks to survive under the 
conditions set by the Banking Ordinance of 1952 was not only 
questioned by the immediate post regulation happenings in 
these banks,21 but also by the Bank of England. In an internal 
memo, J B Loynes, then an Adviser to the Governors of the Bank 
of England, expressed doubts as to whether:
an African Commercial Bank of any size, doing 
African business and being properly run could make 
an adequate profit in present circumstances. Private 
Capital was unlikely to be forthcoming in any 
quantity and on a straight-forward investment basis. 
Hence official support whether capital, deposits or 
subsidy was probably inevitable.22
The NCNC, apparently thinking along similar lines, made as one 
of their party policies the nationalisation of all banks upon 
attaining self government in Nigeria.23 On its return in 1954,
20 Tignor (1993, p.192). See also Deloitte Plender 
Griffiths and Co (Deloittes Report, 1956, p.2).
21 In 1954 alone, 16 of the then existing 24 indigenous 
banks failed.
22 Memo dated 19/3/57 BEAFN OV68/4 folio 56c.
23 This policy was based on the following principles: (a) 
to discourage monopoly of monetary transactions by any one 
bank; (b) to liberalise credit facilities for Nigerian 
entrepreneurs; (c) to encourage the development of indigenous
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the Economic Mission of the Government of the Eastern Region 
to Europe and North America24 recommended that a statutory 
body known as the Finance Corporation should be established to 
kindle investments in business enterprises and financial 
institutions. The committee also recommended that the proposed 
Corporation should make a considerable investment in an 
indigenous bank to enable it 'always to control not less than 
three-fourths of the equity capital of that bank' and that the 
bank should in addition to being used as a depository of 
public funds, be 'the nucleus for a central bank'.25
In December 1954, the House of Assembly enacted the 
Eastern Region Finance Corporation Law. This vested the 
Corporation with the authority to finance agriculture, trade, 
commerce and industry by granting loans or subsidies or by the 
taking up of loan or share capital in any government agency, 
statutory corporation, local government body, co-operative 
society or a limited liability company.26 On 6th April 1955, 
the Finance Corporation held its inaugural meeting, at which 
the then Finance Minister of the Eastern Region, Mbonu Ojike 
announced that a grant of two million pounds was being made 
available to the Corporation as working capital.27 The meeting
Nigerian banking and (d) to plan for the eventual 
establishment of a state bank.
24 The delegation was led by Dr Azikiwe.
25 Report on Banking and Finance in Eastern Nigeria, 1956,
p.4.
26 Eastern Region Finance Corporation Law 1954.
27 This grant was made by the Eastern Region Marketing 
Board. The circumstances in which this was done was one of the 
issues investigated by the Foster-Sutton inquiry (pp.67-78).
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then unanimously agreed that the Corporation invest £750,000 
of its funds in the purchase of shares in the African 
Continental Bank.28 An application was subsequently made to 
the African Continental Bank and on May 20, 1955, an agreement 
was signed between the Corporation and the bank.29
On June 26, 1956, Mr E O Eyo30 moved a motion in the
Eastern House of Assembly which requested that "an independent 
commission of enquiry be appointed forthwith to enquire into 
the circumstances surrounding the investment and/ or deposit 
of public funds of the Eastern Region totalling nearly £2
28 Foster-Sutton Report, 1957, p.23. A subsequent board 
meeting of the Eastern Region Finance Corporation, held on the 
27th of July 1955, increased the amount investible in ACB 
shares to £877,000 (ibid, p.26).
29 The terms of this agreement were as follows: (1) The 
bank shall increase its nominal capital from £250,000 to £1 
million and pay all the preliminary expenses entailed, 
including stamp duty on capital, fees and deed stamp; (2) The 
corporation shall purchase from the bank and the bank shall 
sell to the corporation 784,000 Ordinary Shares and 93000 
Preference Shares at £1 per share of either denomination; (3) 
The bank shall pay the Corporation £87,700 as commission for 
purchasing the above mentioned Ordinary and preference Shares;
(4) The Corporation shall be at liberty to appoint any banking 
company to act as managing agents of the bank for and on 
behalf of the Corporation so long as it has controlling shares 
in the bank; (5) The bank shall waive the restriction in its 
Articles of Association and sanction any transfer of shares 
from any shareholder to the Corporation, provided the sale is 
negotiated at par value per share; (6) The Corporation shall 
nominate five and the bank shall nominate four out of the nine 
directors including the Chairman; (7) The Corporation and the 
Bank shall adjust all outstanding obligations of the bank to 
its directors and shareholders to the mutual satisfaction of 
both parties (Report on Banking and Finance in Eastern 
Nigeria, 1956, p.6).
30 Formerly an ally of Dr. Azikiwe. Once described by the 
Glasgow Herald of 25th July, 1956 as a 'bizarre figure' who 
attained the high rank of Chief Whip, deputy speaker and 
chairman of the Regional Development Corporation in Eastern 
Nigeria despite the fact that he had served five years eleven 
months with hard labour for being in possession of counterfeit 
coins (p.7).
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million in June 1955 in the African Continental Bank Limited 
in which Azikiwe, the Premier of the Eastern Region had an 
interest".31 This motion was however not debated since there 
was a related case still pending in Court and the Standing 
Order of the House, Section 25(3) forbade references to be 
made to any matter on which a judicial decision was pending in 
such a way as might, in the Speakers' opinion, prejudice the 
interests of the parties thereto. The inability of the house 
to debate the motion was however interpreted differently by 
the Bank of England, in an internal memo, Mr J B Loynes 
asserted that:
Dr. Azikiwe managed to block Mr. Eyo's first motion 
by getting the Speaker (an African) to rule it out 
of order. Dr. Azikiwe was then clever enough to 
bring an action for libel which is pending against 
Mr. Eyo and the Newspaper which published the 
latter's accusations. This has given the Speaker 
firmer grounds for rejecting Mr. Eyo's further 
attempts to discuss the matter in the regional 
parliament .32
Apart from his motion, Mr Eyo also appealed to the Regional 
Governor.33 The Colonial Government saw this as providing the 
last opportunity before Regional Independence to inject some 
understanding of financial rectitude into the Government of 
the Eastern Region,34 an opportunity to discredit Azikiwe who
31 Eastern Region House of Assembly Debates, June 26 1956,
p.65.
32 Memo dated 6th July 1956 (BEAFN OV68/3, folio 89).
33 Bank of England Internal Memo dated 29/6/56 (BEAFN 
OV68/3, folio 85).
34 Bank of England internal memo dated 6th July 1956 
(BEAFN OV68/3, folio 89).
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they did not like35 and a pretext to postpone the 
Constitutional Conference in order to maximise the benefits of 
colonisation.36 Amidst controversy,37 the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies set up the Foster-Sutton Commission of 
enquiry38 with terms of reference which differed fundamentally 
from the original intentions of Mr E 0 Eyo who moved the 
initial motion in the house.39 Under these terms of reference,
35 Internal Memo dated 29/6/56 (BEAFN OV68/3, Folio 85).
36 Azikiwe (1956, p.2) .
37 Before the 1952 Constitution, the Secretary of State 
could set up such a Commission under section 22 of the 
Commission of Inquiry Ordinance without consulting with any 
one. At that time there were no Regional Governments. With the 
creation of the regional Governments in 1951 and the advent of 
the 1952 Constitution, the Secretary of State could only set 
up such a commission on matters relating to the Regions on the 
advise of such regional Governments. The infeasibility of this 
option led to the introduction of an Order in Council which 
gave a legal cloak to the actions of the then Secretary of 
State. This Order in Council was described by the then British 
Attorney General as nothing more than a piece of machinery to 
overcome a 'technicality'. See Azikiwe (1956) for further 
discussions in this area.
38 Members of the Commission included: Stafford Foster- 
Sutton, Chief Justice of the Federation of Nigeria; Joseph 
Henri Maximede Comarmond, Chief Justice of the High Court of 
Lagos and of the High Court of the Southern Cameroons; Vincent 
Akinfemi Savage, a Chief Magistrate in the Eastern Region of 
Nigeria and George Forrest Saunders, Fellow of the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. Initially Dr 
Azikiwe pressed that the inquiry be conducted by Savage (an 
African). Though the Colonial Government believed that Savage 
was incorruptible, they feared that he was far too 
inexperienced to conduct an enquiry of such magnitude and may 
be 'brow beaten' by Zik. He was however co-opted as the fourth 
member of the commission as a gesture to Azikiwe- Loynes to 
Parsons, 19/7/56 (BEAFN OV68/3, folio 96). An earlier idea 
that a banker be made a member of the Commission, was dropped 
by the Colonial Office because of Zik's accusations about 
British Banking monopoly- Loynes to Hawker, 23/7/56 (BEAFN 
OV68/3, folio 97).
39 The Tribunal which was appointed to inquire into the 
allegations reflecting on the Official Conduct of the Premier 
of and certain persons holding Ministerial and other Public
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the Commission of Enquiry was mandated to probe into all the 
business activities of the Premier not only before the
investments of public funds in the African Continental Bank, 
but also before he became a Minister. This was tantamount to 
a personal attack on the integrity of the Premier.40
This was perhaps the first major flaw in the Banking 
regulatory process in Nigeria. The probe which could have been 
used to settle some major issues in banking regulation, was 
instead primarily and purposely directed at a person (Dr 
Nnamdi Azikiwe) all for political reasons. The disaffection 
the Colonial Administration had for Azikiwe was evident, and 
was explicitly stated by a senior Bank of England official. In
Offices in the Eastern Region of Nigeria, was specifically 
required to look into the following matters: (1) Allegations
of improper conduct on the part of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Premier 
of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, in connection with the 
affairs of the African Continental Bank; (2) The circumstances 
in which securities or the proceeds of securities belonging to 
the Eastern Region Marketing Board were transferred to the 
Eastern Region Finance Corporation and the circumstances in 
which such proceeds were invested in or deposited with the 
African Continental Bank Limited; (3) The relationship, direct 
or indirect, between Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe and the African 
Continental Bank Limited, its Directors, shareholders or 
officers, at all times, whether before or after such 
investment or deposit as aforesaid, material to the 
circumstances as aforementioned; (4) The relationship between 
the Eastern Region Finance Corporation and the African 
Continental Bank Limited at all material times as aforesaid;
(5) The relationship between any body or organisation, 
corporate or unincorporate in which Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe has or 
had at any material time as aforesaid, an interest, whether 
direct or indirect, and the African Continental Bank Limited;
(6) The use made of the resources of the African Continental 
Bank Limited whether before or after the investments and 
deposits referred to in paragraph 2 were made, in so far as 
any such use appears to the Tribunal to be material for the 
foregoing purposes and (7) Whether in respect of any of the 
aforesaid matters any person holding ministerial or other 
public office has infringed the standards of conduct demanded 
of the holder of such office and if so in what respect.
40 The Economist, August 25 1956, p.622.
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apparent reference to the issue of injecting Marketing Board 
Capital into the African Continental Bank, the official
asserted that:
The Colonial Office do not like Dr. Azikiwe and 
would be privately glad to see a commission set 
up.41
This dislike for Azikiwe may not have been unrelated to his 
Nationalist activities. British Officials were usually quick 
to complain about corruption and self-enrichment whenever 
Africans challenged British hegemony.42 Before the Foster- 
Sutton Commission was inaugurated, the Colonial Office had 
already found Dr Azikiwe guilty. Its minute books of September 
1955, in reference to the investment of public funds in the 
ACB, noted that:
such partisan action is a clearly dishonourable 
departure from the ethical conduct we are entitled 
to demand from people in Dr Azikiwe's position.... 
Zik wants money. Zik is a lazy man. Zik is not in 
any way at all an ascetic nor in any way at all a 
man who believes that what he could do for Nigerians 
would be in Nigeria's own interests. Zik is 
motivated by one interest only: his own interest. 
And his own interest is money and the pleasure and 
power that money can buy.43
At another occasion, Azikiwe was described by the Colonial 
Office as:
41 Loynes to Hawker, 29/6/56 (BEAFN OV68/3, folio.85).
42 Tignor, 1993, p. 180.
43 Colonial Office Minutes, September 1955 (PRO CO 
554/1181) .
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Lazy, out for money and women, with ambitions to
become an international statesman.44
The disdain for Azikiwe by the Colonial Masters did not 
however start with the African Continental Bank 'Scandal'. In 
1945 during a controversy on an alleged plot to assassinate 
Azikiwe, he was described by the then Governor Alan Richards 
as 'no longer sane... an irresponsible lunatic'.45
It was perhaps this paranoia for Dr. Azikiwe that blurred 
the Colonial Office's vision of the regulatory issues at 
stake. Naivety or ignorance on the part of the Colonial 
Office, were certainly not the case. This was so since 
Wainwright, an expatriate inspector with the African 
Continental Bank had secretly informed the Colonial Government 
in Nigeria of the alarming irregularities and the unhealthy 
financial position that existed in the bank46. Wainwright 
identified the causes of the unhealthy situation as follows; 
(1) As at 31st March 1955 there was a loss of £168,500 and 
this was expected to be considerably larger at the end of 
March 1956; (2) Management was so inept that large sums of
money were lying idle on current account in London earning no 
interest; (3) The bank's only investments were debentures in 
the Zik Group of Companies, the value of which was at best 
arguable (4) The bank's outstanding advances at Yaba Branch 
alone amounted to £250,000 at the end of May. Of this,
44 T.B Williamson to J.B. Johnston, 6th January 1955 (PRO 
CO 554/840).
45 PRO CO 583/275/30647/1A.
46 Acting Governor General of Nigeria to Secretary of 
State, 12/7/56 (BEAFN OV68/3 folio 91).
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£187,000 was shown to be unsecured. Advances to the Zik Group 
from Yaba branch at the end of April were over £92,000 and by 
19th June had increased to over £100,000. Advances to NCNC 
Party accounts were over £40,000. Even where advances were 
said to be secured, the security was dubious.
The Bank of England's view of the weaknesses noted in the 
Wainwright report was that they "did not necessarily suggest 
that the bank was in danger or that false returns had been 
made".47 For instance, the losses up to March 1955 were 
incurred before the injection of money from the Eastern Region 
Finance Corporation. Also, failure to employ large cash 
balances in London suggested incompetence on the part of the 
Management but not dishonesty. Furthermore, the Bank of 
England argued, many indigenous banks tended to overinvest in 
Government Securities or local industries and it was natural 
in the Eastern Region that they should play a large part in 
financing Azikiwe's enterprises. The propriety of granting 
unsecured advances depended on the credit worthiness of the 
borrower.48
The incompetence of the Management and Staff of 
indigenous banks and its inherent dangers had been identified 
by the Paton Report of 194849 and Paton subsequently advised 
that everything possible should be done to raise the standard 
of banking practice amongst Nigerians. In particular, he
47 Secret internal Memo signed by J B Loynes and dated 
16th July 1956 (BEAFN OV68/3 folio 93).
48 Ibid.
49 Paton Report, 1948b, p.17.
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advised that Government give consideration to the provision of 
grants to enable selected Nigerians to undergo courses or
training with leading banks in the United Kingdom.50 The 
Colonial Government ignored this recommendation,51 probably 
because they were only interested in preventing local banks 
from being a nuisance, and not in encouraging their 
development.52
Apparently inspired by the disclosures of Wainwright, the 
Colonial Office instigated the Financial Secretary to order an 
investigation into the affairs of the African Continental Bank 
in advance of the Foster-Sutton Commission of Enquiry (the 
Deloittes Enquiry)53 and in 1958, there was another enquiry
50 Ibid.
51 D T Akinbiyi (House of Representatives Debate, 1952,
p.1116) .
52 For instance, the 1952 Ordinance stipulated minimum 
reserve requirements without providing a 'reserve force' and 
no lender of last resort to assist banks in distress. It also 
required banks to maintain adequate liquidity without 
providing investible money market instruments. This made 
indigenous banks to operate at heavy expense by maintaining 
all their liquidity in idle cash (Nwankwo, 1990, p.19).
53 In a secret internal memo of the Bank of England dated 
16/7/56, J B Loynes asserted that 'the Colonial Office wished 
to have an investigation made of the bank's affairs in advance 
of the Commission of Enquiry. I said that it might be 
considered as a separate matter reflecting on the good 
management and solvency of the bank although it might well 
provide material for the Commission's scrutiny of Azikiwe's 
doings. The ideal method of starting the investigation was to 
have a petition from a substantial body of depositors or 
shareholders in the bank, but this was probably not feasible. 
The Nigerian Banking Ordinance permitted the Financial 
Secretary to order an investigation on his own initiative but 
he must presumably be able to justify his action. Whether he 
could refer to Wainwright's disclosures seemed doubtful; but 
perhaps there were other grounds' (BEAFN OV68/3, folio 93).
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by Price Waterhouse.54
6.5 The Investigation Reports
Neither the Foster-Sutton nor Deloittes enquiries found 
that any funds of the bank had been misappropriated.55 The 
reports, like that of Wainwright, however raised various 
regulatory and Management issues. The issues raised by the 
reports included: (a) the practice of banks allowing some of
their Capital to lie idle without earning interest rates; (b) 
the 'inadequate' rate of interest on some loans, overdrafts 
and debentures; (c) the prevailing practice of charging high 
service charges by foreign banks; (d) improper execution of 
guarantees; (e) long outstanding uncalled capital and (f) 
payment of directors fees out of capital.
6.5a The Issue of Idle Capital
The Deloittes report, while acknowledging an improvement 
in this regard, went on to suggest that the bank was still not 
employing its funds in the best possible way. The report 
further asserted that:
It is unusual for such a large part (29.5%) of a 
bank's total funds to be earning no interest at all, 
particularly when 34% of those total funds 
represents customers' deposits on Savings and Time
54 No copy of this report appears to have survived. An 
insight into the terms of reference of and the result of the 
inquiry can however be gotten from a July 1, 1958 internal 
memo of the Bank of England (See BEAFN OV68/6, Folio 35a).
55 Deloittes Report (1956, p.l). and Foster-Sutton Report 
(1956, p.43). The Foster-Sutton report was however of the view 
that Azikiwe's conduct, in the whole affair, fell short of the 
expectations of honest, reasonable people (p.42).
193
Deposit Accounts on which an average rate of 
interest of 2% per annum has to be paid.56
The report subsequently recommended that the bank should 
endeavour to have as much of its funds as possible earning 
interest at all times.57
On the issue of these idle balances, an internal memo of 
the Bank of England wondered whether Barclays Bank, which was 
the custodian of a substantial amount of these funds, ever 
drew the attention of the African Continental Bank to the 
possibilities of employing the idle funds,58 and described the 
level of Cash in Hand as 'astonishing'.59 In the aggregate 
however, this was not abnormal in the Nigerian context. For 
instance, as at December 31, 1953, the ratio of liquid assets 
to total deposits of all Commercial Banks in Nigeria was 69% 
and the ratio of liquid assets to demand deposits was 88%.60 
By 1956, the ratios had reduced to 50% and 70% respectively.61 
These high liquidity ratios were not unrelated to the absence 
of a Central Bank and of a developed Securities Market.62
Since the liquidity ratio of banks are usually inversely 
correlated to the amount of loans and advances they are able
56 Deloittes Report (1956, p.2) .
57 Ibid, p. 9.
58 Loynes to Parsons, 12/10/56 (BEAFN OV68/4, folio 21).
59 Ibid,
60 IBRD, 1955, p. 153.
61 Report of the Advisory Committee on Aids to African 
Businessmen (1959, p.9).
62 Rowan (1952, p.163). See also Nwankwo (1990, p.19).
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to make, this inadvertently limited the amount of loans and 
advances granted by these banks. In December 1953, loans and 
advances accounted for only 33.3% of the total deposits of all 
Nigerian Commercial Banks.63 This low ratio of loans to 
deposits was compensated for by higher interest rates.64
6,5b Interest Rate Charges
Unlike Greaves (1953), the Deloittes report considered 
the interest rate question within the context of the bank's 
dealings. According to the Report, the rate of interest 
charged on loans and overdrafts varied from 3% to 10%. 
Compared with the average rate of 9% charged by the bank to 
other borrowers, the rate of 3% charged to A G Leventis and Co 
Limited and that of 6% charged to Zik Enterprises Limited and 
Associated Companies were considered low.65 The report further 
suggested that unless the ACB operated efficiently and charged 
adequate rates of interest, it would not be able to earn the 
necessary profits to enable it to build up sufficient reserves 
to meet unforeseen losses from bad debts. Such losses were to 
be expected if the bank continued to take unduly high credit 
risks as evidenced by the large amount of bad and doubtful
63 IBRD Report, 1955, p. 153.
64 The rates charged by the British Banks appear to exceed 
those in other British Colonies outside West Africa. For 
instance, it was estimated that interest rates charged by 
these banks were usually between 4-6% in the West Indies as 
compared with 6-8% in West Africa- See Greaves (1953, p.47).
65 At that time it was possible to obtain 5% interest on 
British Government Treasury Bills and 3.5% on Seven days Time 
Deposits with the Commercial Banks in London (Deloittes 
Report, 1956, p.2).
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debts already incurred.66
The 3% interest rate charged Leventis related to a loan 
of £300,000. It was suggested to the Foster-Sutton Commission 
that this was unduly favourable to the Company and may have in 
fact been inordinately influenced by Dr Azikiwe who had cause 
to be grateful to Leventis. In a letter to Mr Blackson, the 
General Manager of the ACB, dated January 30, 1954, Dr.
Azikiwe, in apparent reference to the help received from 
Leventis by Pilot Newspapers, where he had financial 
interests, pronounced that: "But for Leventis, the Pilot would 
have had a terrible time...." thus "we should be grateful to 
this firm for its considerateness in extending credit 
facilities to this young Nigerian Company".67
The Deloittes report also expressed further reservations 
on the loan to Leventis observing that:
it is secured on land and buildings and is stated to 
be repayable on demand.... Whether in fact the loan 
can be repaid on demand depends on the financial 
position of A.G. Leventis and Co. Limited of which 
we have no knowledge. Commercial companies 
ordinarily borrow money on a short term basis only 
to finance their trading activities, and when the 
money is invested in trading stocks and other 
working capital, it is not generally possible to 
repay it on demand.... A.G Leventis and Co. Ltd., 
have confirmed to us the nature of the loan.68
The Foster-Sutton report however concluded that the criticism 
of the above transaction was not well founded as in fact the
66 Ibid, p.2.
67 Foster-Sutton Report, 1957, p.35.
68 Deloittes Report, 1956, pp.6-7.
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'low' interest rate charge was not unconnected with another 
service rendered the bank by Leventis.69
6.5c High Service Charges
Sometimes intertwined with these low interest rate 
charges is the issue of high service charges charged by banks, 
especially British banks. For instance, the low interest rate 
charged Leventis was not unconnected with a previous service 
rendered the bank in this area. Between April and June 1956, 
Leventis helped the bank to avoid transfer charges on 
remittances totalling £650,000. The purpose of the 
transactions was to transfer £650,000 of the bank's funds from 
London to Nigeria without incurring the normal transfer cost 
of 0.5% of remittances. The money was paid to A.G. Leventis 
and Co. Ltd. in Manchester and their Nigerian offices repaid 
it to the Kano, Port Harcourt and Yaba branches of the bank by 
cheques drawn on local banks. Deloittes satisfied itself that 
the money was infact repaid to the bank in Nigeria about the 
same time that it was paid out in London.70
These service charges were a major source of income for 
the British Banks in the West African Colony, and were 
frequently criticised as excessive. A 1951 report in the Gold 
Coast colony noted this fact and recommended that internal 
remittances should be made available freely at cheaper 
rates.71 In Nigeria, the story was not much different.
69 See next sub-heading.
70 p.4.
71 Trevor Report (1951, paragraph 123).
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According to the IBRD Report:
The business of. the European Banks has been to 
provide services rather than to extend credit. The 
greater part of their income comes from service 
charges. Internal remittances bear high charges, the 
rates ranging from .25% for short distance transfers 
such as from Lagos to Ibadan to 1% for transfer to 
an outlying branch such as Maiduguri. These charges 
and in particular, high minimum charges, have 
frequently been criticised as excessive.72
Other methods of avoiding these charges included the use of 
Post Office Savings Bank accounts for internal remittances73 
and in some cases by merchants undertaking to transfer large 
sums of currency themselves usually by air.74 The Deloittes 
report did not comment on the above connection either because 
it was not apparent to them and/or it was beyond the scope of 
their terms of reference. Regulation in this direction was 
also not anticipated by the Financial Secretary or the 
Colonial Office, arguably because foreign banks were the sole 
benefactors of the status quo.
6.5d Loans Secured by Guarantees
Section 7(1) of the 1952 Banking Ordinance prohibited 
unsecured loans or advances in excess of £300 to a private 
company in which any one of its directors is interested as 
director. Accordingly, all the loans to the Zik Group of
72 1955, p.155.
73 At that time, the savings system permitted withdrawals 
without charge any where in Nigeria irrespective of the place 
of deposit.
74 IBRD Report, 1955, p. 155.
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Companies were 'secured' mainly by written undertakings by Mr 
M N Ugochukwu and Mr L P Ojukwu75 guaranteeing the loans.76 
The Deloittes report expressed some reservations on the 
ability of the Zik Group of Companies to repay these loans. 
According to the report, Zik Enterprises Limited and 
associated companies, to whom the loans and overdrafts had 
been made, were shown, by their 1954 accounts, to be 
insolvent. They therefore could not be expected to repay their 
loans and overdrafts if called upon to do so. All the Group 
Companies reported losses in 1954 with the exception of two 
which made very small profits and one, namely, Zik Enterprises 
Limited, which made a profit of £2,673. This however was due 
entirely to a non recurring profit of £8,852 on the sale of 
political party buttons to the National Council of Nigeria and 
the Cameroons.77
With regards to the guarantees by Messrs Ojukwu and 
Ugochukwu, the report noted that Mr Ojukwu's letter was dated 
November 17, 1955 but that his oral undertaking was said to 
date from January, 1953. Mr Ugochukwu's letter was dated 
November 28, 1955 and his oral undertaking was said to date 
from June, 1954. Both men confirmed to Deloittes that their 
guarantees were still effective at the time of the inquiry. 
They however made no reference to the dates on which their
75 Both were prominent African Businessmen.
76 Though Azikiwe had resigned his directorships of these 
companies, Blackson was still a director in some of them.
77 Deloittes Report, 1956, p. 6.
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oral undertakings were said to have been given.78
On the legal validity of these guarantees, the report 
asserted that Deloittes had been advised that Mr Ugochukwu's 
letter was no more than an invitation to enter into 
negotiations and that Mr Ugochukwu could not be sued on it. 
Also, the wording of Mr Ojukwu's letter was generally vague so 
that he could almost certainly escape liability if he wished 
to do so; it was not stated, for example, whether the 
guarantees applied to existing or future overdrafts, or both. 
The mandatory stamp required for such an agreement was also 
missing though it could be affixed later on payment of a 
penalty.79 The Bank of England also arrived at similar 
conclusions.80 The Foster-Sutton report however threw more 
light on the issue suggesting that the guarantees were only 
confirmed in writing at the request of the then Auditors of 
the bank.81 The report went on to assert that Mr Ojukwu, in 
the course of giving evidence had confirmed that he considered 
himself bound by his undertaking. He was believed by the 
committee.82
6.5e Unpaid Capital
Inconsistencies in both the practice and procedure of 
calling up subscribed Capital was also pointed out by the
78 Ibid, p.5.
79 Ibid.
80 Internal memo dated 1/7/56 (BEAFN OV68/6, folio 35a).
81 Akintola Williams and Co.
82 BEAFN OV68/6, folio 35.
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Foster-Sutton Report. According to the report, of the 
principal shareholders in the bank, as at March 31, 1955,
almost all the unpaid capital related to shares held by Dr 
Azikiwe and his family and the Companies of the Zik Group. The 
majority of the other shareholders were called upon to pay for 
their shares in full.83 Not all Dr. Azikiwe7 s shares, however, 
were partly unpaid. Those originally purchased by him in 
Tinubu Properties Limited in 1944 were fully paid. Due to 
improper accounting records, it was impossible for the 
commission to determine how much has been paid up on any one 
share.84 The Foster-Sutton report further noted that although 
Dr. Azikiwe had, by his own holding and through the shares 
owned by the Zik Group of Companies, a major interest in the 
bank, on the basis of Capital invested, the voting power he 
controlled was even greater as, under the Articles of 
Association, each ordinary shareholder was entitled to one 
vote per share irrespective of whether it was fully paid or 
not.85
The Deloittes report was also in broad agreement with the 
Foster-Sutton views. According to the report:
some of the shares have been fully paid up while 
others have been only partly paid up and even these 
vary in the proportions that have been paid up. We 
have been unable to obtain a satisfactory 
explanation of the position regarding the amounts 
actually called up and in arrear.86
83 Foster-Sutton Report, 1957, p.8.
84 Ibid, p. 9.
85 Ibid.
86 Deloittes Report, 1956, p.9.
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The report then recommended that the outstanding capital be 
called up and if not paid within a reasonable time the shares 
should be forfeited.87 J B Loynes of the Bank of England, 
obviously personalising the issue, regretted the delayed 
action of the Financial Secretary. He argued that:
if the Financial Secretary in Lagos had acted when 
the bank was in difficulties, it might have been 
possible to call up more capital and certainly to 
write off capital already paid up and, if necessary, 
to wind up the bank. Once Zik had arranged the 
injection of nearly £2mn. of Regional Government 
money, the bank was put in a strong financial 
position however inefficient or corrupt the 
management. There is now no immediate need for a 
call on the shares which may now possess a market 
value for the first time.88
On the thinking of the Colonial Office that Azikiwe alone 
among the shareholders should be asked to pay up the 
outstanding balance on his 28,000 shares and that those shares 
should then be taken over by the Eastern Regional Government 
at a price to be fixed, Mr Loynes argued that it was pointless 
to call up the unpaid balance on the shares if the adjudicator 
were then to value them at the paid up figure or even higher. 
After all, whatever Azikiwe's misdeeds, he was entitled to the 
market value of his share on surrender. Also, it was neither 
practically or legally possible to make a call on one 
shareholder without making on others.89
87 Ibid.
88 Loynes to Bolton, 30/1/57 (BEAFN OV68/4, folio 45).
89 Ibid.
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Despite the strong position of Azikiwe, at least with 
regards to compensation for his shares in the ACB, he still 
offered to surrender these shares without compensation.90
6.5£ Payment of Directors' Fees Out of Capital
Another concern that arose from the Foster-Sutton 
Inquiry, was the issue of paying directors' fees out of 
Capital. Prior to the investment of public funds in the 
African Continental Bank, outstanding directors' fees which 
had been suspended over the years totalled £10, 092.91 Once 
public money was injected into the bank, the outstanding fees 
were cleared.92 The Foster-Sutton report considered this to 
be inappropriate. According to the report:
There is of course nothing wrong in the payment of 
directors outstanding fees due to them, but in the 
circumstances here and bearing in mind that the 
payment was only rendered possible by the injection 
of public money into the bank, we think the 
transaction is open to question.93
The Bank of England agreed with the above view, but noted that 
there was only a moral and not a legal case of restitution for 
the return to the bank of the directors fees paid out of the
90 BEAFN OV68/4, folio 47.
91 On several occasions in the past, the payment of these 
directors fees had been put off apparently due to the limited 
resources of the bank (See Foster-Sutton Report, 1957, p.33) .
92 Of the said sum, Zik received £5,252, Mr O C Azikiwe 
(his father) received £2,000, Mrs C E Arinze (his sister) 
received £1,550 and Mr Blackson (the General Manager of the 
bank) received £1,150.
93 p.33.
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Government's funds deposited with the bank and not out of the 
banks earnings.94
Azikiwe eager to be seen as co-operating, offered to pay 
back his share of the directors fees provided that the bank 
acknowledged a debt to him for these fees and undertook to 
repay it out of its current earnings.95 The Colonial Office 
considered the offer as 'very fair and reasonable' but however 
noted that there was no prospect in attempting to get the 
other members of the Azikiwe family to surrender their 
directors fees.96 The Bank of England however saw the whole 
gesture as worthless since the banks resources and income at 
that point, were enough to permit handing back the money to 
Azikiwe immediately.97
6.5g Other Concerns
Following the publication of the various reports, the 
Eastern Regional Government started campaigning for the 
Nationalisation of the African Continental Bank in line with 
the NCNC policy. This move was interpreted differently by the 
Bank of England. In a secret internal memo, J B Loynes of the 
bank asserted that:
Azikiwe, who is now again feeling his strength, has
announced that he wants the Federal Constitution
amended to enable the Eastern Region to
94 BEAFN OV68/4, folio 45.
95 BEAFN OV68/4, folio 47.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
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'nationalise' the African Continental Bank. The bulk 
of the Banks shares are already owned by a Regional 
Government Institution, but formal nationalisation 
would suit Azikiwe for political reasons and as a 
method of bailing out the private shareholders 
(largely his relations and friends) .98
At the time in question, there was a widespread subscription 
to the view that regional Governments' investment in banks was 
inevitable whatever the constitutional position." Mr Loynes 
of the Bank of England, however opposed any such Government 
ownership or even large Government participation whether as 
shareholder or depositor, on the grounds that "it was a 
potential danger to the interest of the region and British 
Banks. »100
In another internal memo Mr Loynes, while admitting the 
impossibility of local banks to survive without Government 
assistance, argued that:
it was one matter to have official support.... It 
was another matter to condone the political 
direction, the inefficient management and the 
unbalanced accounts of the African Continental 
Bank.101
Mr Loynes also expressed reservations on the takeover bid of 
the ACB shares by the Eastern Region Government on the grounds 
that management of the bank ought to be at least at arms
98 Loynes to Watson, 11/4/57 (BEAFN OV68/4, folio 63d).
99 Bank of England Internal memo, 19/3/57 (BEAFN OV68/4, 
folio 56d).
100 Ibid.
101 Loynes to Watson, 19/3/57 (BEAFN OV68/4, folio 56c).
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length from the Regional Government.102 The 1952 Banking 
Ordinance was however subsequently amended to enable the 
Eastern Regional Government to nationalize the African 
Continental Bank.103
On realizing the unatainability of the Colonial 
Government's goal to discredit Azikiwe,104 a Bank of England 
Official bluntly stated that:
the first opportunity for action had been fluffed. 
The Executive Council in Lagos (which of course 
contains some of Azikiwe's men) has approved a 
singularly ineffective message to the Eastern Region 
Government about the Bank. The Governor of the 
Region has rightly said that, whatever the past 
history, he remains concerned over the likelihood of 
future mismanagement.105
It was however noted by the Bank of England that, although 
teeth ought to be put into the Banking Ordinance, it was 
unreasonable to expect the Financial Secretary, by virtue of 
resultant bank supervision, to do what the Federal Government 
seemed unable to do now after a detailed enquiry and a first 
class scandal.106
Put in another way and adapting Ayida, the African
102 Loynes to Watson, 11/4/57 (BEAFN OV68/4, folio 63d) .
103 And also to permit Regional Governments generally to 
own or participate in Commercial Banks (See House of 
Representatives Debate, 12th September, 1957,p. 2233) .
104 Though the Foster-Sutton report concluded that Zik's 
conduct in the ACB affair fell "short of the expectations of 
honest reasonable people", it conceded that nationalist 
idealism had animated Zik to found and strengthen the ACB 
(p.42).
105 Loynes to Watson, 19/3/57 (BEAFN OV68/4, folio 56c) .
106 Ibid.
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Continental Bank succeeded against all odds and without the 
support of, if not against latent opposition from the Colonial 
Government.107 Paradoxically, the Nationalist activities of 
Azikiwe, which, as Tignor (1993) had suggested, were one of 
the reasons for the personalised nature of the ACB 
investigations, also helped ensure the survival of the 
bank.108 In a secret internal memo, the Bank of England 
confirmed that whatever the outcome of the official enquiry 
into Dr Azikiwe's behaviour, it was politically impossible for 
the Federal Government to close the Bank down or even to 
insist that the Eastern Region Government's Account be 
transferred elsewhere.109 In another similar document, the 
Bank admitted that:
The basic problem facing H.M.G. is that a Tribunal 
report which, in any civilised country, would have 
put Zik out of public life is unlikely to do him any 
harm in Nigeria. It may even increase his prestige. 
H.M.G., in the virtual certainty that they will have 
to treat with him as Prime Minister of the East 
after the March elections are now obviously seeking 
some face saver through the 'restitution' proposals 
for accepting him back into the fold.110
After this unsuccessful attempt to discredit Azikiwe, 
regulatory issues which had taken a back seat in deference to
107 Ayida (1960, p.28) .
108 Ajibola (1986, p.36).
109 Loynes to Parsons, 12/10/56 (BEAFN OV68/4, folio 21).
110 Loynes to Bolton, 30/1/57 (BEAFN OV68/4, folio 45).
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political objectives, took their proper place.111
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrates how public policy could be 
influenced by the private interests of policy makers. 
Specifically it shows how a politically motivated decision to 
invest Government funds in the ACB saved the bank from 
imminent collapse. It also shows how the Colonial Government 
used regulation as a political tool to attempt to discredit Dr 
Azikiwe, an anti-white nationalist leader. The provisions of 
the 1952 Banking Ordinance made it difficult for the 
indigenous banks in Colonial Nigeria to survive without some 
form of Government support. Various calls for such Government 
support were not heeded by the Colonial Government at the 
time. For instance, K 0 Mbadowe, in 1952, called for the 
immediate establishment of a central bank, one of its main 
aims being to strengthen the existing African banks. Had his 
call been heeded, there might have been little incentive for 
politicians to wrongly exercise their political muscle in 
order to save their private investments in indigenous banks.
111 Some of the regulatory issues raised during the ACB 
crisis were tackled in a subsequent banking regulation: the 
1958 Banking Ordinance (reproduced as appendix 2 in this 
thesis). Among other things, the 1958 Banking Ordinance 
provided for the appointment of a Bank Examiner (section 11) ; 
yearly appointment of an approved auditor by banks (section 
15) ; no one individual to be granted a loan for an amount 
equivalent to more than 25% of the bank's share capital 
(section 7) ; prohibited the payment of dividend before a 
bank's capitalised expenditure, not represented by tangible 
assets, have been written off (section 6) and; the mandatory 
transfer to a reserve fund, of 25% of net profit, in each year 
whenever the reserve fund is less than the paid up capital 
(section 5).
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The next chapter will examine in detail the conflicting 
forces that finally influenced the establishment of a Central 
Bank in Colonial Nigeria.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE ORIGINS OF THE NIGERIAN CENTRAL BANK
7.1 Introduction
Monetary activities in Nigeria during the pre-central 
banking era were overseen by the West African Currency Board 
(WACB)1 which was established in 1912 with headquarters in 
London.2 The constitution of the WACB charged it "to provide 
for and to control the supply of currency to the British West 
African Colonies, Protectorates and Trust Territories."3 In
practice however, the board was no more than a Bureau de
Change issuing as much local currency as the banks wanted to
1 The other members of this Board were Gold Coast 
(Ghana), Gambia and Sierra Leone. The four territories were 
served by a single currency under the WACB regime. Note that 
before 1914, the territories of Southern Nigeria and Northern 
Nigeria were administered as two separate territories under 
the British Colonial rule.
2 This followed the recommendations of the Emmott 
Committee which was appointed by the British Colonial 
Government to "inquire and report as to the desirability of 
introducing into West Africa a special silver coinage common 
to the five British West African Administrations, and also to 
the desirability of establishing a joint issue of currency 
notes in the same territories, and to advise upon the measures 
necessary for the regulation of the special coinage if 
introduced or for the better regulation of the existing 
currency in the event of a special coinage not being adopted." 
See Loynes (1974) and Newlyn and Rowan (1954, Chapter 2) for 
the history of the Currency Board.
3 Section one of the regulation of 194 9 defining the 
constitution, duties and powers of the WACB (reproduced in 
Loynes, 1974).
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buy for sterling and vice versa.4 It was therefore not, in the 
technical sense, a monetary authority. Such a system, however, 
satisfied the Bank of England monetary policy objective of 
achieving price stability in the colonies.5 The price 
stability policy was also compatible with British commercial 
interests in the colony as it helped facilitate trade with 
London. The colonial banks that oiled the trade mechanism also 
benefitted from the system.
Price stability and parity conversions however had its 
cost: the ability of the WACB to create credit was severely 
hampered. This pre-central banking system also perpetuated a 
situation where large parts of Nigerian Government funds were 
held abroad. This further reduced the amount of money 
available for indigenous development.6 Access to credit was
4 In practice, the WACB's function of controlling the 
supply of money had been fundamentally a procedure of issuing 
as much local currency as the banks wanted to buy with 
sterling and buy for sterling as much local currency as the 
banks wanted to sell. The board therefore had no discretionary 
power over the supply of money. The board also had no banking 
functions. Moreover, since the board did not hold local 
government stocks of the territories which they ministered to, 
the governments of these colonies were precluded from 
exercising any control over the money supply and thus 
incapable of pursuing any independent monetary policy. 
Finally, nobody in these British West African colonies had the 
responsibility for determining credit policy. This was so 
since the banking systems in these colonies were mostly 
extensions of the United Kingdom banking system. Not 
surprisingly therefore, the credit policies of such banks were 
determined by their London headquarters (Olakanpo, 1965a,
p.18).
5 Schenk (1993, p.412). The currency board system, no 
doubt, satisfied other objectives. For instance, the Colonial 
Government earned enormous seigniorage profits from the system 
(Emmott Report, 1912, pp.8-9).
6 In obvious reference to pre central banking Nigeria, a 
IBRD internal memo noted that the British were "overtly timid 
in spending money, piling up reserves under various names and
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indeed what the Africans, rightly or wrongly, believed that 
they needed most if they were to break away from the shackles 
of colonialism. Dispensing with the colonial monetary system 
in favour of a central bank was therefore an integral part of 
breaking off the economic fetters of colonialism. Political 
factors were also at work in accelerating the change process: 
according to Sayers, "Colonial territories seeking some 
measure of political independence have tended to regard a 
Central Bank as an outward and visible sign of independence 
and the lack of one as signifying continued subjection."7 In 
fact, the WACB system was generally seen by Africans as "the 
financial hallmark of colonialism."8
As has already been noted, it was the dissatisfaction of 
Africans with the colonial commercial banking system that 
added impetus to the transition to central banking: this led 
to the establishment of poorly capitalised and poorly staffed 
indigenous commercial banks. The imminent collapse of most of 
these indigenous banks, led to calls for a 'God Father' bank 
to help save them. Such rescue operations were seen by the 
Bank of England as beyond the scope of an infant central bank 
if one were established. The Bank of England also had doubts 
about the ability of a central bank, run by Africans, to 
resist political interference in monetary policy management.
tucking them away in various corners, for fear that African 
politicians would go on a spending spree." See Broches to Hoar 
and Demuth (IBRD Archives, March 6 1954) .
7 1957, p.117.
8 See Gold Coast Legislative Assembly Debates (February 
13 1957, Col. 852).
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From previous experience of the interwar years, the Bank of 
England knew that political interference in the activities of 
central banks was an infallible way to high inflation.9 It is 
not the prime intention of this chapter to attempt a belated 
contribution to the literature regarding the merits and 
demerits of establishing central banks in pre-independence or 
newly independent developing countries in the 1940s and 
1950s.10 Rather, an attempt will be made to unravel the 
various interests at work that influenced both the 
establishment of a central bank in Nigeria and the shape of 
the emergent institution.11 In the main, this chapter will 
concentrate on the various roles of the Bank of England12 and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and how these influenced the change process. Emphasis 
will be placed on the forces which ensured that the emergent 
central bank satisfied both the political needs of the 
colonies as well as the Bank of England monetary policy 
objective of price stability.
9 Harvey (1927, p.11).
10 This was promptly addressed by scholars at the time. 
See for instance Clauson (1944), Hazlewood (1954), Shannon 
(1952) and Olakanpo (1961).
11 The transformation from currency board to central 
banking was, no doubt, an important institutional change in 
colonial economic studies. Very little work has however been 
done to enhance our understanding of the forces that impacted 
on this change process. This is, in part, due to the 
widespread archival practice of allowing considerable time to 
elapse before making public their records.
12 Its role is of great importance since the bank was the 
main source of advise for the colonial government.
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7.2 The Fisher Enquiry
Subsequent to the enactment of the 1952 Banking 
Ordinance, a motion was moved in the Federal House of 
Representatives for the immediate establishment of a central 
bank, one of its main aims being to strengthen the existing 
African banks. This motion did not please the Colonial 
Government appointed Financial Secretary who argued that 
Nigeria at "its stage of development" was better served by a 
currency board than a central bank. He was however prepared, 
perhaps due to the immense support the motion received from 
the African Parliamentarians, "to reconsider the matter". This 
culminated in the revision of the motion by the Government. 
The final version of the motion approved by the House read as 
follows:
That as practical means of marshalling the financial 
resources of this country for the purpose of aiding 
Economic Development in all its phases, the 
Government should examine the possibility of 
establishing a Central Bank and report to this House 
as soon as possible.13
In essence, the colonial government did not consider it 
important that such a central bank, if established, should
13 Nigeria House of Representatives Debate, 9th April, 
1952, Col 1181. This motion was described by the Nigerian 
Government in a letter to the Colonial Office dated 1st July 
1952 as "cumbersome and ambiguous". The reason was that the 
Government had been forced to compromise on the motion instead 
of putting it to vote because the motion had considerable 
support from both the Government and non Government benches in 
the Legislature. "The mover was therefore induced to amend his 
original motion but naturally insisted in retaining as many of 
the original words as possible. Consequently, like many 
compromises, the resolution has succeeded in attracting to it 
the worst of both parties" (BEAFN OV68/12).
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concern itself with helping and strengthening of the existing 
African banks. If such banks failed, so be it. The Colonial 
Government, no doubt, reasoned that several of the poorly 
capitalised, poorly managed and fraud infested indigenous 
banks were not salvageable, hence its insistence on a revised 
motion which was silent on "strengthening the existing African 
Banks." The revised Government motion, approved by the House 
of Representatives, however led to the setting up of an expert 
enquiry into the possibility of establishing a central bank in 
the Nigerian Colony. This marked the beginning of the journey 
towards the establishment of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN).
At the time of the adoption of the revised motion by the 
Colonial Government, D C Rowan14 had just completed his 
research into banking in Nigeria and was then writing up his 
treatise.15 Initially the Nigerian Government thought that the 
study would include some observations about central banking in 
Nigeria and that this combined with the 1951 Trevor Report on 
the Gold Coast (Ghana), "might furnish sufficient information 
on which the Council of Ministers might be advised of the 
answer which should be conveyed to the House of 
Representatives in the light of the above resolution".16 
Further enquiries however disclosed that the subject of
14 He was at the time a staff of the West African 
Institute of Social and Economic Research (Ibadan, Nigeria). 
In 1982, he retired as Professor of Economics from the 
University of Southampton.
15 His research resulted in Rowan (1951; 1952) and Newlyn 
and Rowan (1954).
16 Himsworth to Vile, 1/7/52 (BEAFN OV68/12).
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central banking was outside the scope of Rowan's study. Rowan 
also refused an invitation to carry out any such enquiry.17 
He however expressed doubts on the usefulness of adapting the 
Trevor Report to Nigeria on the grounds that it did not apply 
"to the special conditions" which prevailed in Nigeria.18 
Based on the above, the Council of Ministers sought expert 
advise from the United Kingdom.19 Sir Cecil Trevor20 was then 
pencilled for the job. Misgivings were expressed from within 
the Bank of England about the 1951 recommendations of Trevor 
for the setting up of a National Bank in Ghana "whose chief 
function apparently will be to grant advances to people who at 
the moment were regarded as un-credit worthy by the commercial 
banks".21 Trevor's unwelcome recommendation sensitised the 
Bank of England to the need of using experts loyal to the bank 
in such assignments. J L Fisher, then an Adviser to the
17 Ibid. Professor Rowan has told me that he cannot recall 
being officially approached by the Colonial Government to 
carry out such an inquiry.
18 Unlike in the Gold Coast colony, indigenous banks were 
established in the Nigerian Colony. The needs of these 
indigenous banks, Rowan must have thought, were to form an 
integral part of any study on central banking in the Nigerian 
colony.
19 According to an internal document of the Bank of 
England dated July 11, 1952, the Nigerian Ministers could only 
be satisfied by the appointment of an independent expert and 
could not therefore "be fobbed off with the substitute of a 
long range treatise from Whitehall" (BEAFN OV68/12).
20 Formerly of the Reserve Bank of India.
21 A P S Smith, then a Deputy Chief Cashier of the Bank 
of England, thus concluded that "this mission sounds as though 
it has gone seriously wrong" (BEAFN OV69/2, folio 9) . Not 
surprisingly, P S Beale, then Chief Cashier of the Bank of 
England, advised that for Trevor to be selected, "he should be 
given a clear warning not to get himself committed to any 
particular action" (BEAFN OV68/12).
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Governors of the Bank of England was subsequently approached. 
His views on the subject was perhaps best articulated in an 
internal memo to the Chief Cashier dated July 17, 1952 and
signed by Mr Siepmann, then an executive director of the Bank 
of England. According to Siepmann:
I sounded JLF who thinks the job is unattractive and 
thankless but would take it if we wanted him to 
provided we also told him the conclusions we should 
wish to endorse. ... I do not think any of us are 
happy about the encore from Trevor. My own feeling 
would be that unless you can improve on Trevor, we 
should ask JLF and promise him our support if he 
stamps on the idea (as he easily could do 
unanswerably) ,22
Bluntly interpreted, Fisher left London with firm instructions 
on what the recommendations of his report should be. The visit 
to Nigeria was therefore unnecessary and simply a deceptive 
tactics to make the Africans believe that something was being 
done. At the time, this was not an unusual Bank of England 
practice. In the 'ill fated' 1951 Trevor Investigation on the 
Gold Coast Colony, the style was similar: the investigation 
was clearly intended to be a fruitless exercise.23 
Unfortunately for the Bank of England, the scheme back­
fired.24 Unlike Trevor, however, Fisher worked for the Bank
22 BEAFN OV68/12.
23 "...[T]he enquiry would be mainly educational and 
likely to lead to little"- Bank of England Internal memo dated 
2nd April 1951 (BEAFN OV69/1, folio 216).
24 Evidence of the above questionable tactics employed by 
the Bank of England, will no doubt provide excellent arsenal 
for 'conspiracy theorists'. This chapter does not however 
intend to argue along these lines as there is little evidence 
to show that the Bank of England had ulterior motives.
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of England, his loyalty was to the bank and he was
specifically told the recommendations and conclusions his
report was to arrive at. Fisher (1953, p.18), not
surprisingly, concluded that:
it would be inadvisable to contemplate the 
establishment of a Central Bank at the moment. It 
would be difficult to establish a Central Bank which 
could operate satisfactorily in such a narrow field. 
Moreover, it is hard to see how a Central Bank could 
function as an instrument to promote the economic 
development of the country. But that is not to say 
that a Central Bank would not be a useful coping 
stone to the banking system at a future time. Given 
further development of the indigenous banking system 
and growth in the financial mechanism, the 
establishment of a Central Bank would be a logical 
and useful step in due course.25
The above conclusion was arrived at after 'examining' the 
following limited functions which a central bank could perform 
in a developing country like Nigeria. These included: (1)
Provision of rediscount facilities,(2) commercial banking 
inspection and (3) note issue and management.
On the provision of rediscount facilities, the report was 
of the opinion that such a facility should depend on a change 
in existing standards and on a growth in the banking habit.26 
This view was defended on the grounds that a growth in banking 
deposits and customers would lead to a greater direct 
community of interests between the commercial banks and the
25 Fisher, 1953, p. 18.
26 The expression 'banking habit' has been described as 
an omnibus term "covering not only economic psychology with 
respect to banks but also the objective economic facts and 
practices of people with regard to the use of banking 
facilities and their asset holding patterns." There is little 
doubt that the banking habits of Nigerians at the time were 
far from impressive- See Teriba (1986, p.69).
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larger banking public. This, the report argued, would put the 
bank in a better position to appreciate the credit standing of 
its customers. Fisher then asserted that:
Nigeria must guard against the unwise extension of 
credit. Nigeria cannot afford to waste her
resources. It would be a mistake to force the pace 
at the risk of loss and possibly ruinous 
setbacks.27
Another factor that officially influenced Fisher's negative 
decision, was the lack, or the primitive stage of development, 
of supporting institutions, especially a securities market. 
The Fisher report argued that the lack of a securities market 
would greatly impede the duties of the Central Bank especially 
in the area of enforcing credit policies. Fisher then
concluded that "it is better to build the financial structure 
from the base upwards rather than try to build from the top 
downwards."28
On banking inspection carried out by a central bank
Fisher, while admitting that there was a possibility that the
central bank might positively influence the conduct of banking
in Nigeria either through moral persuasion and/or powers of
ultimate sanction, argued that:
It would be wrong to saddle a Central Bank with a 
responsibility for the solvency of banks in Nigeria.
The banks in Nigeria must stand on their own feet.
It would be wrong if the public were to be led to 
believe that a Central Bank was responsible for the 
management of Nigerian banks. To saddle a Central
27 Fisher, 1953, p. 13.
28 Ibid, p. 17.
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Bank with such a responsibility would mean, in 
effect, that the Central Bank would have actively to 
control the operations of the banks. In effect, the 
banks would become branches of the Central Bank. 
This could hardly lead to a strong and stable 
banking system. It would indeed in practice entail 
that the only indigenous bank in Nigeria would be 
the Central Bank. It is clearly preferable that a 
Central Bank should operate through a system of 
banks; and that the habit of banking should grow in 
the community.29
The report then concluded that a spirited use of the Financial 
Secretary's powers of examination by a competent bank 
examiner, coupled with action by the banks themselves, ought 
to lead to significant progress among the indigenous banks.30
On the base duty of note issue and management, Fisher was 
of the opinion that staffing and provision of capital might 
serve as impediments arguing that:
it would be of little use to establish a Central 
Bank if it could not be operated satisfactorily 
except only in a very restricted field. Clearly, if 
expenses were no object, it would be possible to 
found a bank by law and give it the sole right of 
note issue; but whether or not it could in practice 
operate satisfactorily, would depend on whether it 
could be satisfactorily staffed and whether the 
field in which it would operate were such that it 
could influence the economy beneficially.31
To this end, the report recommended three stages of 
development towards the goal of central banking: (1) Transfer 
the West African Currency Board to Africa; here, Fisher
29 Ibid, p.13-14.
30 Ibid, p. 17.
31 Ibid, p. 8.
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reasoned that by associating the population more closely with 
the management of the currency, West Africans could gain 
experience in both the doctrine and practice of currency 
management (2) the establishment of a Nigerian currency board 
and a distinctive Nigerian Currency and (3) the establishment
of a bank of issue which should be able to assume other
functions of a central bank according to the stage of 
development of the financial mechanism.
The above views of the Bank of England on the
inadvisability of central banking32 were not limited to 
Nigeria alone.33 It was based on the belief that central 
banks were of little use in countries with underdeveloped 
securities markets.34 The Bank of England also feared that 
central banks in newly independent developing countries might 
be unable to adhere to sound principles of monetary
management, especially when exposed to political pressures.35 
The Bank of England was no doubt keen to avoid the mistakes of
32 There was no doubt that the experts from the bank 
shared a common view as regards central banking in its 
theoretical and practical aspects- See Loynes to Taylor, July 
23, 1962 (BEAFN OV70/2, folio 16a).
33 In 1949, H C D Mynors, later to become Deputy Governor 
of the Bank of England, also advised against the establishment 
of a Central Bank in Southern Rhodesia. This report was 
however not made public (Olakanpo, 1965a, p.25). A similar 
advise was also proffered by Loynes (1961, pp. 6-7) in the case 
of the Sierra Leone.
34 Sayers (1957, p.112-3); Newlyn and Rowan (1954, p.271).
35 There was a widespread belief in the Bank of England 
that Africans lacked the mentality and outlook to effectively 
manage such an institution. See Executive Director to Chief 
Cashier, 17th July 1952 (BEAFN OV68/12).
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the past.36
The appropriateness of this line of thinking has not gone 
undisputed. Several notable scholars justified the usefulness 
of central banking in the older Commonwealth by the new 
functions which such banks performed.37 For instance, the 
Reserve Bank of India took on the function of developing and 
integrating the banking system in India,38 while banking 
supervision became an integral part of central banking in 
Pakistan.39 These activities had originally been seen as being 
outside the scope of central banking.40 Perhaps the most 
formidable opposition to the views of the Bank of England, at 
least with respect to the setting up of a central bank for the 
Nigerian colony, came from the IBRD.
7.3 The IBRD Mission
In 1953, the Governments of the United Kingdom and
36 Writing about the collapse of central banks in Europe, 
in the early twentieth century, a one time Comptroller of the 
Bank of England asserted that "in every instance an 
examination of events which led to their collapse reveals that 
their failure in time of crisis was largely due to the fact 
that political pressure was put upon the central banks to 
avoid the fundamental principles of sound central banking and 
to subordinate financial prudence to political expediency" 
(Harvey, 1927, p.11).
37 Newlyn and Rowan (1954, Chapter 13) ; Sayers (1957, 
Chapter 9); Basu (1967, Chapter 8).
38 See Section 55 (1) of the Reserve Bank of India Act
1934.
39 See Sections 26 and 36 of the State Bank of Pakistan 
Order, 1948.
40 Sen (1967, p.l). A former Deputy Governor of the Bank 
of England once asserted that he never remembered hearing the 
word "supervision" used in the bank before 1974. Quoted in 
Nwankwo (1990, p.l).
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Nigeria, invited the IBRD to look into the future economic and 
developmental prospects of Nigeria.41 The Mission42 which 
arrived Nigeria in September 1953 was asked to:
assess the resources available for future 
development, to study the possibilities for 
development in the major sectors of the economy and 
to make recommendations for practical steps to be 
taken, including the timing and co-ordination of 
developmental activities.43
The terms of reference were wide ranging and the mission, 
rightly or wrongly, interpreted them to include an examination 
of the entire financial system. The final report which was 
divided into three parts,44 therefore included sub-section on 
' State Bank'45 and 'Money and Banking'. We shall, for the 
purposes of this chapter, concentrate on the recommendations 
of the above sub-sections.
41 This was the tenth general economic survey mission to 
be organised by the IBRD, and the first to visit Africa. At 
the time, survey missions had already been completed dealing 
with the development problems of British Guyana, Ceylon (Sri 
Lanka), Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Iraq, Jamaica, Surinam and 
Turkey- Press Release Number 340 (IBRD Archives, September 18, 
1953) .
42 The mission consisted of ten full time members and five 
part time consultants. Six of the above number were recruited 
from outside the bank. This included the adviser on Money and 
Banking who was on the regular staff of the International 
Monetary Fund.
43 IBRD, 1955, p.vii.
44 General Report, Technical Reports and Appendices.
45 In the 1940s and 1950s, the terms 'central bank' and 
'state bank' were used interchangeably in British colonial 
monetary circles. While, for instance, a central bank was 
established in Nigeria, a state bank was set up in Pakistan 
(1948). Both banks performed similar functions. For the 
purposes of this chapter, both terms will be used 
interchangeably.
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On the issue of creating a State Bank, the above report 
used the Fisher report as a foundation. The mission agreed 
with Mr Fisher on "many points" including the view that the 
creation of a fully fledged Central Bank was premature at the 
time. The report however argued that with the increased 
massive strides towards self government,46 the timing for the 
setting up of a State Bank need not be as cautious as that 
proposed by Fisher. The mission therefore proposed the early 
establishment of a 'State Bank of Nigeria' with limited 
functions.47 These functions were to be gradually expanded 
over time so as to enable the institution to assume other 
functions of a central bank. The report then concluded that:
The continued political and economic advancement of 
Nigeria is bound to lead to the establishment of a 
Central Bank. To postpone the day when functions of 
currency issue and the management of foreign assets 
are performed in Nigeria will also postpone the day 
when trained Nigerians will be able to perform these 
functions responsibly by themselves.48
The above view, which was also maintained in an earlier draft 
report by the IBRD team,49 did not please the Bank of England.
46 It is important to note that Fisher's report was 
completed before the decision was taken to convene the London 
Constitutional Conference (IBRD, 1955, p.97) which was to 
provide for greater Regional autonomy and for the removal of 
powers of intervention by the centre (Ezera, 1964, p.176).
47 The initial functions to be taken up by the bank, as 
advised by the mission, included: (1) currency issue (2) act
as principal depository of funds for Government and semi- 
Government Institutions (3) regulating banks and accepting 
deposits from them and (4) buying and selling Government 
Securities.
48 IBRD, 1955, p.97.
49 A copy of this draft report dated March 19, 1954 was 
available to the Bank of England (BEAFN OV68/2, folio 116).
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In a draft document, the Bank of England affirmed that:
we would have preferred that the mission did not 
raise the question of a Central Bank for Nigeria at 
all. their recommendations on this will certainly be 
embarrassing to us50.
Equipped with the draft report from the IBRD, a meeting was 
arranged in London with Messrs Broches51 and Adler52, 
respectively Chief and Assistant Chief of the IBRD Mission to 
Nigeria.53 Unable to convince Broches and Adler to alter their 
main recommendations, the Bank of England explored various 
ways of overturning this 'embarrassing' recommendation. First, 
they toyed with the idea of fighting it on the grounds that it 
was outside the jurisdiction of the mission. The Bank of 
England, in conjunction with the Colonial Office, however 
concluded that a chapter on currency and credit reasonably 
fell within the terms of reference of the mission.54 The Bank 
of England also explored the idea of "inducing the I.M.F. to 
take issue with the I.B.R.D. on the question of their 
respective fields of responsibility."55 This also never 
materialised. The Bank of England was left with no other
50 Letter dated June 25, 1954 (BEAFN OV68/2, folio 128).
51 A citizen of the Netherlands.
52 A citizen of the United States of America.
53 Bank of England internal document dated 21/6/54 (BEAFN 
OV68/2, folio 112) .
54 Ibid. See also Potter to Melville, 25/6/54 (BEAFN
OV68/2, folio 127) .
55 Bank of England internal memo dated 4/5/54 (BEAFN 
OV68/2, folio 117d).
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option than to secretly attempt to persuade the IBRD to alter 
the draft report.
The Bank of England then went ahead to prepare a draft 
letter to the British representative at the IBRD, the aim 
being to "ask him to let it be known informally that we 
consider two of the proposed recommendations in the chapter to 
be unsound and one of them dangerous."56 This draft letter 
which was titled "IBRD Mission to Nigeria" was then forwarded 
to the Colonial Office for clearance. The Colonial Office 
replied disagreeing with both the tactics of the Bank's 
proposition. According to Melville of the Colonial Office:
apart from the fact that it seems to me to be much 
too late to intervene, I think it inappropriate that 
views should be expressed to the Banks Mission from 
the U.K. side which purport to run contrary to the 
express wishes, or probable wishes of the West 
African Governments, to one of which the Mission is 
reporting direct. Moreover, I think it unfair and 
also dangerous to involve our Washington people in 
an argument with the Bank Mission on this difficult 
and complicated subject.57
Melville then advised that the precious time and energy being 
wasted on belatedly attacking the mission should rather be 
spent "preparing the ground" for any recommendations the 
Mission may put forward.58
Though the Bank of England, by this time, had realised 
that very little could be done to revise the IBRD 
recommendation as regards the establishment of a central bank
56 Bank of England internal memo dated 4/5/54 (BEAFN 
OV68/2, folio 127) .
57 Melville to Potter, 29/6/54 (BEAFN OV68/2, p.129).
58 Ibid.
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in the Nigerian colony, it was determined not to allow future 
IBRD missions to British colonies to get out of their control. 
To this end, the following strategy was devised: (a) to
restrict Colonial Government's, so far as lies in the Bank of 
England's power, invitations for General Survey Missions from 
the IBRD. Instead, they should put up properly prepared 
projects and proposals for a loan, which the IBRD would 
investigate with its normal machinery and in which the danger 
of spilling over into central banking area is less; (b) to 
ensure, so far as possible, that the Bank of England get full 
advance notice of missions and that these missions are 
properly acquainted with its point of view and (c) to try, so 
far as possible, to get hold of advance copies of the report 
before issue, and criticise it fully with the authors before 
it goes before the IBRD board of directors for approval.59
All the above complaints, criticisms and schemes by the 
Bank of England against the draft IBRD report did not go 
unrewarded as the "majority" of the "factual comments" made by 
the bank were accepted and incorporated into the final report 
by the IBRD mission.60 The above changes did not however alter
59 Stamp to Ryan, 12/11/54 (BEAFN OV68/3, folio 11, p.3).
60 A letter from R.H. Atkinson of the Overseas and 
Foreign Office to Mr Ryan of the Bank of England dated 19th 
October 1954 noted the following differences: (1) the final
report placed less emphasis on the urgency for the 
establishment of a State Bank. (2) A statement was added 
stating that "foreign reserves should not fall below 100% of 
the Currency issue in the foreseeable future". The letter 
noted that this would not appear to be an objection to the 
establishment of a fiduciary issue but rather a statement that 
Nigeria's existing external reserves are adequate to maintain 
a 100% currency backing for some time to come. (3) The State 
Bank was no longer specifically charged with the 
responsibility for the external solvency of Nigeria. (4) A
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the substance of the draft report,61 thus the clock for the 
establishment of a State Bank continued to tick. The Bank of 
England had little choice but to accept the earlier advice of 
Melville at the Colonial Office to start "preparing the 
ground" for implementing the recommendations of the IBRD 
Mission.
Despite the dislike by the Bank of England of most of the 
recommendations of the IBRD Mission,62 it was recognised that 
there was still room for manoeuvre. For instance, the IBRD 
concluded that:
paragraph suggesting that the State Bank should assist the 
commercial banks in the training of Staff was omitted. (5) 
The final report also recommended that the Nigerian Government 
should seek the expert assistance of the UK Monetary 
authorities or of the IMF while carrying out its 
recommendations (BEAFN OV68/3, P.2).
61 Ibid.
62 Several complaints of the Colonial Administration 
against the draft report were not reflected in the final 
report. For instance: (1) Although the final report still 
stated that particular attention should be given to the 
selection of the first Governor of the Bank, the further 
recommendation that he should be "a man of experience in the 
field of central banking and command the respect of British 
banking circles" was omitted. (2) The final report accused the 
West African Currency Board of virtually limiting its 
investments to UK Securities. The recommendations by the 
Colonial Machinery that it should be altered to read "sterling 
securities issued and marketable in the United Kingdom" was 
not accepted. (3) The final report still stated that an 
appreciation of the West African Pound would be essentially 
inconsistent with the Currency Board System. (4) No notice was 
taken of the comment of the Colonial Authorities that it was 
unfair to compare the development of banking in Nigeria with 
that in India, which already had a 'State Bank' since India 
already had a long standing indigenous banking system in 
operation and (5) The final report still described European 
Banks as "extremely conservative" and nothing was said about 
the lack of adequate security and the fact that the demand for 
credit and loans is largely for purposes unsuitable for bank 
credit- See Atkinson to Ryan, 19/10/54 (BEAFN OV68/3, folio 
2) .
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Our recommendations are not intended to present a 
complete blueprint for a State Bank. In the creation 
of such an institution, problems will arise which we 
have not discussed or to which we have referred only 
in general terms. In carrying out our 
recommendations, the Government should seek the 
expert assistance of the United Kingdom monetary 
authorities or of the International Monetary Fund 
(IBRD, 1955, p.101).
The Bank of England also took solace in the fact that 
Nigerians knew very little about the subject matter and that 
the IBRD recommendations were 'vague enough' giving room for 
considerable freedom of both interpretation and 
recommendations.63
Despite the above loopholes, the attitude of the 
financial secretary and other colonial officials in Lagos was 
that the question of a central bank and a national currency 
for Nigeria should be approached cautiously and as slowly as 
possible: "They considered it essential to set an enquiry in 
motion at a fairly early date in order to satisfy local 
ambitions: but in view of local inexperience and of the
expense of creating a bank of issue, they hoped to play the 
matter long."64 J B Loynes of the Bank of England advised 
against this arguing that the advantage of looking forward to 
an early implementation was that "this should at least remove 
the possibility of a further report being asked for later on 
and of an adviser being chosen from elsewhere to make it."65 
On the April 13, 1956, representatives of the Bank of
63 Loynes to Fisher, 9/4/56 (BEAFN OV68/3, folio 61a).
64 Loynes to Parsons, 17/10/56 (BEAFN OV68/4, folio 21a).
65 Ibid.
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England, the Colonial Office and the Treasury met and it was 
agreed that the Bank of England should suggest an expert to go 
to Nigeria and make "recommendations in regards to the type of 
bank to be set up paying lip service to the recommendation of 
the IBRD."66 The Bank of England was also asked to suggest the 
terms of reference which would ultimately be agreed with the 
Nigerian Government.67 Within the Bank of England itself, the 
job of drafting the terms of reference ironically fell on J L 
Fisher, whose 1952 report frowned at the idea of an early 
establishment of a State Bank and on J B Loynes.68 The draft 
proposal which they prepared and later approved by the Bank of 
England, read as follows:69 "Having regard to the political 
and economic development of Nigeria, to the existing 
organisation of banking and currency, and to the importance of 
maintaining monetary stability at home and the credit standing 
of Nigeria abroad; and in the light of the recommendations of 
the 1953 mission of the IBRD:- to advise on: (1) the creation 
of a Nigerian currency, whether to be introduced at an early 
or later stage, and the administration of such a currency so 
as to preserve its external value and its acceptability within 
the country; (2) the form of a Federal institution with its 
Head Office at the Federal Capital which would act as bank of 
issue and would perform other appropriate central banking
66 Fisher to Hawker, 10/4/1956 (BEAFN OV68/3, folio 62a).
67 Ibid.
68 Loynes was later sent to Lagos to advise on "the 
establishment of a Nigerian Central Bank, the introduction of 
a Nigerian Currency and other associated matters".
69 See Fisher to Hawker, 1/5/56 (BEAFN OV68/3, folio 65a) .
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functions; (3) the relationship of such an institution to the 
Federal and Regional Governments, to Government institutions, 
to the commercial banks and to the public; and (4) the role of 
such an institution in the development of local money and 
capital market".
These terms of reference were then discussed at a secret 
meeting of the representatives of the Bank of England, the 
Colonial Office and the 'Nigerian Government' held at the
Colonial Office on the 22nd of May, 1956. According to the
notes on the meeting,70 doubts were expressed about the 
desirability of putting the creation of a Nigerian currency as 
the first item on the terms of reference. Mr Carlyle, then 
acting Financial Secretary of Nigeria, clearly asserted that 
he was not in favour of the early introduction of a Nigerian 
Currency. He argued that apart from 'other considerations', 
such a project would be too expensive71 and that no provision 
had been made for this in the Economic programme which was to 
run until 1960. It was therefore not possible to introduce a 
Nigerian currency at the time except of course if it was done 
at the expense of some other project(s). In any event, he did 
not believe that Nigeria was ready to manage its own currency.
Further discussions revealed the inevitability of the 
establishment of a separate currency for Nigeria. Gold Coast 
(Ghana) , which was one of the four members of the West African
Currency Board, had indeed already decided to issue its own
70 See BEAFN OV68/3, folio 69c.
71 It was estimated that this would cost about £4m.
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currency.72 Given the above element, it was agreed that it was 
probably advisable that the new currency be introduced while 
Her Majesty's Government still had some control over Nigerian 
affairs. This was important in order to ensure that such a 
currency was properly established. There was also some 
disagreement on the issue of delaying the establishment of a 
Nigerian Currency. It was argued that such an action would 
only put Nigeria in the undesirable position of attaining 
political independence without the necessary experience and 
expertise in managing its financial affairs. It was however 
noted that even if a Nigerian currency was introduced 
immediately, the actual currency arrangements and management 
would to a great extent fall on the Governor of the State Bank 
"who would certainly have to be an experienced European". 
There could however be no question of an early introduction 
of a local currency in Nigeria since it would take at least 
three years to finalise the necessary arrangements.
It was then agreed, at the meeting, that the reference to 
the creation of a Nigerian currency in the terms of reference 
should be retained but that the draft terms should be 
reexamined to see whether this aspect of the investigation 
should be given less prominence. The meeting further agreed 
that the reference to the IBRD Mission Report which gave 
significance to the need for the creation of a Nigerian 
Currency should remain in the preamble since the opposition in 
the Federal House of Representatives would doubtless query the
72 As early as 1954, Nkrumah in his election manifesto 
pledged himself to giving Gold Coast (Ghana) a Central Bank 
with issue functions (BEAFN OV68/2, folio 128, p.2).
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absence of any reference to the IBRD Report. Mr Carlyle then 
accepted that, despite his varied misgivings against the early 
introduction of a local currency, the only tenable objection 
given the existing circumstances could only be on grounds of 
cost.
As regards the second item on the terms of reference 
(form of the Federal institution to be introduced), Loynes 
explained that he had worded it carefully in order to avoid 
pre-judging the title of the bank. He argued that the title 
"State Bank" was primarily an "Iron Curtain" expression and 
that the powers of such banks varied considerably. It was thus 
preferable to give the Nigerian Federal Bank some other name. 
Based on the above suggestions, Mr Loynes revised the terms of 
reference and subsequently forwarded it to Carlyle in Nigeria. 
This was then presented and subsequently approved by the 
Federal Executive Council with a minor amendment.73 On the 
appointment of the expert that was to go to Nigeria, Fisher
73 The Federal Council of Ministers decided that there 
should be a central bank and a national currency at an early 
stage. This did not involve any change in the draft terms of 
reference other than the removal of the phrase "at such time 
as the Federal Government may decide"- See Loynes to Parsons, 
17/10/56 (BEAFN OV68/4, folio 21a) . The final terms of 
reference read thus: "Having regard to the political and
Economic development of Nigeria, to the existing organisation 
of banking and currency and to the importance of maintaining 
monetary stability at home and the credit standing of Nigeria 
abroad; and in the light of the recommendations of the 1953 
mission of the I.B.R.D. to advise on (1) the establishment of 
a Federal institution to perform appropriate central banking 
functions; (2) the introduction of a Nigerian currency and the 
administration of such a currency so as to preserve its 
external value and its acceptability within the country; (3) 
the relationships of the Federal institution to the Federal 
and Regional Governments, to Government institutions, to the 
commercial banks and to the public; and (4) the role of such 
an institution in the development of a local money and capital 
market."
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first suggested to the Governor of the Bank of England the 
appointment of a person from outside the Bank of England. He 
argued that:
if a person from the bank goes, presumably, he would 
not wish to ask for an honorarium, but if somebody 
from outside the bank goes, the Colonial Office 
think that the honorarium should be pitched on the 
high side since the more the Nigerians have to pay, 
the more they will value the advice and the greater 
importance will they attach to the person.74
This advice was ultimately not accepted as the Bank of England 
later advised the Colonial Office that Mr Loynes, who actively 
participated in drafting the terms of reference, "would suit 
the bill admirably."75 On the issue of a honorarium, the bank 
advised that even though Mr Loynes may not be entitled to ask 
for it, it would however not be unusual for him to be 
accompanied by his wife with the Nigerian Government meeting 
her expenses.76
The linkage between making the recommendations and 
operationalising such recommendations was also explored by the 
Bank of England. Here Loynes suggested that different persons 
should be sent to do the two jobs. He argued that a second man 
sent after the planning, who would go as the governor 
designate, would be in a stronger position since he would be 
starting from a basis reinforced not only by his own views, 
but those of another expert: a "man commissioned for the dual 
purposes of working out a blueprint and then implementing it
74 Fisher to Hawker, 10/4/56 (BEAFN OV68/3, folio 62a).
75 Fisher to Galsworthy, 2/5/56 (BEAFN OV68/3, folio 65b,
p.l) .
76 Ibid, p.2.
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seems less likely to be successful in the second stage and 
much more likely to be sniped at and to have his original 
motives and decisions repeatedly being called into 
question.1177
With the stage set, a formal request was made for J B 
Loynes by the Nigerian Government to advise on "the 
establishment of a Nigerian Central Bank, the introduction of 
a Nigerian Currency and other associated matters". Despite an 
earlier decision by the Nigerian dominated Federal Council of 
Ministers, "that there should be a Central Bank and a National 
Currency at an early date,1,78 thereby limiting the room for 
manoeuvre by any 'expert adviser', Loynes was content with the 
scheme of events and asserted that "all things considered, the 
Nigerian response seems on the right lines and more positive 
than we might have expected."79 The central bank which Loynes 
was obliged to recommend in his 1957 report was established in 
1958. Mr R P Fenton, formerly of the Bank of England, was 
appointed its first Governor. The bank's principal objects 
were to issue legal tender currency in Nigeria, to maintain 
external reserves in order to safeguard the international 
value of the currency, to promote monetary stability and a 
sound financial structure in Nigeria and to act as a banker 
and financial adviser to the Federal Government.80 More
77 Loynes to Fisher, 9/4/56 (BEAFN OV68/3, folio 61a).
78 Loynes to Parsons, 17/10/56 (BEAFN OV68/4, folio 21A,
p.l) .
79 Ibid.
80 See section 4 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Ordinance 
1958. The whole ordinance is reproduced as appendix 3.
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important to the Bank of England, the Nigerian pound retained 
a one to one parity with the British Pound81 and was 
substantially backed by sterling reserves. For instance, 
section 26(a) of the 1958 Central Bank of Nigeria Ordinance 
stipulated that, at least for a period of five years of the 
bank's coming into force, the value of external reserves to be 
maintained by the central bank should not be less than the 
aggregate of an amount representing 60% of the Bank's notes 
and coins in circulation together with an amount representing 
35% of the Bank's other demand liabilities.
The main difference between the new central bank and the 
WACB was therefore in the degree of monetary policy autonomy 
exercisable by each. For instance, while the WACB lacked the 
authority to influence money supply, the new central bank was 
granted limited powers to do so. These provisions no doubt 
satisfied the Bank of England monetary policy objective of 
price stability. The creation of the Nigerian central bank 
also pleased the nationalists by replacing the WACB system 
which was generally seen by Africans as the financial hallmark 
of colonialism. The central bank however came too late to aid 
the collapsed indigenous banks.
7.4 Conclusion
There is no doubt that the Bank of England employed 
questionable methods in its attempt to delay the establishment 
of a central bank in the British Nigerian Colony. Though 
unjustifiable, the actions of the Bank of England may have
81 Ibid, section 17.
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been based on some genuine fears it harboured at the time. For 
instance, it was feared that political interference with the 
money creating function of central banking in developing 
countries would be met with disastrous consequences. It was 
therefore not surprising that the Bank of England always 
favoured the enshrinement of statutory limits to the ability 
of such central banks to create money. The 1958 Nigerian 
Central Bank Ordinance, which the Bank of England advised on, 
contained such statutory limitation. The emergent central bank 
was also not designed to be a lender of last resort to 
indigenous commercial banks which was the main reason why the 
call for such a bank was made in the first place. Despite 
this, the changing political environment, given the imminence 
of political independence, made it necessary for some colonial 
banks to re-examine their credit policies towards Africans. 
One such bank was the Barclays Bank (DCO).
The next chapter will examine the accounting, control and 
operational consequences of a pre-independence experiment by 
Barclays Bank (DCO) to liberalise its credit policy towards 
Africans.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE BARCLAYS BANK CREDIT TO THE AFRICANS EXPERIMENT
8.1 Introduction
In the mid 1950s, Barclays Bank (Dominion Colonial and 
Overseas) started its drive towards liberalising its credit 
policy towards Africans in the British Nigerian Colony. This 
brought to an end several years of discriminatory credit 
practices by the bank against the Africans. Within a few
years, the bank was recognised by Africans as a 'friendly
bank'1 but this did not occur without costs: bad debts, until 
then a relatively unknown phenomenon in the bank's Nigerian 
operations,2 took the centre - stage. This forced the bank to 
re-evaluate its accounting, control and operational procedures 
both for advancing new credit to Africans and for controlling 
existing ones. It also led to the reversal of the
liberalisation policy, thus bringing to an end a very brave, 
but costly, experiment. Very little is however known about the 
underlying factors that impacted on this uncommon experiment 
in colonial banking history.
This credit to the Africans experiment was possible
partly because credit policy and administration, at least 
under the 1952 Nigerian Banking Ordinance, remained largely
1 See Daldry to Macdona- Barclays Bank Archives (BBA 
11/2044, 22nd November 1959).
2 Crossley and Blandford (1975, p.258).
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unregulated. As already noted in chapter 5, legislation for 
complicated banking controls, which were seen as unnecessary 
interference with the activities of the two main British 
banks, were avoided. With no external checks on this area of 
banking activity, Barclays Bank (DCO) had to depend mainly on 
its internal control mechanisms to ensure the effective 
monitoring of operations. Such internal mechanisms are however 
not infallible especially when management has other political 
objectives.
This chapter chronicles the bank's policy changes that
culminated in the bad debt problem, and argues that the bad
debt problem had little to do with the inadequacy of 
accounting and control procedure in the Nigerian branches of 
the bank. Rather, the problem lay mainly with the regular 
flouting of the existing controls, at the time, by
inexperienced and overworked bank staff. It was this lack of
adherence to control procedures that made it possible for most 
of the African bad debtors to emerge. It is not the intention 
of this chapter to delineate the residues of Barclays Bank's 
accounting past. Rather, an attempt will be made to decipher 
the underlying processes and forces at work that led to the 
disregard of the control regulations culminating in the bad 
debt problem.
8.2 Credit to the Africans Controversy
Scholars are in general agreement that European banks 
were not very helpful to the indigenes of the British West 
African colonies, at least in terms of providing them with
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credit facilities3. The contentious issue, however, is the 
question of whether these European banks deliberately 
discriminated against the Africans or whether the Africans 
were, in most cases, not credit worthy. Proponents of the 
deliberate discrimination policy include Kennedy who argued 
that the European banks:
normally refused to provide loans or overdraft 
facilities to their African customers.... The banks 
saw their main functions as serving the interests of 
their brother capitalists with whom they also shared 
certain common perceptions of the African
population4.
Kaniki also arrived at a similar conclusion, asserting that
recent research has shown that in their lending 
policies all the banks discriminated against African 
entrepreneurs in favour of the British and Asian 
population5.
The 'pro discrimination theorists' are however in the 
minority. The majority of commentators have offered 
alternative views and in some cases attempted to justify the 
unhelpful attitude of the British banks in economic terms. The 
Trevor report in the Gold Coast, for instance, concluded that:
an unduly high risk is involved in the granting of
3 Cf. Trevor (1951), Newlyn and Rowan (1954), Cox- George 
(1958), Nwankwo (1972), Kennedy (1988), Kaniki (1985) and 
Cowen and Shenton (1991).
4 1988, p.40.
5 1985, p.405.
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credit in the colony6.
An official of the Bank of England who assisted Sir Cecil 
Trevor in his Gold Coast enquiry, also noted that:
The state of indebtedness among the Africans is 
fantastic, almost without exception, they are 
permanently in debt either to moneylenders [or] 
cocoa brokers.... The debts are never fully repaid, 
the debtors go on borrowing, paying a little on 
account and borrowing again. This is accepted as the 
normal way of life.7
Rowan8 also attempted an economic justification of the 
discrimination by the British banks against Africans on four 
grounds: (1) the high risk of lending locally due to sharp
fluctuations in crop prices, not only within the trade cycle 
but also within individual years9, (2) the unavailability of 
liquid assets in Nigeria10 (3) the low reputation of Africans
6 para 122.
7 Letter from Mr S W Payton to Mr 0 Brien (both of the 
Bank of England) dated July 7, 1951- Bank of England Archive 
File Number (BEAFN OV69/2, folio 3, p.2).
8 Rowan, 1951, p.244.
9 It was mainly due to this problem that Commodity Boards 
were established with the aim of ensuring price stability all 
year round ( Statement on Future Marketing of West African 
Cocoa, 1946, p.8).
10 This could to some extent be attributed to the 
activities of the expatriate banks. For instance, the United 
Nations concluded that such institutions lacked interest in 
developing internal markets and in assisting indigenous 
enterprises especially in underdeveloped territories 
possessing racially heterogenous societies (Report on the 
Mobilisation of Domestic Capital, 1951, Chapter 3).
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for commercial reliability and caution mainly because of 
scanty, if not non existent accounts and the lack of fixed 
capital assets in their business11 (4) the difficulty of the 
African traders in meeting the British bankers security 
requirements. The problem was partly legal since the systems 
of land tenure in most part of the country made it difficult 
to lend against mortgage.
Nwankwo is in agreement with Rowan and similarly 
concludes that:
the criticisms levied against the overseas banks do 
not stand rigorous economic analysis, and cannot be 
justified on economic grounds since the banks are 
profit making rather than philanthropic or 
humanitarian undertakings.12
Nwankwo's conclusion was based on three arguments: (1) What
appeared to have been discrimination might have been derived 
from the objectives and practices of expatriate banks coupled 
with the institutional limitations of the indigenous 
population. The expatriate banks were established to finance
11 Bauer (1963, p.10) has argued that many "examples of 
African commercial dishonesty stem from periods of imperfect 
imports and price control during and after the war. Quick and 
almost riskless profits were open to those traders who were 
able to obtain short-supply merchandise at controlled prices 
or who were allotted the necessary import permits. The trade 
attracted many ad hoc traders including (school boys) who 
because they regarded their activities as isolated and 
discontinuous ventures, were not averse to breaking contracts 
if owing to changes in market conditions their fulfilment was 
no longer advantageous.... In fairness, it should be stated 
that some Overseas suppliers of African customers are also apt 
to follow standards very different from those prevailing in 
Britain and Western Europe."
12 1972, p.157.
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foreign trade between the overseas country and their home 
countries. Domestic banking in these colonies developed later 
and as far as the overseas banks were concerned, this was only 
incidental to the achievement of their primary objective and 
thus of secondary importance; (2) the preference for 
expatriate business and customers by these expatriate banks 
stemmed from the fact that in most cases these expatriate 
firms in developing countries were branches or subsidiaries of 
large corporations which in some cases were of the same 
origins as the expatriate banks. They therefore had more 
developed banking habits and were more credit conscious than 
the native customers and; (3) discrimination was inconsistent 
with the profit maximising motives of the expatriate banks 
since this would have suggested that they would ordinarily 
have turned down profitable business propositions from local 
firms in preference for less profitable propositions from 
expatriate firms.
Similar justification was also proffered by Trevor in the 
Gold Coast where he concluded that there was:
no appreciable weight of evidence in support of the 
contention that the existing banks favour the 
Europeans, Levantine and Asiatic communities to the 
detriment of the African, but it did appear that, 
owing to their experience of more advanced 
economies, their greater degree of mutual trust and 
their willingness to enter into partnerships and 
company memberships , the other communities are able 
to make use of and take fuller advantage of the 
existing facilities13.
13 1952, paragraph 103.
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Archival evidence from Barclays Bank, however, lends 
support to the theory that colonial banks did indeed 
discriminate against Africans. For instance, before its credit 
liberalisation experiment, Barclays Bank's policy for granting 
loans, specifically to Africans, rested on three pillars:
(1) the purpose of such loan should be to finance seasonal or 
short-term or bridging expenditure containing no element of 
expenditure on fixed capital but rather providing further 
working capital;
(2) the repayment of such a loan should accrue from the 
transaction itself, which means that such a loan must be self 
liquidating. Such a loan should also usually be short term and 
subject to repayment on demand and;
(3) the borrower should be well known to the banker as a man 
of integrity. He should also possess reasonable business 
acumen and be skilled in his profession. Finally, he should be 
able to provide a substantial stake in the proposition he is 
putting forward before his banker.14
Bluntly interpreted, it was the bank's policy not to 
grant any capital investment or long term loans to Africans no 
matter what their previous record with the bank was. Such a 
blanket and stereotypical policy was explicitly 
discriminatory. This stereotype of the African arguably made 
British bankers reluctant to grant Africans even the recurrent 
expenditure loans that were permitted. Another factor that 
reinforced the prevention of credit flow to Africans was the
14 Business with West African Customers (BBA 11/2272, 19th 
March 1958, pp.1-2).
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low credit approval limits given to bank managers in some of 
the localities. For instance, in 1958, the Barclays Bank 
branch managers in Aba and Onitsha had a loan approval limit 
of only £350 for unsecured loans and £1,000 for secured loans. 
Even on the few occasions when the Africans were given loans, 
it was not unusual for the interest rates to be substantially 
greater than those applying to non-African borrowers.15 These 
discriminatory policies were sustained over a long time, 
perhaps because there was little incentive for the bank to 
make any real attempt to understand Africans in the context of 
their environment. This may have been due to the 
insignificance of the bank's operations in Africa in 
proportion to its global operations.16 Even in staffing 
decisions, the needs of the African branches were usually 
subordinated to those of the other branches.17 The 
oligopolistic nature of the Nigerian banking arena at the time 
also helped sustain this lackadaisical attitude. A deft 
economic calculation of the imminent political change18 
however led Barclays Bank to liberalise their credit policies
15 LHO to Cade (BBA 11/2272, 22nd May 1959).
16 In 1951, for instance, Nigeria hosted only 10 of its 
691 branches worldwide. The total number of the bank's 
branches in the entire British Colonial Africa in the same 
year was 84. This accounted for only 12% of the banks 
worldwide branches- See Newlyn and Rowan (1954, p.73).
17 Daldry to Macdona (BBA 11/2272, 23rd November 1959,
p. 5) .
18 A Local Director once noted that: "...in the long run, 
the consolidation of our position in this country by a chain 
of branches completed before independence, and the build up of 
goodwill and high standing which we have achieved, may prove 
to have been worth even the heavy price we are paying" (Daldry 
to Macdona (BBA 11/2272, 23rd November 1959, p.4) .
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with respect to the Africans in the 1950s despite the 
perceived risks.19
8.3 Roots of the Bad Debt Problem
The starting point of this change in policy was 1951, 
when Barclays Bank established its Local Head Office (LHO) for 
the West African territory in Lagos.20 The same year, J C D 
Coy was appointed as its first director and in 1952 he was 
joined by L C Daldry. Both men became the driving force behind 
the rapid expansion of branches of the bank in the 1950s.21 
According to the official history of the bank, the branch 
expansion of the 1950s was not:
a policy dictated by one man's whim but carried out 
in response to a tremendous demand for banking 
facilities from Nigerian and expatriate trading 
companies, from residents, district officers, emirs 
and natives administrators. Moreover, it was carried 
out in keen competition with the Bank of British
19 It was never anticipated by the Barclays Bank 
management that such a credit liberalisation policy towards 
Africans could be followed without making some losses (Cade to 
Daldry, BBA 11/2272, 28th April 1959).
20 Covering the areas of Nigeria, Gold Coast, British 
Cameroons and Sierra Leone. The essence of a Local Head Office 
was part of the bank's decentralisation policy of encouraging 
the closeness of the bank to its immediate environment (See 
Tuke and Gillman, 1972, Chapter V and Crossley and Blandford, 
1975, p.256) . Note that the British Cameroons were part of the 
Nigerian Federation until 1961 when they decided in a 
referendum to join the federation of Cameroons. Thus the term 
"Nigeria and the Cameroons" will be used in some parts of this 
study.
21 For instance the number of the bank's branches and 
agencies in Nigeria rose from 8 (1950) to 66 (1960) - See
Memorandum to the General Mangers, 25 th April 1960 (BBA 
11/2044) .
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West Africa.22
Complementing the official reason however, was an underlying 
economic reason which was identified by Milne23 in 1946. 
According to him:
The future of banking in West Africa depends upon 
getting the African to conduct a normal banking 
account. There are considerable African markets in 
all the main towns where active trading takes place 
daily and very few of the traders conduct an account 
of any kind. The cash turnover must run into very 
large figures.24
Despite the above rapid increase in the number of branches,25 
it was the visit of J F Cade,26 in 1955, to the West African 
territory that was the landmark of a policy change especially 
with regard to the granting of credit to Africans.27 During 
his visit for instance, Cade instructed the opening of a sub­
branch in the African section of Port Harcourt to serve the
22 Crossley and Blandford, 1975, p.256-7.
23 General Manager, Barclays Bank (DCO), 1946-1951.
24 Report on the visit to west Africa by W W Milne (BBA 
38/906, 6th June 1946, p.5).
25 Compare with the fact that there were only 19 Offices 
under the control of the Local Head Office which spanned, 
Nigeria, Ghana, British Cameroons and Sierra Leone in 1951.
26 General Manager, Barclays Bank (DCO), 1952-1959.
27 Previously, there was a perverse belief amongst the 
Barclays Bank managers that it was difficult to have any 
reasonable business dealings with Africans. This was mainly 
because of the high illiteracy level amongst Africans- see 
General Report of the visit to West Africa by W W Milne (BBA 
38/906, 6th June 1946, pp.5-6).
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Africans contending that:
I feel we should get in here as soon as possible in 
our effort to get closer to the Africans, and get 
them into our bank.28
He noted that the main branch in Port Harcourt was not 
suitable to serve Africans on the grounds that it was quite 
divorced from the African township. The siting of the branch 
also gave the impression that it was set up to serve only 
European interests. This certainly was not the way to compete 
for African business with African banks.29 Likewise in Kaduna, 
when the branch manager explained that the bank did not have 
any African debtor because they knew of none who was 
sufficiently credit worthy, Cade retorted that the bank could 
not go far by maintaining that kind of attitude.30 Implicitly, 
the managers were put under pressure from very high quarters 
to lend to Africans. Credit worthy Africans must be found at 
all costs and loans advanced them. Very little was done in 
terms of training the managers to understand the new business 
environment they were venturing into.
Two years later, on a second visit to Nigeria, Cade 
continued to preach his 'Gospel' of liberalising credit for 
the Africans despite the problems such a policy was already
28 Extracts from Mr Cade's visit to Port Harcourt, Nov 
1955 (BBA 11/1275).
29 Ibid.
30 Crossley and Blandford, 1975, p.258.
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causing.31 On his visit to the Calabar branch of the bank, for 
instance, he described the loans granted to Africans as 
"disappointing" and "small in number and amount"32 and on his 
visit to the Enugu branch he concluded that such advances to 
Africans were not "good enough".33 In Aba, Cade similarly 
described the branch advances to Africans as "disappointingly 
small".34 A similar conclusion was also arrived at in the 
Onitsha branch35 and in Kano he concluded that:
31 By the time of the Cade's second visit in December 
1957/ January 1958, bad debts was already becoming a problem 
in some branches. An example is the Ife branch where Cade 
noted that the African advances as at 15.1.58 "were 78 
totalling £73,000 - and in addition, 15 African a/cs. in the 
B. & D. category totalling £9,000 (...some of the others seem 
to be heading the same way, so I think we can say that African 
advances have not been neglected at this branch!) (BBA 
11/2155) .
32 Extracts from Mr Cade's notes on his visit to Calabar 
(BBA 11/2155, January 1958).
33 Extracts from Mr Cade's notes on his visit to Enugu 
(BBA 11/2155, January 1958).
34 Extracts from Mr Cade's notes on his visit to Aba (BBA 
11/2155, January 1958) .
35 Here for instance, Cade noted that "Advances are only 
£24,000 - and £22,765 of these is to 54 Africans. The 
comparative smallness of advances at first sight seems to 
support the old criticism that we concentrate on raising money 
and don't lend it back to the community. One factor I believe 
is that B.W.A. has most of the big African traders, because 
they were in Onitsha long before we opened. Also lendings are 
low here because it is not a produce buying centre like Kano 
and the big European firms- all well represented in Onitsha- 
do not borrow from us here as they are mainly selling in 
Onitsha, not buying. However, it is the Africans who are 
buying from them and lots of the Africans must want to 
borrow". He further observed that "From 1.8.57 to 10.1.58 the 
branch received 93 applications - of which 32 totalling 
£30,500, were refused.... The record kept usually does not 
explain why the overdraft was refused- instructions are that 
it should always do so. I had a strafe about this. Some of the 
advances refused were required to take up bills or goods, and 
perhaps could have been made without any great risk" - Extract 
of Cade's visit to Onitsha (BBA 11/2155, January 1958).
249
we are still in many places not getting across to 
the Africans as we should.36
In all the above cases, Cade emphasised to the various 
Managers the need to improve the situation.
A major factor that precipitated the "disappointing" 
level of loans to Africans was the low discretionary limits of 
branch managers. Cade, for instance, described the limits of 
£1,000 for secured loans and £350 for unsecured loans in most 
of the branches as inadequate. The frequent transfers of 
branch managers also made them reluctant to lend even within 
their limits. This was mainly because the managers hardly 
spent enough time in a branch to understand the commercial 
climate of the area before being transferred to other 
branches.37
Cade thus instructed the local directors in Lagos to 
review the discretionary limits without delay as such 
conservative limits put the branches at a disadvantage 
especially in comparison with its competitors.38 He further 
instructed the local directors to review the existing 
procedure for granting loans with the aim of making it more 
adaptable to the needs of the Africans.39
36 Extracts of Mr Cade's visit to Kano (BBA 11/2155, 
December/ January 1958).
37 Extracts from Mr Cade's visit to Aba (ibid).
38 At the time for instance, branch managers of the Bank 
of British West Africa in the colony had a credit limit of 
£2,000 for secured advances and £600 for unsecured advances 
(extracts from Cade's visit to Onitsha, ibid).
39 Ibid.
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On March 19, 1958, Daldry, a Local Director in Lagos,
came out with a draft circular "Business with African 
Customers". He reviewed the existing guidelines for such 
lending to Africans and, like Cade, concluded that by- 
insisting on such standards from all prospective borrowers, 
the bank could make little headway anywhere.40 The draft 
circular was reviewed by the London Head Office and approved 
with few amendments.41 In summary, the new rules made it 
possible for the bank, in some cases, to lend for capital 
projects, forego the usual requirement of loan repayments 
being on demand and increase its maximum loan repayment period 
from the usual 1 year to 2 1/2 years and in some cases even 
more.42
Within two years of putting in place the new policy for 
encouraging lending to Africans bad debts, previously a 
relatively unknown phenomenon in the Barclays Bank operation 
in Nigeria, "had reached a very alarming figure".43 The sudden 
jump in bad debt levels, predictably, was an unwelcome 
development to London and soon Cade wrote to Daldry asserting 
that:
40 Cade's draft Circular to Branches "Business with 
African Customers" (BBA 11/2272, 19th March 1958, p.l).
41 For instance, a recommendation that in granting 
advances, the rule of thumb should be that customers be 
granted up to 50% of their working capital was rejected by the 
London Head Office on grounds of impracticability - Colonial 
Advances Department to Harrison (BBA 11/2272, 29th May 1959).
42 "Advances to Africans" Circular to the branches (BBA 
11/2272, 11th April 1958, p.l) .
43 Daldry to Managers of full branches (BBA 11/2044, 21st 
November, 1959,p.l). See Table 5 for an appreciation of the 
African Debt problem.
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We have been increasingly concerned here at the very 
substantial amounts of Bad Debts coming forward in 
respect of lending to Africans. This policy was, of 
course, introduced - and largely by myself- because 
we had to deal with the damaging allegations which 
we encountered on all sides that we were not lending 
to Africans and we were discriminating against them.
We did not expect that we could follow this policy 
without making some losses, but I am afraid that the 
losses have been greater than anticipated.44
The first thing the General Managers in London wanted to know 
was the cause of the debt problem. Daldry identified the two 
main causes of the crop of African bad debts as:(l) the 
general lack of integrity and business experience of the 
customers who had borrowed and (2) the poor quality and lack 
of experience of so many of the officials who had done the 
lending. Various other related causes were identified by other 
interested parties.45 For instance, the West African Advances 
Department at the London head office summarised the underlying 
causes of the bad and doubtful debt problem in Nigeria as due 
to the fact that the facilities were "out of line with the 
customer's means and our experience of them, coupled with a 
lack of control and continual scrutiny and 'follow up' by the 
branch, which Africans particularly take full advantage of."46 
While another local director concluded that many of the bad 
debts arose because "funds lent for the trade have been 
diverted to property development or acquisition of other fixed
44 Cade to Daldry (BBA 11/2272, 28th April 1959) .
45 See Table 6 for a summary of the causes of the bad debt 
problem.
46 West African Advances to Mr Macdona (BBA 11/2044, 9th 
May 1960) .
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assets. "47
A visiting bank examiner placed the blame on the local 
directors asserting that "no useful instructions appear to 
have been issued on how this business was to be conducted.1,48 
This claim may have been erroneous. Rather than a lack of 
guidelines, the likely cause for the sudden surge in the bad 
debts of Barclays Bank was the flouting of the existing 
uniform guidelines.49 There is evidence, for instance, that 
the Local Directors gave several credit policy and management 
directives to branches which most branches either ignored or 
followed haphazardly. For instance in Circular No.45/1956 to 
the branches, the Local Directors stressed the importance of 
maintaining a separate file for each customer with the 
relevant advances information records.50 A further Circular 
to the Branch Mangers on 11th June 1959, by the local 
directors, repeated the above instruction.51 Davies, a local 
director, also cautioned that the practice of describing a 
customer and or his business under 'character and general 
information' as "Good" "Well known to the branch" was quite 
inadequate. Rather something brief but illuminating on the 
following lines was recommended:
47 Dyson to Branch Managers (BBA 11/2272, 26th May 1960,
p.3) .
48 Quoted in "Advances-West Africa" circular (BBA 11/2272, 
22/3/60) .
49 Daldry to Managers of full branches (BBA 11/2272, 21st 
November 1959, p.l).
50 Quoted in Dyson to branches 17th May 1960 (BBA 11/2272, 
17th May 1960).
51 Ibid.
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Established 1950, account opened December 1958. 
Always conducted satisfactorily. Previously banked 
with X.Y.Z., whose report was satisfactory. Business 
progressing. Chief lines: textiles, cement, salt, 
stockfish and sugar. Main suppliers: A.B.C., who 
extend credit £1,000 and have no complaints.52
Davies further advised that the balance sheet of customers be 
obtained at least once a year but preferably every half year. 
This should be compared painstakingly with previous statements 
with explanations for any important differences obtained and 
recorded. The memorandum also emphasised the need not to take 
the customer's balance sheet on its face value, reminding 
branch managers that:
all balance sheets (except those certified by 
reputable auditors) must be checked by a signatory. 
This will involve a physical check of assets and 
enquiries of other banks and customer's suppliers 
regarding liabilities. A pencil note of the 
checker's valuation should be made against each item 
of the "Balance Sheet" so it will be clear how the 
estimate of surplus and of working capital has been 
calculated. Assets which cannot be checked should be 
excluded from the calculation. Property to which 
title has not been proved should also be excluded. 
It is preferable that no two consecutive "Balance 
Sheets" should be checked by the same official. If 
it is not possible to establish with reasonable 
certainty the extent of customers' assets and 
liabilities, no facilities should be granted.53
One factor that led to the rise of inexperienced managers was 
the rapid expansion in the bank's branch network in the 
Nigerian colony. It was such an expansionary scheme that made 
it possible for persons with little or no banking experience
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid, p.2.
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to be entrusted with management responsibilities. For 
instance, after a visit to a sub branch in Ibadan, Cade noted 
that:
the African Clerk-in-Charge had a discretionary 
limit of only £25 and only the sketchiest idea how 
to deal with the problems of lending to Africans (or 
any body else!). His advances totalled £350 to only 
ten Africans, and quite clearly these advances had 
arrived mainly by the process of the customer 
drawing a cheque without prior arrangement and the 
Sub Branch deciding to pay it rather than to return 
it. . . . The Clerk-in-charge described his advances as 
"overnight only" and they were of small amounts. No 
record was kept of advances declined and reasons. 
L.H.O. instructions on this were clearly not known 
to the C in C.54
He then concluded that:
It is quite hopeless to send these Africans out and 
put them in charge of branches on the present casual 
system.55
In a letter to Daldry, Cade reinforced his above views 
asserting that:
I think that a good deal of the trouble has been due 
to the inexperience of the Managers who have been 
applying the policy. Certainly some of the lending 
made has not been warranted.56
Sometimes entwined with incompetence was the acute staff 
shortage, in both numbers and quality. This may also have
54 Extracts from Cade's notes on his visit to Ibadan (BBA 
11/2155, February 1958) .
55 Ibid.
56 Cade to Daldry (BBA 11/2272, 28th April 1959).
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affected the performance of the bank's branches especially 
with regards to the mounting bad debts. The problems caused by 
the rapid increase in branches were compounded by the 
inability of the head office to deliver the right calibre of 
staff. As a local director once noted:
It has been a perpetual struggle to staff L.H.O. and 
the branches at all, leaving aside any question of 
quality, and in the later respect I have often felt, 
quite frankly, that Nigeria's needs have been for 
the most part subordinated to those of the rest of 
the Bank.57
The Director, not surprisingly, concluded that:
Many of our young Managers, despite deficiencies of 
quality and experience, are really trying their best 
under most unattractive and difficult conditions, in 
remote spots with no other Europeans on their staff 
with whom to discuss anything. It is not their fault 
if they have been given a burden which they are 
unqualified to bear.58
Though the London directors did not expect to engage in loan 
liberalisation to Africans without running up some bad 
debts,59 the scale of the bad debt run up by Nigerian 
branches, within a very short period, alarmed them and they 
swiftly moved to curb it.60
57 Daldry to Macdona (BBA 11/2272, 23rd November 1959,
p.5) .
58 Ibid, p. 3.
59 Cade to Daldry (BBA 11/2272, 28th April 1959).
60 As Cade noted "unless we can substantially reduce the 
flow of bad debts, we shall have to think very seriously of 
cutting down drastically on this lending policy, and that 
would be a great pity" - Cade to Daldry (BBA 11/2272, 28th 
April 1959, p.2).
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8.4 Tackling the Bad Debt Problem61
The matter of dealing with advances in the Nigerian 
territory fell under three main headings: (1) Implementing and 
tightening existing controls (2) The granting of fresh 
facilities and (3) A vigorous drive for the recovery of bad 
and doubtful debts.
8.4a Implementing and Tightening of Existing Controls
Apparently due to observations on the ground and of 
course to pressures from the Head Office, the LHO decided to 
clamp down on branches especially with regards to their 
lending policies. With the major cause of the bad debt problem 
identified as the disinclination of the branch managers to 
follow the laid down procedures for awarding credit, a local 
director emphasised the need for branch managers to exercise 
their discretionary credit limits with the greatest caution. 
He further instructed that excesses over discretionary limits 
and limits sanctioned by the LHO must normally be first 
referred to the LHO and must not be granted without the prior 
approval of the LHO unless the delay in referring to LHO would 
be prejudicial to the bank's interests and managers were 
entirely satisfied that the excess was fully justified, of a 
purely temporary nature and would be repaid as arranged, the
61 Table 7 summarises a "question and answer session" 
between the London Head Office and Local Head Office on ways 
of tackling the problem.
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facility being of course repayable on demand.62
Furthermore, the discretionary limits of all branch 
managers with regards to unsecured advances were reduced as 
follows (i) all limits of £5,000 were reduced to £3,000 (ii) 
all limits of £3,000 were reduced to £2,000 (iii) all limits 
of £1,500 were reduced to £1,000 and (iv) all limits of £750 
were reduced to £500. Daldry further instructed the branches 
to: (1) regard all advances made in anticipation of the
perfection of security as unsecured until security is 
perfected and (2) accept third party guarantees, unsupported 
by tangible security, as security only with the approval of 
the Local Head Office.63
The head office also instructed the local directors to 
prepare a security guide for the branches which was to take 
into consideration the various circumstances of the regions in 
general and the branches in particular. This security guide 
was deemed necessary because each of the Nigerian regions had 
different forms of land tenure so that the procedure for 
perfecting mortgage security varied between regions. In view 
of this, of the importance of obtaining effective security and 
of the normal frequent changes of managers and reliefs, it was 
considered that such guides would greatly assist managers and 
also LHO. Any latent procedural difficulties would moreover 
become more easily apparent and steps could be taken to 
initiate changes or improvements in procedure. Apart from
62 Daldry to Managers of Full Branches (BBA 11/2272, 21st 
November 1959, p.l).
63 Ibid, p.1-2.
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properties as security, problems also arose in connection with 
other forms of security e.g effective pledges over goods and 
over the legal assignments of rents payable and debts due 
which, in some cases, could be effectively registered.64
Apart from the above directives, the Bad and Doubtful 
Debts Committee at the London Head Office insisted on the 
separation of the total lending to Africans. This was 
obviously to enhance the close monitoring of the accounts of 
Africans. The total of provisions against such lending to 
Africans in the bad and doubtful debt category was also to be 
segregated.65
As it was realised that these instructions would be of 
little use without regular supervision,66 London Head Office 
instructed the local directors to increase the frequency of 
visits to branches by experienced supervisors. This would, as 
far as possible, ensure that all individual managers were 
exercising proper judgement and control or, if not, that steps 
were taken to remedy matters before any damage was done.67 
Daldry agreed but expressed reservations on its practicality, 
mainly on grounds of costs and lack of skilled manpower.68
64 Harrison to the Nigerian and Cameroon Directors (BBA 
11/2272, 11th May 1960).
65 Harrison to the Nigerian and Cameroon Directors (BBA 
11/2044, 29th February 1960).
66 Inspection report dated 11/6/60. Quoted in Harrison to 
Nigerian and Cameroon Directors (BBA 11/1275, 7th July 1960) .
67 Harrison to Nigerian and Cameroon Directors (BBA 
11/2272, 11th May 1960, p.2).
68 Daldry to Macdona (BBA 11/2272, 23rd November 1959,
p.2) .
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On the suggestion that more Local Head Offices be 
established to ensure closer monitoring of the branches, 
Daldry disagreed, again, on economic grounds pleading the 
inadequacy of experienced managers to man the new LHOs.69 
Instead, he suggested that head office should select a few 
men, truly experienced in advances, to visit Nigeria, two or 
three at a time, for periods up to nine months. They would 
tour branches, staying for periods varying from a week to, if 
necessary, a month. They would go through all the advances 
with branch managers and give advice and guidance. They could, 
where absolutely necessary, report to LHO. Otherwise, their 
report should be to the head office.70
The local directors also preferred on the spot training 
of local managers over attaching branch managers to head 
office or LHO for very short periods, arguing that time was 
the only cure for inexperienced managers. The local directors 
also proposed to introduce an internal proposal form with 
instructions that one must be completed for every advance 
within every manager's discretion. This was to compel managers 
to get into the habit of asking the orthodox questions.71
The bad and doubtful debt position was not just alarming 
in terms of the accounting numbers, it was also worrying in 
terms of the manpower the various branches spent in tackling 
it. Barclays Bank (DCO) had a global policy on bad debts which
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Daldry to Macdona (BBA 11/2272, 23rd November 1959, 
p.3-4) .
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required LHOs to monitor all bad debt accounts above £1,000 in 
branches and make regular reports to head-office on these 
accounts. By 1960, the Lagos LHO had almost one thousand of 
such accounts. With a small advances department consisting of 
a manager and three clerks, the local directors estimated that 
more than half of the department's time was spent dealing with 
accounts in the bad and doubtful debts category. Increased bad 
debt portfolio also meant a corresponding increase in the work 
load of the branch managers. This made it difficult for branch 
managers to get out of their offices to cultivate new business 
or to take active steps to recover bad debts without normal 
work falling into arrear. A viable solution, LHO reasoned, was 
for head office to devise some means of reducing internal 
correspondence.72 The local directors further suggested some 
streamlining of the reports usually submitted to the London 
head office.73 While head office sympathised with LHO Lagos' 
desire to eliminate unnecessary paperwork they refused to 
accede to most of their demands.74
Another measure suggested by the local directors directed 
at saving time was an increase in their £5 discretionary limit 
of writing off bad and doubtful debts without reference to 
head office.75 The Assistant General Manager promptly turned
72 Daldry to General Managers (BBA 11/2044, 22nd April 
1960) .
73 Colonial Advances Department to Assistant General 
Mangers (BBA 11/2044, 22nd April 1958).
74 Ibid.
75 Local Director to General Manager (BBA 11/2044, 19th 
August, 1960).
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down their request on the grounds that such an increase would 
take Lagos out of step with other controlling offices and in 
fact might send the wrong signals to Branch Managers. In his 
reply, the Assistant General Manager asserted that:
While we appreciate that an increase in the amount 
(you have not indicated the figure you have in mind) 
will go some way in easing the work of examining bad 
and doubtful accounts at your office we are 
reluctant to consider a change in the figure which 
is identical with that authorised to all our 
Controlling Offices.76
The Assistant General Manager further advanced that:
Apart from reasons which you may feel justify an 
increase, we consider that having regard to the 
comparatively large volume of bad and doubtful debts 
in your territory, it would not be desirable to do 
anything that might give the impression to branch 
managers that we are in any way relaxing our 
attitude towards the recovery of these small 
debts.77
Apart from the implementation and tightening of the existing 
controls, further guidelines were issued as to the types of 
advances requests to be entertained in the future. Changes 
were also put in place with regard to the mode of 
operationalising such future advances.
8.4b The Granting of Fresh Facilities
Here, an existing practice recommended to be made 
compulsory was the separation of the Loan Account from the
76 Harrison to Nigerian and Cameroon Directors (BBA 
11/2044, 12th September 1960, p.l).
77 Ibid, pp. 1-2.
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current account for operations purposes. The final mode of 
operation for the new system was outlined in the circular of 
May 19, 1960 to the branches from the LHO. This circular
stated that:
1. Whenever a loan is granted, the customer should 
sign a cheque on the loan account for the full 
amount involved. If the loan is for a specific 
transaction, it is most desirable that the 
customer's cheque should be drawn in respect of the 
particular commitment involved and not for cash, to 
prevent the diversion of our advance to other 
purposes. If the loan is not for making a specific 
payment, a cheque should nevertheless be drawn on 
the loan and the amount credited to the customer's 
current account. In all cases, an active current 
account must be maintained.
2. The customer should sign a letter addressed to 
the bank acknowledging the loan and setting out the 
repayment arrangements - to include interests - 
incorporating a standing order, duly stamped, for 
transfers from the current account and undertaking 
to provide funds on the current account at regular 
and suitable intervals to meet the reductions. These 
need not, however, necessarily be for an even amount 
each month, but should be arranged to conform to the 
pattern of the customer's account business.
3. This letter signed by the customer must include 
a statement that he recognises and accepts the 
position that the loan is a banking advance 
repayable on demand.
4. The current account, which the customer should 
undertake in writing to maintain actively, must be 
kept strictly in credit and he should be suitably 
told that any cheques drawn against insufficient 
funds will automatically be returned unpaid. This 
rule must be rigidly followed without exception, 
for all African customers with loan accounts.78
These new regulations, which in some cases applied to existing 
facilities,79 relieved the bank officials of a considerable
78 "Advances Policy" circular from LHO to Branch Mangers 
(BBA 11/2272, 19th May 1960, p.2).
79 As regards current facilities, the General Managers 
noted "we consider that it may be a little too sweeping to 
anticipate that all existing advances should be switched to
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amount of work, especially that spent in dealing with 
"refers". This was so since nearly all cheques could then be 
drawn against credit balances in the customer's current 
account. The new system was however not infallible. For 
instance, the West African Advances Department at the London 
headquarters of the bank expressed reservations because of the 
possibility of Africans exploiting the system to their own 
advantage. For instance, they might pass little of their 
business over their ordinary current accounts and branches 
would find that all that their customers were doing was merely 
complying with their fixed loan repayment arrangements. The 
West African Advances department also felt that such 
arrangements might not be appropriate in every case, for 
example, where advances were made against specific goods to be 
reduced as and when goods were released for sale. The 
difficulty, therefore was to ensure that current accounts were 
being properly used,80 and branch managers were advised to 
ensure that customers who had loan accounts should keep active 
current accounts and where possible, give a written
Loan Accounts. We therefore suggest that some additional 
latitude should be allowed to Branch Managers as regards the 
extent to which they are to disturb existing arrangements 
which are working entirely satisfactorily. Certain advances 
may not be suitable for the loan system for example facilities 
effectively secured by goods in store which are to reduce 
proportionately with goods released or a temporary facility 
pending the receipt of specific remittances or sales proceeds 
may not be suitable for the loan arrangement" -Letter to 
Nigerian and Cameroons directors (BBA 11/2272, 11th May 1960,
p.2) .
80 West African Advances Department to Mr Dyson (BBA 
11/2272, 2nd May 1960).
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undertaking to do so.81
Apart from the above controls, introduced to stem the 
flow of bad debts, four categories of business were identified 
as "carrying considerable risk" and were to be discouraged 
where possible.82 An internal circular of the bank to its 
branches in Nigeria and the Cameroons identified the four 
categories as: (1) cattle traders in the North (2)
transporters (3) rubber traders and exporters and (4) petrol 
station proprietors. Unless fully effective tangible security 
was held or was available in support of such lending, branch 
managers were advised to avoid them.83
The tackling of the bad debt problem did not stop with 
the implementing of existing controls and the setting of new 
ground rules for fresh advances: steps were also taken to 
remedy the existing level of bad debts.
81 Ibid.
82 This was first suggested by Cade. In a Memorandum to 
the LHO, he suggested that: "What I think we must try to do is 
perhaps to give Managers a bit more guidance as to the lines 
on which they should work. Maybe some advances had better be 
blackballed more or less, for example lending money to people 
of small capital to buy lorries, or to pay the instalments 
required to buy lorries on hire purchase terms. There have 
been some losses on lorry lending, and it seems too easy for 
the borrower to disappear with his lorry. Perhaps also we 
might think of following a system adopted elsewhere for 
lending in less advanced communities of insisting that every 
would-be borrower must have at least two good sponsors who 
guarantee his overdraft. Perhaps also we could in some cases 
follow practices elsewhere of lending to co-operatives or to 
groups of people, all of whom know each other and will take 
responsibility for any lapses"- Letter to Daldry (BBA 11/2272, 
28th April 1959, p.l).
83 Ibid, p.l.
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8.4c The Recovery of Bad and Doubtful Debts
Though a record of bad and doubtful debtors was already 
stipulated as an essential record that branches must maintain, 
it was in several cases not properly maintained. This prompted 
the LHO to circularise all the branches reminding them of the 
need to maintain proper and complete records of all bad and 
doubtful debtors. In the case of firms the names of all 
partners were to be separately indexed. Similar rules were 
also to apply to the directors of limited companies. It was 
the duty of the LHO to prepare a comprehensive list of all the 
previous loan defaulters and circulate the list to all 
branches. It was however the duty of the branch managers to 
verify that all new customers had no previous bad debt record. 
Should a defaulter customer apply to any of the branches for 
a facility or to open a new account, the application should be 
refused and the LHO and the customer's previous branch should 
be advised immediately. Efforts should also be made to 
establish the present address of the applicant in order to 
enable the bank reestablish contact where this had been 
lost.84
As regards the recovery of bad and doubtful debts, the 
circular directed the managers to continue the recovery drive 
"with all possible energy" as the local directors were worried 
by the slow progress and prospects of recovery of African 
debts. An impediment to the recovery process was the bank's 
lack of information concerning the assets of debtors. This
84 Local Director to branches (BBA 11/2044, 27th February
1960) .
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precluded Barclays Bank from considering legal action for 
recovery of such bad debts in several cases.85
To further deal with the recovery of bad debts, Daldry 
instructed branch managers to employ the services of African 
lawyers, on commission basis,86 since they were obviously 
versed in the ways of fellow Africans and thus were at an 
advantage to effect recovery. African lawyers were also to be 
used to trace undisclosed assets belonging to African debtors 
where such assets were thought to exist but had not been 
established.87 The policy to use African lawyers in recovering 
debts of fellow Africans was not in any way to jeopardise the 
bank's patronage of expatriate lawyers. In fact, such African 
lawyers were only to be used when expatriate lawyers were 
incapable of achieving results.88
The new scenario of using African lawyers, on commission 
basis, to recover bad debts, had accounting consequences. To 
put the records straight, a local director instructed that the 
full amount collected from the customer by the lawyer should 
be credited to the customer's account. The 10% commission 
payable to the lawyers should then be debited to Legal 
Charges. Managers were further instructed to disclose, on a
85 Daldry to Managers of full branches (BBA 11/2044, 4th 
March, 1960).
86 Not all lawyers were appointed on commission basis. A 
case in point was that of one Mr Shonuga who was employed full 
time by the Broad Street Branch for recovery of debt purposes 
only - Memorandum to Mr Eaton, 12th June 1961 (BBA 11/2272) .
87 Daldry to Managers of full branches (BBA 11/2044, 4th 
March 1960, p.l).
88 Ibid.
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half yearly basis, how much of the legal charges related to 
the 10% commission paid to the lawyers.89 Given that African 
lawyers were to be used only when there was no hope of the 
European lawyers making any recovery, it was not surprising 
that they achieved limited results.90
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted an analysis of the accounting, 
control and operational consequences of a pre-independence 
experiment by Barclays Bank to liberalise its credit policy 
towards Africans in the British Nigerian colony. It concludes 
that the resultant "alarming" bad debts had little to do with 
the absence of adequate instructions on control and operations 
procedures for dealing with credits even after the 
liberalisation process. Rather, such bad debts were 
attributable to the flouting of existing controls and 
operations procedures by inexperienced bank managers who were 
under pressure to lend to Africans. Such pressures were 
inconsistent with the management objective of minimising bad
89 Davies to Managers of full branches (BBA 11/2044, 10th 
June 1960).
90 In 1961, an internal memo of the Barclays bank noted 
that "Results from the use of African debt collectors have 
been somewhat disappointing- most of them have lucrative 
practices and are naturally reluctant to spend time chasing 
the Bank's debtors. It should be mentioned, however, that 
debts placed in the hands of the debt collectors are, in the 
majority of cases, already considered irrecoverable by 
branches and it is considered that in all the circumstances 
the recoveries had been fair in relation to the nature of the 
debts handled. We have suggested to the General Manager in 
Nigeria that they may care to consider raising the commission 
to 25% but they prefer to leave it at the present rate for the 
time being - Memorandum to Mr Eaton (BBA 11/2272, 12th June
1961).
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debts. Had the existing procedures been adhered to, the 
resultant bad debts would have been considerably curbed.
This chapter shows that internal control mechanisms are 
not infallible and therefore cannot always be a substitute for 
external regulation. Individual enterprises may not indeed be 
the best judges of their economic and political self. The next 
chapter will summarise and conclude the entire thesis.
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Table 5
BARCLAYS BANK: NIGERIA AND THE CAMEROONS 
Bad and Doubtful Debts Statistics as at 31st March 1960 
Total Debit Balances 31/3/60 £10,998,000
Provision 30/9/59. 662,340
New and increased Provision 385,680
Global Provision 350,000
Not Required and Reduced Provision 63,044
Provision 31/3/60 (including Global) £1,336,977
From the foregoing, details of African Advances and African 
Bad and Doubtful Debts have been extracted as follows
Total African Advances as at 31/1/60 £4,833,775
Total African Bad and Doubtful Debt at 31/3/60 £950,975
Total African Bad and Doubtful Debt Provision £746,888
Sources:
Memorandum to General Mangers, 25th April 1960 (BBA 11/2044). 
Memorandum to the General Managers, 21st October 1960 (BBA 
11/2044) .
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Table 6
REASONS FOR THE AFRICAN BAD DEBT PROBLEMS
1. Advances being granted indiscriminately to new customers.
2. Insufficient investigation into customers' background, integrity, etc.
3. Failure to obtain reports from other banks before granting facilities.
4. Absence of balance sheet and previous results.
5. Advances out of all proportion to customers' available liquid resources.
6. Failure to check balance sheets supplied by customers and, in particular, to 
verify the existence of stocks and properties to the value claimed.
7. Undue reliance on customers' statements and promises.
8. Advances being made indiscriminately for unsuitable purposes.
9. Advances being granted to customers already known to be indebted to other banks.
10. Too many unsecured lending.
11. Advances being made against the promise of security.
12. Failure to check value of security adequately before advances are made
13. Advances being made before stipulated security are put in order and, in 
particular, before title of property has been verified.
14. Defects in security being discovered after advances have been made.
15. Failure to ensure that goods are adequately insured with the Bank's interest 
noted.
16. Advances against goods being bought on hire purchase without knowledge of 
branch.
17. Advances against rents in advance which do not materialise.
18. Failure to ensure that monies due by third parties will irrevocably be paid to 
the Bank.
19. Insufficient use of loan accounts with regular reduction arrangements.
20. Facilities granted without H.O.N. C. authority especially contractors' accounts.
21. Excesses not reported.
23. Failure to examine accounts frequently and follow up as soon as unsatisfactory 
trends become apparent.
24. Facilities used for purposes other than those arranged. Trading receipts being 
diverted for building, etc.
25. Reluctance to decline further facilities when previous facilities have been 
temporarily repaid, where experience of the account has been unsatisfactory.
26. Failure to obtain regular up to date balance sheets when facilities are 
current.
27. Credits secured by documents turning into unsecured overdrafts.
Source: Memorandum to the General Managers, 25th April 1960 (BBA 11/2044).
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Table 7
TACKLING THE BAD DEBT PROBLEM
Questions from London Head Office Answers from Local Head Office
1 Can we reduce the flow of Bad debts and get the business on 
a sounder basis?
Yes
2 Can we cut it out? No, but we can be more selective.
3 What principles are our men working on? Various
4 What sort of advances have the mistakes mainly been made 
in?
Over-generous desire to implement the policy, exaggerated 
by lack of experience at some branches
5 Are there some types of advances which we should not do at 
all (e.g. purchase of lorries or cash payments for H.P. 
transactions )
Yes
6 Are there others which we should do only with very special 
precautions or with very special additional security?
No
7 Are Managers getting the right sort of information about 
would be borrowers?
Not always, but the necessity of this has been emphasised 
to them
8 Do they get help from their African Staff? Sometimes
9 Should we insist on having at least two sureties etc? I 
don't see why we would not insist.
A guarantor is usually an unsatisfactory form of security 
except where he provides suitable security in support of 
his guarantee
10 Do you think our discretionary limits for small branches 
are too high?
No
11 Should all advances be on loan account also? Where possible
12 Should we charge higher interest because of the increased 
risk?
This is usually done
Sources:
"African Advance" Appendix in LHO to Cade (BBA 11/2272, 30th May 1959).
"Advances" Circular from Local Directors to all branches (BBA 11/2272, 22nd May 1959).
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION
This thesis has attempted to show how different interest 
groups influenced the various banking developments in pre- 
independence Nigeria. In chapter two, we examined the two main 
theories of regulation (public good theory and capture 
theory). Some scholars have however argued that because of the 
ever shifting perception of "public good', shifting individual 
and group interests and perhaps the entwinement of public and 
individual good, neither the capture theory nor the public 
good theory has yet fully explained the rationale for 
regulation. There have thus been calls for a synthesis of the 
two regulatory theories. This thesis will conclude by 
examining to what extent the above theories explain the 
various banking developments in pre-independence Nigeria and 
what these episodes tell us about these theories.
Perhaps the first significant episode in Colonial Nigeria 
that brought out the influence of interest groups on the 
regulation process and the impact regulation could have on the 
operations of various groups was the 1900 legislation on the 
recovery of credit to Africans. With the proclamation by the 
British Government of the Oil Rivers Protectorate, the 
protectorate Government, urged on by the British trading 
interests in the territory, adopted a credit policy aimed at 
discouraging the granting of credit to Africans. This was
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followed by the Recovery of Credit Proclamation of 1900. This 
legislation was defended by the Colonial Government on grounds 
of public interest. The official explanation was that because 
of limited manpower in the newly created consular courts, it 
was necessary to discourage credit sales to Africans in order 
to reduce the court cases arising from such transactions. In 
other words, the economic consequences of trade credit 
litigations made legislation in the public interest necessary. 
This was however not the whole story.
Prior to the declaration of the Southern Nigeria 
Protectorate, the European and African traders had in place an 
effective and efficient way of settling such trade disputes: 
Courts of Equity. With such a system in place, the Consular 
Courts did not need to, in the first place, inherit such trade
disputes. If indeed the workload of the consular courts was an
/
issue, one would have thought that the Courts of Equity should 
have been encouraged to continue dealing with such cases with 
some occasional supervision from colonial officers. It is 
therefore more likely that the protection of the British 
trading interests was the main reason behind the recovery of 
credit legislation. The colonial credit legislation was simply 
a tool used by the Colonial Government to break the back of 
the African middlemen who were seen as all powerful, and to 
entrench the supremacy of the British in Anglo-African trade. 
This legislation thus had little to do with un-credit 
worthiness of the African. In other words, the regulation was 
used rhetorically to advance public good but effectively to 
protect British trading interests. This represents a clear
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example of regulatory capture by the British trading
interests. This legislation also served as the official excuse 
for some colonial banks for not lending money to Africans and 
also as the official proof that Africans were as a rule un­
credit worthy. Even when Barclays Bank (DCO) changed their 
credit policies towards Africans, it was more based on a 
economic calculation of the imminent political change 
(independence). In other words, the bank reasoned that 
political power will put Africans in a position to formulate 
regulations that could fundamentally affect their operations. 
To be perceived as an enemy by the soon to be empowered
Africans was certainly not in the bank's economic interest.
The foreign banks in the Nigerian Colony also remained 
unregulated by the Colonial Government for a long time. The 
advent of colonial banking in the Nigerian Colony was 
initially to provide banking services for the Government and 
the British commercial enterprises then in existence. It was 
therefore not surprising that these banks were registered in 
London, head-quartered in London, and controlled from London. 
These banks, at the time, preferred to be under the regulatory 
jurisdiction of London, where they had considerable influence 
and input in regulation, than be regulated by a Colonial 
Government that was under considerable pressure from the 
Africans to make such banks more useful to the indigenes.
By 1945, the two main Foreign banks had in place a
working agreement on virtually all spheres of banking activity
thus hindering competition. The agreement, for instance, fixed 
minimum charges for overdrafts, loans and local bills
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discounted. Maximum interests payable on various forms of 
deposits were also fixed. This agreement ensured that the 
competition among the two banks did not lead to a price war. 
This agreement, no doubt, helped in making the interest and 
service charges in the Nigerian Colony one of the highest in 
the entire British Empire at the time. Government regulation 
of such excessive bank charges would no doubt have been in the 
public interest. This never happened despite protests from 
Africans. Even when regulation was introduced in 1952, such 
monopolistic arrangements were left untouched. Up until 
Independence, this agreement remained in force, in one form or 
the other, stifling competition. Also the 1952 Ordinance did 
not contain detailed inspection provisions partly because it 
had the potential of precipitating a demand for complicated 
banking control which could cause "undesirable and unnecessary 
interference with the two chief banks." To this extent 
therefore, the capture theory of regulation again provides a 
more useful explanation for the above episode.
But the self interest of the foreign banks is however not 
enough to explain the advent of the 1952 legislation nor its 
provisions. The introduction of this legislation was 
inevitable on grounds of public interest. The activities of 
poorly capitalised, poorly staffed and in some cases fraud 
infested indigenous banks had to be monitored in the interest 
of the public. Most of the requirements of the Ordinance were 
rudimentary and could clearly be defended on grounds of public 
interest. For instance, under the 1952 Ordinance, indigenous 
banks were required to: (1) have a nominal share capital of at
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least £25,000 of which not less than £12,500 should be paid 
up; (2) be licensed by the Financial Secretary in order to be 
able to carry on banking business; (3) abstain from granting 
loans and advances on the security of their own shares and 
granting unsecured loans and advances in excess of £300 to any 
one or more of its directors or to a business in which it or 
any one or more of their directors had any interests; (4) 
maintain adequate cash reserves; (5) maintain a reserve fund 
out of net profit of each year of not less than 20% of such 
profits until the reserve fund equals the share capital; (6) 
refrain from paying dividend until all their capitalised 
expenditure not represented by tangible assets had been 
written off and (7) make periodic returns to the Financial 
Secretary.
The provisions of sections 5(2) and 6(2) of the Ordinance 
were however more contentious. They gave the existing banks 
three years within which to comply with the provisions of the 
Ordinance or discontinue banking business. Not surprisingly, 
there was an exodus of deposits from these indigenous banks 
further entrenching stress and resulting in mass failure of 
these indigenous banks. The fact that the colonial Government 
did little to protect the interest of the largely uninformed 
depositors have provided arsenal for conspiracy theorists. For 
instance no attempt was made to set up a deposit insurance 
scheme despite the fact that the United Nations at the time 
generally promoted the establishment of such schemes in 
developing countries. There is however no evidence that the 
colonial banks in any way influenced this provision. The
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inability of the Government to take into consideration the 
welfare of the largely ignorant depositors, was more of a 
policy failure on the part of Government than any form of 
regulatory capture by the colonial banks. The Colonial 
Government is also indicted for its inability to appreciate 
the fact that Africans, no matter how backward they may appear 
by British standards and no matter how unprepared they may 
have appeared for self rule, needed a banking system to 
support them in their level of development. A task the British 
banks were unable to perform and the indigenous banks, despite 
all their deficiencies, were in a better position to 
accomplish, at least in some respects. The 1952 Banking 
Ordinance and its consequences can thus be explained by a 
combination of public interest theory, capture theory and 
Government policy failure.
The 1952 Banking Ordinance did not however result in the 
failure of all indigenous banks. Most of the indigenous banks 
that survived had regional Government support which was 
politically motivated. The African Continental Bank was one 
such bank. It was set up primarily to help further the 
interests of the Zik Group of Companies while at the same time 
protecting the economic interest of the indigenous people. 
Like most other indigenous banks, economic emancipation of the 
Africans was one of its cardinal objectives. The 1952 Banking 
Ordinance however altered its playing field. The bank's 
conduct was called to question especially as regards its 
ability to meet the requirements of the new Banking Ordinance. 
A political decision by the Government of the Eastern Region,
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where Azikiwe was the helmsman, to invest almost £2 million in 
both shares and deposits in the bank was the obvious saviour.
The Colonial Office, which was well aware of the 
difficulty, if not of the impossibility of the bank's survival 
without such a political action, worried, on grounds of
defending the public interest, about the consequences on sound 
banking practices and accountability of public officers of 
Government ownership and investments in such local banks and 
the procedures for such investments. More importantly however, 
this was seen as an opportunity by the Colonial Office to 
discredit Dr Azikiwe, whom they evidently did not like.
Paranoia for Azikiwe relegated the ideal goal of establishing 
sound banking regulations to the background. The Colonial 
Office then caused the searchlights of three separate
inquiries to be directed at the African Continental Bank
and/or Azikiwe's relationships with the bank. Though some of 
the reports alluded to the fact that Dr Azikiwe's conduct in 
the whole affair fell short of the expectations of honest 
reasonable people, there was no indication that the bank's 
funds had been misappropriated. Paradoxically, it was the 
Nationalist activities of Azikiwe, which were clearly the 
reason why the probe was directed at his person, which also 
saved the African Continental Bank from being wound up. In 
this intermingling of politics and economics, "technical" 
regulatory issues were displaced in terms of importance by 
political objectives.
The African Continental Bank episode shows that there are 
various levels of "capture" all aimed at satisfying
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organisational and individual objectives whatever they may be. 
While it was possible for the colonial banks to capture the 
regulatory agencies and influence regulation, it was also 
possible for some indigenous banks, like the African 
Continental Bank, to capture the political apparatus of 
regional governments and influence the formulation of 
government policies that could aid such indigenous banks in 
complying with regulation. In other words, people simply 
pursue their objectives, whatever they are, using the 
resources available to them. Again a synthesis of public 
interest and capture theories of regulation is needed in order 
to explain the African Continental Bank episode.
The 1952 Banking Ordinance was also fundamental to the 
initial call for the establishment of a central bank in the 
Nigerian Colony. The imminent collapse of most of these 
indigenous banks, led to calls for a 'God Father' bank to help 
save them. This was to some extent an attempt by the indigenes 
to influence regulation in order to protect private interests. 
The Bank of England however believed that it was in the public 
interest to put such rescue operations beyond the scope of an 
infant central bank, if established. The Bank of England also 
had doubts about the ability of a central bank, run by 
Africans, to resist political interference in monetary policy 
management. From previous experience in the interwar years, 
the Bank of England believed that political interference in 
the activities of central banks was an infallible way to high 
inflation. Thus the Bank's attitude could be explained in 
terms of defending the public interest in sound banking and a
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stable economy. There is however an alternative explanation 
for the position adopted by the Bank of England. The bank was 
also interested in protecting the West African Currency Board 
system which provided the Colonial Government with enormous 
seigniorage profits. It was therefore in their interest to 
defend the currency board system. A pre-briefed Bank of 
England 'expert',in 1952, not surprisingly, advised against 
such a bank on 'technical grounds'. An IBRD Economic Mission 
to the Colony, the following year, advised to the contrary and 
again opened up the debate. Various overt and covert attempts 
by the Bank of England to get the IBRD to change its mind 
achieved little result. The Central Bank episode illustrates 
how the colonial Government used 'experts' and questionable 
methods to influence the regulatory process and enshrine 
policies that economically benefitted them. Such policies were 
also defendable on grounds of public interest. This episode 
therefore demonstrates that a synthesis of both the capture 
theory and the public good theory is necessary in order to 
explain banking developments in pre-independence Nigeria.
This thesis is distinct from other studies in the area of 
banking in Colonial Nigeria in two ways. Firstly, it has 
introduced new archival evidence into the study of the subject 
matter. Secondly, it has attempted to explain the various 
banking developments in pre-independence Nigeria, in the 
context of regulatory theories and principles. This thesis 
provides empirical support and illustration for the argument 
that neither the capture theory nor the public good theory can 
fully explain the rationale for regulation. A synthesis of
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both theories leads to a better understanding of the various 
banking developments in Colonial Nigeria.
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APPENDIX 1: 1952 BANKING ORDINANCE
A 1 1 8  Assented to in Her Majesty's name this 12th day of May, 1952.
Title.
D ate o f 
com m ence­
m ent.
Enactment.
Short title.
Interprets-
lioa.
J. S. M A C P H E R S O N .  
Governor
( L . S . )
Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria
IN THE FIR ST YEAR OF TH E REIGN OF
HER MAJESTY QUEEN ELIZABETH II
S i r  JOHN STUART MACPHERSON. o.C.M.o. 
Governor and Co/nmander-in-Cliief
A n  O r d i n a n c e  f o r  t h e  R e g u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  B u s i n e s s  o f  
B a n k i n g .
[22nd May. 1952.] 
BE IT ENACTED by the Legislature of Nigeria as follows: —
1. This Ordinance may be cited as the Banking Ordihance, 1952.
2. In this Ordinance, unless the context otherwise requires : — 
“bank” means any company carrying on banking business or
using the word “bank” or any of its derivatives as part of the 
title under which it carries on business;
“banking business" means the business of receiving from the 
public on current account money which is to be repayable 
bn demand by cheque, and of making advances to customers ;
5 2 4 1 3
Banking No. 15 of 1952 A 119
“company” means any limited liability company registered 
under the Companies Ordinance and includes a company 
incorporated outside Nigeria which is duly registered within 
Nigeria ;
"Court” means the Supreme Court;
"demand liabilities” means liabilities which must be met on 
demand, and “time liabilities” means liabilities which are not 
demand liabilities;
a company shall be deemed to be a “subsidiary” of another if 
that other either is a member of it and controls the composition 
of its board of directors or holds more than half in nominal value 
of its equity share capital or if the first mentioned company is a 
subsidiary of any company which is that other's subsidiary ;
“equity share capital” means the issued share capital of the 
company excluding any part thereof which neither as respects 
dividends nor as respects capital carries any right to participate 
beyond a specified amount in a distribution.
3. (1) No banking business shall be transacted in Nigeria 
except by a company, and any person who acts in contravention of 
the provisions of this sub-section shall be liable on conviction to 
a fine not exceeding ten pounds for every day during which the 
offence continues.
(2) The incorporation of a company which has as its object 
or one of its objects the carrying on of banking shall not be 
registered unless its nominal capital is not less than twenty-five 
thousand pounds.
(3) The Registrar of Companies shall not certify that any 
company which has as its object or one of its objects the carrying 
on of banking is entitled to commence to carry on business in 
accordance with the provisions of section 88 of the Companies 
Ordinance, unless its nominal capital shall have been issued and 
paid up in cash to the extent of at least twelve thousand five 
hundred pounds, and it shall have complied with the provisions of 
section 6 of this Ordinance.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in Part VII of the 
Companies Ordinance, no company incorporated outside Nigeria 
which has as its object or one of its objects the carrying on of bank­
ing shall commence business unless it is proved to the satisfaction 
of the Registrar of Companies that it has an issued and paid-up
C ap. a .
Banking 
business 
to  be tran s­
acted on ly  by 
com panies 
w ith
prescribed
m inim um
capita l.
A  120 No. 15 of 1952 Hanking
R eitricnon  
on use of 
w ord " b a n k 1
E a it i in f  
com panies 
lo  acquire 
capita l 
w ithin three 
yea rs of 
com m ence­
m en t o f this 
O rd inance.
capital which in his opinion is equivalent to not less than one 
hundred thousand pounds, and the Registrar of Companies is 
empowered to call for any documents as evidence that such capital 
has been so paid up.
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section (4) of this 
section, a company incorporated outside Nigeria which has as one 
of its objects the carrying on of banking but does not intend to 
carry on banking in Nigeria may commence business other than 
banking within Nigeria upon the filing by the directors of such 
company with the Registrar of Companies of a statutory declara­
tion to the effect that the company does not intend to carry on bank­
ing business in Nigeria, and of an undertaking not to carry on 
banking business unless the company shall comply with the 
provisions of this Ordinance.
4. (1) After the expiry of one year from the commencement 
• of this Ordinance, no person or body of persons, whether 
incorporated or unincorporated, other than a company authorised 
to carry on banking in accordance with the provisions of this 
Ordinance, shall, without the consent of the Financial Secretary, 
use or continue to use the word “bank” or any of its derivatives 
in the name under which such person or body of persons is carrying 
on business, and no company so authorised shall carry on banking 
unless it uses as part of its name the word “bank” or one of its 
derivatives.
(2) Any person or body of persons whether incorporated ‘or 
unincorporated who acts in contravention of the provisions of this 
section shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding ten 
pounds for every day during which the offence continues:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any Associa­
tion of Banks formed for the protection of their mutual interests.
5. (1) Any compuny lawfully carrying on banking business in 
Nigeria at the date of the commencement of this Ordinance which 
has not on that date u nominal capital of not less than twenty-five 
thousand pounds of which not less than twelve thousand five 
hundred pounds has been issued and paid up in cash shall, within a 
period of three years from the date aforesaid, increase its nominal 
capital to an amount not less than twenty-five thousand pounds of 
which not less than twelve thousand five hundred pounds shall have 
been issued and paid up in cash.
(2) Where any banking company fails to comply with the 
requirements of sub-section tl) of this section it shall, at the expiry 
of three years from the date of the commencement of this 
Ordinance—
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(o) cease to carry on banking ; and
(b) cease to use the word “bank” or any of its derivatives in 
the name under which it is carrying on business:
Provided that the cessation of banking shall not affect the 
rights of any creditors of the company.
6. (1) Save as hereinafter provided, no company shall carry on Licensing of 
banking in Nigeria unless it holds a licence granted by the Financial ^ , kp^ *ics 
Secretary in such behalf.
(2) Every banking company in existence at the date of 
commencement of this Ordinance shall, before the expiry of three 
months from such commencement, and every other company shall, 
before commencing banking in Nigeria, apply in writing to the 
Financial Secretary for a licence under this section:
Provided that in the case of a banking company in existence at 
the date of the commencement of this Ordinance, nothing in sub­
section (1) of this section shall be deemed to prohibit the company 
from continuing to carry on banking until it is granted a licence in 
pursuance of sub-section (2) of this section, or is by notice in writing 
informed by the Financial Secretary that a licence cannot be granted 
to it:
Provided further that the Financial Secretary shall not give a 
notice as aforesaid to a banking company in existence at the date of 
the commencement of this Ordinance before the expiry of the period 
of three years referred to in sub-section (1) of section 5 of this 
Ordinance.
(3) Before granting any licence under this section, or at any 
time or times after the granting of a licence, the Financial Secretary
, shall be entitled to cause an inspection of the books of the company 
to be made or to call for such other information as he may think 
fit in order to satisfy himself that the affairs of the company are not 
being conducted to the detriment of the interests of its creditors.
(4) The Financial Secretary may cancel any licence granted 
under this section where the requirements of sub-section (3) of this 
section cease to be fulfilled or if the company ceases to carry on 
banking in Nigeria or goes into liquidation or is wound up or other­
wise dissolved.
(5) Any banking company aggrieved by the refusal of a licence 
under sub-section (2) of this section or by the cancellation of its 
licence under sub-section (4) of this section may appeal to the 
Governor, and the decision of the Governor on such appeal shall be 
final.
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(6) In considering an application for a licence under this 
section, the Financial Secretary shall have regard to—■
(0 the amount of the bank’s liquid resources in relation to its 
liabilities to depositors and other creditors ;
07) the amount of its issued and paid-up capital;
07/) the amount of its reserves.
and he shall not issue a licence under this section if, in his opinion, 
the circumstances render the issue of such licence undesirable in 
the public interest.
R estriction* 7 .  (i) N0 banking company shall make any loans or advances
advances. *nd on tlie security of its own shares or grant unsecured loans or
advances in excess of £300 to any one or more of its directors or to 
a firm or private company in which it or any one or more of its 
directors is interested as director, partner, manager or agent, or to 
any individual, firm or private company of whom or of which any 
one or more of its directors is a guarantor. For the purpose of this 
sub-section a private company means a private company as defined 
in section 121 of the Companies Ordinance.
(2) Every banking company shall, in the return required to be 
furnished to the Financial Secretary under section 11, give 
particulars of all unsecured loans and advances granted by it to 
companies other than private companies in which it or any of its 
directors is interested as director, manager or agent or guarantor.
(3) If on examination of any return submitted under section 
11 it appears to the Financial Secretary that any loans or advance; 
referred to in sub-section (2) arc being granted to the detriment of 
the interests of the depositors of the banking company, the Financial 
Secretary may, by order in writing, prohibit the banking company 
from granting any further such loans or advances or impose such 
restrictions on the grant the-oof as he thinks fit. and may by like 
order direct the banking company to secure repayment of any loan 
or advance within such time as may be specified in the order.
C aih  reserve. 8. (1) Every banking company shall at all times maintain by 
way of cash reserve such amount as is necessary to ensure an 
adequate degree of liquidity and to provide adequate cash reserves 
against its commitments, and the Financial Secretary may from time 
to time require the banking company to furnish to the Financial 
Secretary a statement in writing setting out the cash reserve and the 
time and demand liabilities of the banking company at a date 
specified by him.
i
|
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(2) If it shall appear to the Financial Secretary on examination 
of such statement that adequate cash reserves are not being 
maintained, he shall direct that steps be taken to increase the ratio 
of the cash reserves to the demand and time liabilities in such 
manner and within such time as shall be stated in the direction, and 
if such direction is not fully complied with he may at his discre­
tion cancel any licence granted to the bank under section 6 of this 
Ordinance.
9. (1) Every banking company incorporated in Nigeria and 
operating solely within Nigeria shall maintain a reserve fund, and 
shall, out of the net profits of each year and before any dividend 
is declared, transfer a sum equivalent to not less than twenty per 
centum of such profits to the reserve fund, until the amount of the 
said fund is equal to the paid up capital.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) of this section shall also 
apply to banking companies incorporated outside Nigeria unless 
it is proved to the satisfaction of the Financial Secretary that the 
aggregate reserves of the company fulfil the requirements of that 
sub-section.
10. No banking company shall pay any dividend on its shares 
until all its capitalised expenditure (including preliminary 
expenses, organisation expenses, share selling commission, 
brokerage, amounts of losses incurred and any other item of 
expenditure not represented by tangible assets) has been completely 
written off.
11. (1) Every banking company shall furnish to the Finan­
cial Secretary: —
(a) not later than forty-two days after the last day of each 
quarter ending on the 31st March. 30th June, 30th September 
and^lst December, a statement in the form set out in the First 
Schedule to this Ordinance showing the assets and liabilities of 
the banking company at the close of business on the last day 
of the quarter;
(b) not later than forty-two days after the last day of March, 
June, September and December a statement in the form set out 
in the Second Schedule to this Ordinance, giving an analysis of 
advances current and bills discounted as at the 31st March, 30th 
June, 30th September and 31st December, respectively:
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Provided that in the case of a banking company which is a 
company incorporated outside Nigeria, the statements to which 
reference is made in paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, shall comprise 
data only with respect to offices and branches of such company 
which are situated in Nigeria; and such statements shall be 
submitted by the manager or agent of the principal office of the 
company in Nigeria :
Provided further that the Governor may by regulation from 
time to time vary the form of the First and Second Schedules, and 
the dates as at which the information required in the Second 
Schedule shall be compiled and forwarded to the Financial 
Secretary.
(2) Any banking company failing to comply with the require­
ments set out in paragraph (a) or (b) of sub-section (1) hereof 
shall be liable to a fine not exceeding five pounds for every day 
during which the default continues.
(3) Where a banking company is liable to furnish the returns 
set out in sub-section (1) of this section it shall not be liable to 
comply with section 108 of the Companies Ordinance.
12. (1) Every banking company shall—
(a) exhibit throughout the year in a conspicuous position in 
every office and branch of the banking company in Nigeria a 
copy of its last audited balance sheet;
(b) on or about the date of the presentation of such balance 
sheet to the shareholders in general meeting, cause a copy there­
of to be published in a dai'y newspaper circulating in Nigeria ;
(c) forward to the Financial Secretary a copy of its last 
audited balance sheet within six months after the close of its 
financial year.
(2) Any banking company which fails to comply with any of 
the requirements of this section shall be liable on conviction to 
a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds.
13. (1) After the expiry of three months from the 
commencement of this Ordinance every banking company shall, 
in all circulars and letters issued or sent by or on behalf of the 
company in connection with its business, cause to be set out in 
legible characters the full and correct names of all persons who 
are directors of the company.
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(2) Any banking company which fails to comply with the 
requirements of this section shall be liable on conviction to a fine 
not exceeding twenty-five pounds.
14. (1) Without prejudice to anything contained in section 
74 of the Companies Ordinance, no person—
(a) who has been a director of, or directly or indirectly 
concerned in the management of, a banking company which 
has been struck of! the register of companies under the provi­
sions of this Ordinance ; or
(b) who is or has been convicted by a criminal court of an 
offence involving dishonesty and has not received a full pardon 
for the offence of which he was convicted,
shall, without the express authorisation of the Governor, act or 
continue to act as a director of, or be directly or indirectly 
concerned in the management of, any banking company.
(2) Any person acting in contravention of sub-section (1) of 
this section shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding two years or to a fine not exceeding five 
hundred pounds, O' both such imprisonment and such fine.
15. (1) Any banking company which wilfully fails to comply 
with the provisions of this Ordinance, may, upon application to 
the Court by the Attorney-General, be struck off the register of 
companies.
(2) Any person who, being a director or manager of a banking 
company,
(a) fails to take all reasonable steps to secure compliance by 
the banking company with the requirements of this Ordinance, 
or
1 (b) fails to take all reasonable steps to ensure the correctness
of any statement submitted under the provisions of this 
Ordinance,
shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall in respect 
of each offence be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding two years or to a fine not exceeding three hundred 
pounds or to both such imprisonment and such fine :
Provided that no proceedings shall be instituted in respect of 
any such offence save by or under the direction of the Attorney- 
General.
16. The Governor may make such rules as may be required 
from time to time for carrying into effect the objects of this 
Ordinance and for regulating the proceedings and functions of the
286 Financial Secretary under this Ordinance.
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F IR S TTo be rendered in accordance with section 11 of the 
Banking Ordinance, 19S1.
l  i a  u  i m  t i e s
N a m e  o p  D a n k ...
Q U A R T E R L Y  S T A T E M E N T  OF
A S AT.  ____________
1 . C a p it a l  p a i d  o p  . .  .......................................
2 .  R e s e r v e  F u n d  ........................................................
3 .  D e b e n t u r e s
4 .  B a l a n c e s  H e l d  f o r  :—
(a) Other Banks in Nigeria
(b) Other Banks outside Nigeria
(c) Head Office o f this Bank outside Nigeria
(d)  Branches o f this Bank outside Nigeria . .  
(*) Subsidiary Companies
(1) In Nigeria
(2) Outside Nigeria
( / )  Other Correspondents
Current Account 
Savings Account
(A) 0  R ^ S f r f f ,T* REPAYADLE * •  « O M  THE DATE OP THIS
(i) within 3 months
(ii) between 3 and 6 months
(iii) between 6 and 12 months 
(fti) later than 12 months
6 . B i l i e  P a y a b l e  ..........................................................................................
7. A dvances prom :—
(a) Other Banks in Nigeria
(b) Other'Banks outside Nigeria
(c) Other parties or institutions
Contingent Liabilities
8 .  A c c e p t a n c e s  o n  A c c o u n t  o f  C u s t o m e r s ......................................
9 .  C o n f i r m e d  D o c u m e n t a r y  C r e d i t s
1 0 . G u a r a n t e e s , E n d o r s e m e n t s  a n d  o t h e r  O b l ig a t i o n s  o n  
A c c o u n t  o p  C u s t o m e r s .........................................................................
O t h e r  A c c o u n t s  ...........................................................................................
I I 1-----------
* Details should be given, on an attached sheet, in regard to balances lodged in countries in 
t  “Scheduled Territories" means the territories specified in the First Schedule to the Exchange 
We declare that the foregoing is mode up from the books of the Bank, and that, to the best o f
Date.
a t 
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!' S C H E D U L E
*  A S S E T S  A N D  L IA B IL IT IE S
' ..........   19-
A S S E T S
- |  C u r r e n c y  o n  H a n d  a n d  i n  T r a n s i t  ......................................
2 . Ba l a n c e s  w i t h , i n c l u d i n o  r e m i t t a n c e s  in  t r a n s it  t o  :—  
(a) Other Bonks in Nigeria 
•(b) Other Banks outside Nigeria 
•(e) Head Ollice of this Bank outside Nigeria 
•(d) Branches of this Bank outside Nigeria 
*(r) Subsidiary Companies :—
(1) In Nigeria ...........................................................
(2 )  Outside Nigeria
C * tl £ s d £  s d
• (f )  Other Correspondents
3 . T re a su r y  B il l s
(a) Nigerian Government Bills
4. L o a n s  a n d  A d v a n c e s  t o
(o) Subsidiary Companies of this Bank :—
(1 )  I n  Nigeria
(2 )  Outside Nigeria
(b) Other Banks in Nigeria 
(e) Other Banks outside Nigeria 
(<f) Other Customers
(i) Repayable within six m onths from dote of this 
return
(it) Repayable within one year from date o f  this return 
(ill) Repayable later than one year from date of this 
return ..........................................................................
5 . I n v e s t m e n t s  :—
(a) Investments in subsidiary companies of this Bank :—
(1) I n  Nigeria
(2 )  Outside Nigeria
(b) Nigerian Securities :—
( 1 ) Nigerian Government
(2 )  Other ............................................................................
4 (c) Foreign Securities
(1 )  British Government
(2 )  Other Scheduled! Territories securities :—
(i) Empire
(ii) Other
(3 )  Investments outside the Scheduled Territories . .
6 . B a n k  P r e m is e s  a n d  o t h e r  I m m o v a b l e  P r o p e r t y
(Including Furniture, Fixtures, and Fittings)
7. L i a b i l i t i e s  o p  C u s t o m e r s  f o r  A c c e p t a n c e s  (us per contra)
8 . L ia b i l it i e s  o f  C u s t o m e r s  f o r  C o n f i r m e d  D o c u m e n t a r y
C r e d it s  (as per contra)
9. L ia b il it i e s  o f  C u s t o m e r s  f o r  G u a r a n t e e s , E n d o r s e m e n t s
a n d  O t h e r  O b l ig a t i o n s  (as per contra)
10 . O t h e r  A c c o u n t s ..........................................................................
which currency restrictions exist, and which are subject to such restrictions.
Control Ordinance. 1950.287 our knowledge and belief, it is correct.
General Manager
13
C hief Accountant
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S E C O N D  S C H E D U L E
To be rendered in accordance w ith  section 11 o f  the Banking Ordinance, 1951
N a m e  o f  B a n k _____________ _______ ____________________________________________________________
A N A L Y S IS  O F C U S T O M E R S ’ L IA B IL IT IE S  T O  B A N K  a s  a t _________________________
F O R  L O A N S  A N D  A D V A N C E S
1. T o  G overnm ent
2. T o  Native A dm inistrations, T ow n sh ip s and other Local Authorities
3. T o electricity, water, harbour, dock and other public utility bodies 
C u e d i t  a n d  F i n a n c i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n s  :
4. T o  Banks, e tc ........................... ..............................................................
A g r i c u l t u r e  :
5. Cocoa
6. G roundnuts
7. Palm products
8. Other export crops (in clud ing  tim ber)
9. Other agriculture (including livestock)
M i n i n o  :
10. T i n .............................................................................................
11. Other m ining  
F o r  M a n u f a c t u r e  of :
12. Textiles, leather and clothing
13. Wood products (including furniture)
14. Soaps and oils
15. Stone, cem ent, bricks, glass, ceram ics and pottery
16. Other m anufactured products 
C o n s t r u c t i o n  :
17. For buildings in course of erection 
G e n e r a l  C o m m e r c e  :
18. T o  wholesale and retail merchants
1 9 . M is c e l l a n e o u s
T o t a l s
Amount
£
Number o f  
Customers
N um ber o f  custom ers liable in respect o f  loans and r.<' ances : 
up to £5Q.
over £50 and up to £100  
over £100 and up to £500  
over £500 and up to £1,000  
over £1,000 and up to £5 ,0 0 0  . .  
over £5,000  and up to £10 ,000  
over £10,000  .................................
T o t a l s
Am ount
£
Number of  
Customers
D ate______________
General M anager
Chief Accountant
B a n k in g N'O. 15 Of 1952 A  129
This printed impression has been carefully compared by me 
with the Bill which has passed the House of Representatives, and 
is found by me to be a true and correctly printed copy of the said 
Bill.
S. ADE. OJO,
Clerk o f the House o f Representatives
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APPENDIX 2: THE 1958 BANKING ORDINANCE Assented to in Her Majesty's name this 24th day of April, 1958. A 81
I
J. W. ROBERTSON, 
Governor-G eneral
(L.S.)
N o . 19 1958
Federation of Nigeria
■J IN  T H E  S E V E N T H  YEAR O F  T H E  R E IO N  O F
HER MAJESTY QUEEN ELIZABETH II
Sre JAMES WILSON ROBERTSON, o . c . m . g . ,  G.c.v.0., k .b .e .  
Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief
A n  O r d i n a n c e  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  t u b  R e c o i .a t i o n  a n d  L i c e n s i n c  o f  t h e  
B u s i n e s s  o f  B a n k i n g .
[1st May, 1958]
BE IT  EN A C TED  by the Legislature of the Federation of Nigeria as 
follows—
1. T h is  Ordinance may be cited as the Banking Ordinance, 1958, and 
shall come into operation upon such date as may be notified by the Governor- 
General after the signification of the pleasure of H er Majesty thereon,
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2. In this Ordinance, unless the context otherwise requires—
“ bank" means any person who carries on banking business ;
“ banking business" means the business of receiving money on current
account, of paying and collecting cheques drawn by or paid in by customers 
and of making advances to customers ;
“ Central Hank" means the Central Hank of Nigeria ;
"com pany" means-
(i) any limited liability company registered under the Companies 
Ordinance and includes a company incorporated outside Nigeria which 
has complied with Part VII of that O rdinance; and
(ii) a body incorporated directly by a law of any Legislature in 
Nigeria ;
"director" in relation to a banking company incorporated directly by a 
law in Nigeria includes any person, by whatever name he may be referred 
to, carrying out or empowered to carry out substantially the same functions 
in relation to the direction of the company as those carried out by a director 
of a banking company registered under the Companies Ordinance j
“ licence" means a licence granted under section 3 authorising the carry­
ing on of banking business in Nigeria, or deemed to be so grunted in 
aecordancc with that section ;
"licensed bank" means a bank holding a licence and all the offices and 
branches in Nigeria of such a bank shall be deemed to be one bank ;
“ M inister" means the M inister charged with responsibility for matters 
relating to banking in the Federation, or a person acting under his direction 
or on his behalf.
3. (1) No banking business shall be transacted in Nigeria except by a 
company which is in possession of a vali'1. licence, which shall be granted by 
the M inister after consultation with .nc Central Hank, authorising it to 
carry on banking business in Nigeria : Provided that a valid licence granted 
under the provisions of the Banking Ordinance, 1952, shall be deemed to 
be a licence granted under the provisions of this section.
(2) Any person who contravenes the provisions of subsection (1) shall 
be liable to a fine of fifty pounds for each day during which the offence 
continues.
(3) Prior to commencing banking business in Nigeria a company shall 
apply in writing through the Central Bank to the M inister for the grant of 
a licence, and shall submit a copy of the memorandum of association and 
articles of association under which it is incorporated and, if it is currently 
carrying on banking business outside Nigeria, a copy of its latest audited 
balance sheet.
(4) T he M inister may call for such information from the company 
in such manner as he may think fit.
(5) (a) If the M inister is of the opinion that it would be undesirable 
in the public interest that a licence should be granted, he shall report the 
circumstances to the Governor-General in Council who may direct him 
to refuse to grant a licence, and the M inister need not give reasons for so 
refusing.
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(b) T he M inister may by Order revoke any licence—
(i) if the holder ceases to carry on banking business in Nigeria or 
goes into liquidation or is wound up or otherwise dissolved ; or
(ii) in the circumstances and in the m anner provided for in section 14.
4. No bank shall be granted or shall hold a licence unless -
(«) in the ease of a bank of which the Head Office is situated in Nigeria, 
its capital paid up in cash is not less than twelve thousand five hundred 
pounds j
(b) in the ease of a bank of which the Head Office is situated outside 
Nigeria, its capital paid-up in cash is equivalent to not less than two 
hundred thousand pounds.
5. (1) Every licensed bank of which the H ead Office is situated in 
Nigeria shall maintain a reserve fund and shall, out of its net profits of each 
year and before any dividend is declared, transfer to that fund a sum equal 
to not less than twenty-five per cent of such profits whenever the am ount of 
the reserve fund is less than the paid up capital of the bank.
(2) T he provisions of subsection (1) shall also apply to any licensed 
bank of which the Head Office is situated outside Nigeria unless it is proved 
to the satisfaction of the M inister that the aggregate reserves of that bank 
arc adequate in respect of its business.
(3) This section shall not apply to any bank the reserve fund or aggregate 
reserves of which amount to at least two hundred thousand pounds.
6. No licensed bank shall pay any dividend on  its shares until all its 
capitalised expenditure (including preliminary expenses, organisation 
expenses, share selling commission, brokerage, am ounts of losses incurred) 
not represented by tangible assets has been completely written off.
7. (1) A licensed bank shall not in Nigeria—
(a) grant to any person any advance'or^redit facility or give any financial 
guarantee or incur any other liability on behalf of such person so that 
the total value of the advances, credit facilities, financial guarantees and 
other liabilities in respect of such person is at any time more than twenty- 
five per cent of the sum of the paid-up capital and published reserves of 
the ban k : Provided that—
(i) the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to transactions 
between banks or between the branches of a bank, or to the purchase of 
clean or documentary bills of exchange, telegraphic transfers or docu­
ments of title to goods the holder of which is entitled to payment 
outside Nigeria for the payment of exports from Nigeria or to advances 
made against such bills, transfers or docum ents ;
(it) the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to advances 
or credit facilities granted to or established on behalf of a M arketing 
Board established by any legislature in Nigeria, or to the purchase of 
bills of exchange payable in Nigeria and accepted by any such Board 
or to advances made against such bills w here such advances or credit 
facilities or bills are for the purpose of financing the movement in 
Nigeria of produce delivered to u M arketing Board ;
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(Hi) the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply in respect of 
any bank while all the banking liabilities it may from time to time incur 
are the subject of an irrevocable guarantee given by another bank inside 
or outside Nigeria, if the form and substance of that guarantee have been 
approved by the Minister upon tin express recommendation by the 
Governor of the Central Hank.
(h) grant any advance or credit facility against the security of its own 
sh ares ;
(c) grant or permit to he outstanding unsecured advances or unsecured 
credit facilities of an aggregate amount in excess of five hundred pounds—
(») to any one of its directors whether such advances or facilities are 
obtained by its directors jointly or severally ;
(ii) to any firm, partnership or private company in which it or any 
one or more of its directors is interested as director, partner, manager 
or agent, or to any individual, firm, partnership or private company 
of whom or of which any one or more of its directors is a guarantor. 
For the purpose of this paragraph, a private company means a private 
company as defined in section 121 of the Companies O rdinance;
(d) grant or permit to be outstanding to its officials and employees 
unsecured advances or unsecured credit facilities which in aggregate 
amount for any one official or employee exceed one year’s emoluments 
of such official or employee;
(e) engage, whether on its own account or on a commission basis, in 
the wholesale or retail trade, in» aiding the import or export trade, except 
in so far as may exceptionally be necessary in the course of the banking 
operations and services of that bank or in the course of the satisfaction of 
debts due to i t ;
( f )  acquire or hold any part of the share-capital of any financial, com­
mercial, agricultural, industrial or other undertaking except such share­
holding as a bank may acquire in the course of the satisfaction of debts 
due to it which shareholding shall, however, be disposed of at the earliest 
suitable m om en t: Provided that this paragraph shall not apply—
(i) in respect of any shareholding approved by the Central Bank in 
any corporation set up for the purpose of promoting the development 
of a money market or securities market in Nigeria or of improving the 
financial machinery for the financing of economic developm ent;
(ii) to all shareholdings in other undertakings the aggregate value of 
which docs not at any time exceed twenty-five per cent of the sum of 
the paid-up capital and published reserves of that bank ;
(g) purchase, acquire or lease real estate except as may be necessary for 
the purpose of conducting its business or housing its s ta ff: Provided 
that—
(i) in respect of any real estate held or leased by a bank at the coming 
into operation of this Ordinance for purposes other than those referred 
to herein, that bank shall be allowed a period of three years in whiclt to 
comply with this paragraph; and,
(ii) in the event of any debt due to a bank becoming endangered the 
bank may secure such debt on any real or other property of the debtor 
and may acquire such property which shall, however, be resold at the 
earliest suitable moment.
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(2) In  paragraph (c) and (d) o f subsection (1), the expression 
“ unsecured advances or unsecured credit facilities" means advances or 
credit facilities made w ithout security, or, in respect of any advance or 
credit facility made with security, any part thereof which at any time exceeds 
the market value of the assets constituting that security.
(3) Any licensed bank which, prior to the coming into operation of (his 
Ordinance, entered into any transactions incompatible with the provisions 
of paragraphs (a) to ( f)  of subsection (1), shall subm it a statement of those 
transactions to the M inister through the Central Hank and shall, within one 
year from the said date, liquidate the transactions.
8. (1) Every licensed bank shall maintain a holding of specified liquid 
assets not less than such am ount as may from time to time be prescribed by 
the Central Bank by virtue of section 40 of the Central Bank of Nig-ria 
Ordinance, 1958.
(2) For the purpose of com puting the am ount of specified liquid assets 
to be held by each licensed bank, the offices and branches situated in Nigeria 
of such a bank operating in Nigeria and elsewhere shall be regarded as if 
those offices and branches constituted a separate bank carrying on business in 
Nigeria. All the demand liabilities, and all the time liabilities, of that bank 
owed through any of those offices or branches in Nigeria shall be regarded as 
if they constituted liabilities of that separate bank, and all the assets held by 
or to the credit of any of those offices or branches on behalf of that bank and 
not on behalf of a customer, including any balance in the books of any office 
or branch of that bank situated in the U nited Kingdom, shall be regarded as 
if they were assets of that separate bank.
(3) For the purpose of subsection (2), “ demand liabilities” means the 
total of deposits tn any bank which m ust be repaid on demand, and “ time 
liabilities" means the total of deposits repayable otherwise than on demand".
(4) The specified liquid assets referred to in this section shall consist of 
all or any of the following—  . _
(a) notes add coins which artf legal tender in Nigeria ;
(b) balances at the Central B an k ;
(c) balances a t any other bank in N igeria and money a t call in Nigeria ;
(d) balances at any bank, including the offices and branches of a licensed 
bank, in the U nited K ingdom and money at call in the United Kingdom ;
(«) Treasury Bills issued by the Federal Governm ent and maturing 
within ninety-three d a y s ;
( / )  Treasury Bills issued by the G overnm ent of the United Kingdom and 
maturing within ninety-three days ;
(g) inland bills of exchange and promissory notes rediscountable at the 
Central B ank;
(h) bills of exchange bearing a t least two good signatures and drawn on 
and payable at any place in the U nited Kingdom.
(5) A licensed bank shall be guilty of an offence if—
(a) it fails to furnish w ithin a reasonable tim e any information required 
2  9 1  by *be Central Bank to satisfy itself that that bank is observing the require­
ments of subsection (1 );
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(6) it allows its holding of specified liquid assets to be less in amount 
than is from time to time prescribed by the Central B ank ;
(r) during the period of any such deficiency of specified liquid assets, it 
erants advance* or overdrafts without the prior approval of the Central 
Bank.
(6) Any licensed hank which commits an offence under subsection (5) 
shall he liable to a fine of fifty pounds—■
(a) lor every day during which a default under paragraph (a) of that
su b sec tio n  e x is t s ;
(A) for every day during which a deficiency under paragraph (b) of that 
subsection exists, and
(e) for every offence under paragraph (e) of that subsection.
9. (1) Not later than four months aft'.r the close of each financial year 
of each licensed bank, the bank shall puK ish in a daily newspaper circulating 
in Nigeria, and exhibit in a conspicuous position in each of its offices and 
branches in Nigeria, and forward to the M inister and to the Central Bank, 
copies of its balance sheet and profit and loss account and the full and correct 
names of the directors of the bank. T he balance sheet and profit and loss 
account must bear on their face the certificate of an auditor who is an approved 
auditor in accordance with subsection (5) of section 15.
(2) Any licensed bank which fails to comply with the requirements of 
subsection (1) shall be liable to a fine of one hundred pounds.
10. (1) Every licensed bank shall subm it to the Central Bank—
(a) not later than thirty-one days after the last day of each month a 
statement in the form set out in the First Schedule showing the assets and 
liabilities of its offices and branches in Nigeria at the close of business on 
the last business day of the preceding m onth, together with a statement of 
the total of any outstanding unsecured advances or unsecured credit 
facilities as defined in subsection (2) of section 7 ;
(b) not later than thirty-one days after the last day of each half-year 
ending on the 30th day of June and the 31st day of December a statement 
in the form set out in the Second Schedule to this Ordinance giving an 
analysis of advances and other assets of its offices and branches in Nigeria- 
as at the 30th day of June and 31st day of December respectively.
(2) The Central Bank may exceptionally require a licensed bank to 
submit such further information as the Central Bank may deem necessary for 
the proper understanding of the statem ents furnished by that bank under 
subsection (1) of this section, and such information shall be submitted 
within such reasonable period as the Central Bank may require.
(3) Any licensed bank which has its head office in Nigeria but maintains 
offices or branches outside Nigeria shall produce to the Central Bank such 
statements relating to its offices or branches outside Nigeria in such form 
and at such times as the Central Bank may require.
(4) Any licensed bank failing to comply with the requirements of 
subsection (1), (2) or (3) of this section shall be liable to a fine of fifty pounds 
for every day during which the offence continues.
(5) T he M inister may, after consultation with the Central Bank, amend 
by regulation the form of the First or Second Schedule and the dates for the 
compilation or submission of the statements under subsection (1).
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(6) I t  shall be the responsibility of the Central Bank to prepare and to 
publish consolidated statements aggregating the figures in the statements 
furnished under subsection (1). T he statem ents subm itted by each bank 
under subsection (If or (3) and any information subm itted under subsection
(2) shall be regarded as secret other than as between that bank and the Central 
Bank : Provided that the Central Bank shall furnish any such information 
required by the M inister, and shall inform the M inister if at any time in its 
opinion there is a need for an examination of any licensed bank, and may in 
support of its opinion convey to the M inister such information as it possesses 
concerning the state of that bank's affairs.
11. An exam iner shall be appointed, who if the M inister so approves shall 
be an officer of the Central Bank appointed by the Central Bank, and other­
wise shall be an officer of the M inistry appointed by the M inister, to examine 
periodically, under conditions of secrecy, the books and affairs of each and 
every licensed bank. If  the examiner is an officer from the M inistry he shall 
be given access to any accounts, returns or information with regard to 
licensed banks that are in the possession of the Central Bank.
(2) In  examining any bank in accordance with subsection (I) it shall 
be the duty of the examiner at all times to avoid unreasonable hindrance to 
the daily business of that bank and to confine the investigation to matters 
strictly relevant to the examination.
(3) T h e  exam iner shall report to the Governor of the Central Bank, 
who shall inform the M inister of any circumstances likely to call for action 
by the M inister in accordance with section 14.
12. T h e  M inister may at any time require the examiner appointed in 
accordance with section 11, or one or more other qualified persons whom 
he shall appoint, to  make a special examination under conditions of secrecy 
of the books and affairs of any licensed bank—
(а) where, after consultation with the Central Bank, the M inister hss 
reason to believe that that licensed bank may be carrying on its business 
in a m anner detrim ental to the interests of its depositors and other creditors 
or may have insufficient assets to covdr its liabilities to the public or may 
be contravening the provisions of this O rd inance;
(б) where application is made by shareholders holding not less than 
one-third of the total num ber of shares in that bank for the time being 
issued or by depositors holding not less than one-half of the gross amount 
of the total deposit liabilities in Nigeria of that bank : Provided however 
that the applicants subm it to the M inister such evidence as he may consider 
necessary to justify  an examination, and provided also that they furnish 
adequate security for the payment of the costs o f the examination ;
(e) if  the bank suspends payment or informs the M inister or the Central 
Banlc o f its intention to do so.
13. (1) Every licensed bank of which an examination has been ordered 
under section 11 or 12 shall produce to the appointed examiner at such times 
as the examiner may specify, all books, accounts and documents in its 
possession or custody, or of which it is entitled to possession or custody, 
relating to its business, and shall produce within such times as the examiner 
may specify all oral information concerning its business which he may require.
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(2)5If any book, account, document or information is not produced in 
accordance with subsection (1) the bank shall be guilty of an offence and 
shall be liable to a fine of fifty pounds in respect of every day during which 
the offence continues. I f  any book, account, document or information is 
false in any material particular, the bank shall be liable to a fine of five 
hundred pounds.
(3) As soon as may be after the conclusion of the examination the 
examiner shall submit a full report thereon to the M inister who shall forward 
a copy to the I lead Ofiiec of the bank concerned.
(4) T he M inister shall have lower to order that all expenses of and 
incidental to an examination shn'. be paid by the bank examined. He shall 
also have power, in respect of examinations made under paragraph (b) of 
section 12, to order that the expenses shall be defrayed by the applicants.
14. If, in the opinion of the M inister, an examination shows that the 
licensed bank is carrying on its business in a manner detrimental to the 
interests of its depositors and other creditors or has insufficient assets to 
cover its liabilities to the public o r is contravening the provisions of this 
Ordinance, the M inister may take such one or more of the following steps 
from time to time as may seem to him necessary—
(a) require that bank forthwith to take such steps as he may consider 
necessary to rectify the m a tte r; or,
(b) appoint a person who in his opinion has had proper training and 
experience to advise the bank in the proper conduct of its business and 
fix the remuneration to be paid by the banlc to such person ; or,
(e) report the circumstances to the Governor-General in Council who, 
unless satisfied that the bank is taking adequate measures to put its affairs 
in order, may direct the M inister to make an Order revoking the bank’s 
licence and requiring its business in Nigeria to be wound up : Provided 
that he shall not so report the circumstances without giving the bank 
reasonable prior notice of his intention to do so and an opportunity of 
submitting a written statem ent in reply.
15. (1) Every licensed bank shall appoint annually an approved auditor 
whose duties shall be to make to the shareholders of that bank a report 
upon the annual balance sheet and accounts, and in every such report the 
auditor shall state w hether in his opinion the balance sheet is full and fair 
and properly drawn up, whether it exhibits a true and correct statement of 
the bank’s affairs, and, in any case in which the auditor has called for explana­
tion or information from the officers or agents of the bank, whether this is 
satisfactory.
(2) T he report of the approved auditor shall be read together with the 
report of the board of management of the bank at the annual meeting of 
shareholders and a copy shall be sent to the Central Bank for transmission 
to the M inister. I f  any default is made in complying with the’requiremcnts 
of this subsection, the bank shall be liable to a fine of five hundred pounds.
(3) If  a licensed bank fails to appoint an approved auditor under 
subsection (1) of this section or, at any time, fails to fill a vacancy for such 
auditor, the M inister shall have power to appoint an approved auditor and 
shall fix the remuneration to be paid by that bank to such auditor.
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(4) T he duties, powers and liabilities imposed and conferred by sub­
sections (1) and (2) of section 13 in relation to examiners appointed under 
sections 11 and 12 are hereby imposed and conferred also in relation to 
approved auditors.
(5) For the purposes of this section, an approved auditor shall be an 
auditor who is a member of one of the professional bodies for the time being 
declared by the M inister by notice in the Gazelle to be approved for such 
purposes: Provided that—
(i) during a period of three years from the coming into operation of 
this Ordinance, the M inister may, on application from a licensed bank, 
authorise the appointment as auditor of that bank of a person who, although 
not so qualified, has had such professional experience as an auditor or 
accountant as is, in the opinion of the Director of Federal Audit, equivalent 
to at least five years service in the Federal Audit D cparuncnt in a rank 
not below that of assistant auditor, and any such person so appointed 
shall be deemed to be an approved auditor to the extent and for the duration 
of any such authorisation ;
(«) no person having an interest in any bank otherwise than as a depositor 
and no director, officer or agent o f any bank shall be eligible for appoint­
ment as an approved auditor for that bank and any person appointed as 
such auditor to any bank who subsequently acquires such interest or 
becomes a director, officer or agent of that bank shall cease to be such 
auditor.
(6) Sections 112 and 113 of the Companies Ordinance shall not apply 
to licensed banks.
16. (1) Save with the consent of the M inister, no person other than a 
licensed bank shall—
(а) use or continue to use the word “ bank” or any of its derivatives, 
eitner in English or in any other language, in the description or title under 
which such person is carrying on business in Nigeria ;
(б) make or continue to make any  representation in any billhead, letter 
paper, notice, advertisement o r in ahy other manner whatsoever that such 
pers6n is carrying on banking business in Nigeria : Provided that nothing 
in this subsection shall apply to any association of licensed banks formed for 
the protection of their mutual interests.
(2) Every licensed bank shall use as part of its description or title the 
word “ bank" or some one or more of iu  derivatives, either in English or in 
some other language.
(3) Any person who acts in contravention of this section shall be liable 
to a fine of fifty pounds for every day during which the offence continues.
17. (1) W ithout prejudice to anything contained in section 74 of the 
Companies Ordinance, no person—
(a) who has been a director of, or directly or indirectly concerned in the
management of, a bank which has had its licence revolted in accordance
with paragraph (c) of section 14 of this Ordinance, or has been struck off
the register of companies under the provisions of the Banking Ordinance, io c o .
Cap. 38.
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(4) who is or has been convicted by a crim inal cou rt o f an ollcncc 
involving dishonesty and has not received a full pa rdon  for the  offence of 
which he was convicted, shall, w ithout the  consent in w riting  o f the 
M in ister act o r continue to act as a director, o r be d irectly  o r indirectly 
concerned in the m anagem ent, of any licensed bank.
(2) Any person acting in ontravention o f subsection (1) shall l)e liable 
to im prisonm ent for a term  r.ot exceeding two years o r to  a fine o f five h und­
red pounds o r bo th  such im prisonm ent and such fine.
18. Any person who, being a director or m anager of a  licensed bank—
(a) fails to take all reasonable steps to secure com pliance by the bank
w ith the requirem ents o f this O rdinance, or
(4) fails to take all reasonable steps to ensure the  correctness o f any 
statem ent subm itted  under the provisions o f this O rdinance, 
shall be liable to im prisonm ent for a term  not exceeding tw o years or to a fine 
o f five hundred  pounds o r to both such im prisonm ent an d  such fine.
19. N o prosecution in respect of any offence com m itted  by a licensed 
bank under this O rdinance shall be instituted except by, o r w ith  the consent 
of, the A ttorney-G eneral of the Federation.
20. (1) T h e  provisions of this O rdinance shall not apply  to—
(а) the C entral Bank established under the Central Bank O rdinance ;
(б) the Post Office Savings Bank constituted and appointed under the 
Savings Bank O rdinance.
(2) Except where this O rdinance expressly provides otherwise, the 
provisions of this O rdinance shall have effect in addition to and not in deroga­
tion of any o ther provisions having the force of law in N igeria.
21. T h e  M in ister may make such regulations as m ay be required  from 
tim e to tim e for carrying into effect the provisions of this O rdinance.
22. Section 108 of the Com panies O rdinance is am ended by the deletion 
of the words "a  lim ited banking com pany or an insurance com pany" and the 
substitu tion  therefor o f the following—
"a  lim ited insurance com pany” .
Repeal. 23. T he  Banking O rdinance 1952 is repealed.
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K a m i  or Rank .
M o n t h l y  S t a t e m e n t  or A s m  a n d  L ia b il it ie s  
____________  DAT or____________________
L ia b il it ie s
1- C ott a l paid u p   ## „
2 . R eserv e  F u n d  . .  . .
3 .  D e b e n t u r e s  . .
4 . B a la n c e s  h i l d  for—
(«) O th e r banks in N igeria . .  . .  * .
(A) Offices and  branches of this bank outsidej N igeria 
O th e r banks outside N igeria
5. D tro s r r s —
(a) R epayable on d e m a n d .............................................
(b) Savings Account* ...............................
(f ) O th e r deposits repayable as from  th e  date  o f  this 
re tu rn —
( 0  w tth tn  3 m onths . .  .«  „
(if) betw een 3 and  6 m onths 
(in ) betw een 6  and  12 m onths 
(to) la te r than  12 m o n th s ..  .«  , ,  . .
o f w hich, in  total, b y  G overnm ents
6. B il l s  P a y a b l e  . .  . .  ..................................
7 . L o a n s  a n d  A d v a n c es  pr o m —
(«) O th e r banks in N ig e ria .............................................
(b) Offices and  branches o f this bank]outside Nigeria
(c) O th e r  banks ou tside N igeria . .  , ,
(<0 O th e r  creditors . .  . .  . .
(C on tingen t liability in  respect o f  b ills 
rediscounted) . .  . .  . .  , ,
O th e r contingent liabilities) „
(7*# I# m bm itted  in  accordance tm lk tcction 10 of the Banking Ordinance (s e c tio n  1 0 4 ) , 195b
A ssets
8. A cceptances on  account o f custom ers (as per contra)
9. Confirm ed docum entary c redits (as per contra)
10. G uarantees, endorsem ents and  o ther obligations on
account o f  custom ers (as per contra)
11. O th e r liabilities ...............................
N et external assets £_
N et external liabilities £_
------------- (N earest £)
-------------(N earest £)
1. C ash  in  han d
2 . B a l a n c e s  h e l d  w i t h  ( i n c l u d i n g  r e m i t t a n c e s i n  
t r a n s i t  t o ) —
(a) O th e r  banks in  N igeria 
•(b ) Offices and branches o f  this bank outside 
N igeria  . .  , ,  . .
•(c) O th e r  banks ou tside N igena
3. M oney at call i
4 . T r ea su r y  B il l s  ( m a tu a im c  w i t h in  3 m o n t h s )—
(a)  In  N igeria  ..........................................................
(b) O u ts id e  N igeria ............................................
5. B il l s  d is c o u n t e d —
(o) Payable in  N i g e n a ..............................
(b) P ayable  ou tside N igena 
C o m pris ing  bills—
( 0  m a tu rin g  as from  the  date  of this return—
(joa) w ith in  3 m o n t h s .........................................
(bb) betw een  3 and 6 m onths
(ec) la te r than  6 m onths ...........................
(ii)  p a s t-d u e  (unpaid and  unaccepted)
6 . L o a n s  a n d  A d va nc es  t o —
(a ) O th e r  banks in  N igena
(b) Offices and branches of th is bank outside Nigeria 
(e) O th e r  banks ou tside N igeria . .
(d )  Subsid iary  com panies of th is bank—
( 0  In  N i g e r i a ..........................................................
(ii)  O u ts ide  Nigeria
(e) O th e r  custom ers ; repayable as tr.wn the date 
o f  th is  re tu rn—
(s) w ith in  3 m onths 
(n ) w ith in  6 m onths
(m ) w ith in  12 m o n t h s ............................................
(ro) la te r than  12 m onths
7 .  I n v e s t m e n t s —
(a) In  N igeria—
(x) Federal G overnm ent securities
(ii)  Investm ents in subsidiary com panies of this
b a n k ..............................
(in) O th e r ...........................................................
(b) O u tside  Nigeria
8. Bank P rem ises (including fu rn itu re , fixtures and
fittings) «• • •  • •  ...............................
9 . L iabilities o f  custom ers for acceptances u s  per contra)
10. L iabilities o f custom ers for confirm ed docum entary
cred its (as per contra)
11. L iabilities o f  custom ers for guarantees.*  ndorsem cnts
and  o th e r  obligations (as per con:m)
12. O th e r assets . .
T o ta l o f ou tstanding—
(0  U nsecu red  advances and unsecured  c red it facilities 
provisions o f paragraphs ( t)  and (d ) *•*. vdw ection  (1) o f ••
than those grsr.Dd under : 
\ 7 of *he B anxirg Ordir.an
(ii) L oans, advances and  c red it facilities 
£__
ured against real-estate.
. fN earest £
•D eta ils  should be given. on7*n attached shee t, in regard to  balances w hich are r.ot freely transferable to  N igeria.
N .i? .— A  com pany shall be dccm ed*to;bc a subsid iary  o f a bank  if  th a t bank e ith e r is a m em ber o f  it and  contro ls the  com position o f h.>ard o f directors or holds more th*n h=I: in norr.-.r.:
value o f  its  equity  share capital o r if a com pany is a  subsidiary of any com pany w hich  is a subsid iary  o f  that bank . (By equity  share  capital •< tj»'*si*t the  »<*i»ed « h " r  capital of the w n p a r y  e x c lu d e r
any p a rt thereof w hich neither as respects div idends nor as respects capital ca rries any righ t to  partic ipate  beyond a specified am oun : a d istribution).
W e declare that this sta tem ent is m ade u p 'fro m  th e  books o f  th e  bank , and  th a t ,  to  th e  best o f  ou r know ledge and  belief, it is correct.
____________ . . General A farcer'
D ate C,ki~l  Arena-?
lUhikiim No. 19 of 1958 A  93
S liC O N D  S C I I I iD U L li  
T o  b e  s u b m itte d  in  a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  (a u ctio n  10 (1)) o f  th e  B unk in g  O rd in a n c e  1458
Nuinc o f bank ™  ......... ......................  ..............— —........— ....... ......................
A n a l y s is  o r  C i s i o m l u s ' I . i a u i l i t im i  t o  H a n k  y o u  L o a n s  a n i i  A d v a n c e *
A * a t    D a y  o f   .............................................. ..........................1 9 —
1. T o  Governments
2. T o  Native Administrations, Tow nships and other Local
Authorities . .
3. T o  electricity, water, harbour, dock and other public utility bodies
C r e d it  a n d  F in a n c i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n s  :
4. T o  banks, etc. ......................................................................................
A g r i c u l t u r e  :
5. Cocoa ............................................  ............................................
6. Groundnuts
7. Palm products ..............................  ............................................
8. Other export crops (including rubber ond timber)
9. Other agriculture (including livestock)
M in i n o  :
10. T in ore ....................................................................................................
11. Other mining ......................................................................................
F o r  M a n u f a c t u r e  o f  :
12. Textiles, leather and clothing
13. Wood products (including furniture)
14. Soaps and oils . .  . .  . .  . .
15. Stone, cement, bricks, glass, ceramics and pottery
16. Other manufactured products
C o n s t r u c t i o n  :
17. For buildings in course of erection
G e n e r a l  C o m m e r c e  :
18. T o wholesale and retail merchants r . .  , .
19. Miscellaneous
T o t a l s  .......................................................
Number of Customers liable in respect of loans anil advances :—
Up to £ 5 0 ....................................................................................................
Over £50 and up to £100 . .
Over £100 and up to £500 ........................................................................
Over £500 and up to £1,000
Over £1,000 and up to £5,000..................................................................
Over £5,000 and up to £10,000................................................................
Over £10,000 .......................................................................................
T o t a l s  ........................................................................
Amount
£
Number of 
Customers
General Manager
D a t e _______
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R. F. A. GREY,
Officer Administering the 
Government o f the Federation
(L.S.)
N o . 24 1958
Federation of Nigeria
'in  t h b  s e v e n t h  y ea r  o p  t h e  r e ig n  o f
HER MAJESTY QUEEN ELIZABETH II
S ir  RALPH FRANCIS ALNWICK GREY. k .c .v .o .. c .m .0 ., o .b .e . 
Officer Administering the Government o f the Federation
A n O r d in a n c e  t o  p r o v id e ' f o r  t h b  e s t a b l is h m e n t  o f  a  C e n t r a l  B a n k  
o f  N ig e r ia  a n d  t o  p r o v id e  f o r  it s  c o n s t it u t io n  a n d  f u n c t i o n s ;
t o '  P R O V ID E  T H A T  I T  8 H A L L  BB A B A N K  O F  ISSU B  A N D  FO R  SU C H  PU R P O S E  
T O  PR O V ID B  T H A T  IT S  N O T E S  A N D  C O IN  S H A L L  BB L E G A L T E N D E R  A N D  
AT 8 0 M B  PU TU R B  D ATB S H A L L  BB T H B  8 0 L B  LB C A L  T E N D E R  IN  N lC E R IA  J 
T O  P R O V ID B  T H A T  T H B  C E N T R A L  B A N K  SH A L L  BB BANKER T O  T H E  G O V E R N - 
M B N T  A N D  8 H A L L  HAVB C E R T A IN  P O W E R S  IN  R E L A T IO N  T O  O T H E R  BA N K S ; 
A N D  F O R  PU R P O S E S  A N C IL L A R Y  T O  T H B  P U R PO SE S A FO R ESA ID .
I [By Notice]
BE I T  E N A C T E D  by the Legislature of the Federation of Nigeria as 
follows—
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C a p ita l
1. This Ordinance may be cited as the Central Dank of Nigeria O rdi­
nance, 1958, and shall come into operation upon such date as may be notified 
in the Gazette by the Governor-General after the signification of the pleasure 
of Her Majesty thereon, and different dates may be prescribed for the coming 
into operation of different sections of the Ordinance.
I n t e r p r e t a t io n
2. In  this Ordinance, unless the context otherwise requires—
“ the Bank" means the Central Bank of Nigeria established by this 
O rd inance;
"the  Board" means the Board of Directors of the Bank ;
"the  Governor" and "the Deputy Governor" mean, respectively, the 
Governor of the Bank and the Deputy Governor of the Bank ;
"the  M inister" means the M inister charged with responsibility or 
matters relating to finance in the Federation ;
"Region" or "Regional" means appertaining to the Regions of Nigeria 
or to the Southern Cameroons, either individually or collectively as the 
context requires.
C o n s t it u t io n
3. (1) A bank to be called the "Central Bank of Nigeria" shall be 
established in accordance with the provision of this Ordinance and shall 
commence business on a day to be appointed by the Governor-General 
by notification in the Gazette.
(2) T he Bank shall be a body corporate and shall have perpetual 
succession and a common seal, and may sue and be sued in its own name, 
and subject to the limitations contained in this Ordinance may acquire, 
hold and dispose of movable and immovable property for the purpose of 
its functions.
4. T he principal objects of the Bank shall be to issue legal tender 
currency in Nigeria, to maintain external reserves in order to safeguard the 
international value of that currency, to promote monetary stability and a 
sound financial structure in Nigeria and to act as banker and financial 
adviser to the Federal Government.
5. T he Bank shall have its chief office in Lagos and may open branches 
in Nigeria and appoint agents and correspondents in accordance with 
decisions of the Board.
C a p it a l  a n d  R eservb
6. (1) T he  authorised capital of the Bank shall b<T One Million~Fivc 
Hundred Thousand Bounds. There slull be paid up such amount as shall be 
resolved by the Bank and confirmed by the M inister and this amount shall 
be subscribed by and paid up at par by the Federal Government upon the 
establishment of the Bauk.
(2) T he paid-up portion of the authorised capital may be increased 
by such amount as tire Board may, from time to time, resolve with the 
agreement of the M inister, and the Federal Government shall subscribe 
and pay up at par the amount of such increase.
(3) All the paid-up capital shall be subscribed and held only by the 
Federal Government.
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7. (1) T he Bank shall establish a general reserve fund to which shall 
be allocated at the end of each financial year of the Bank—
(а) one-eighth of the net profits of the Bank for the year when, at the 
end o f that year, the fund is less in am ount than the paid-up capital of 
the B ank ;
(б) one-sixteenth of the net profits of the Bank for the year when, at 
the end of that year, the fund is not less in am ount than the paid-up 
capital of the Bank b u t is less in am ount than  twice the paid-up capital.
(2) After any allocation has been made in term s of subsection (1), one 
half of the remainder of the net profits shall be applied to the retirem ent of 
any outstanding obligations of the Federal G overnm ent to the Bank arising 
from the financing of the cost of the printing, m inting and shipm ent of the 
initial stock of the Bank’s notes and coins.
(3) T he  remainder of the net profits shall be paid to the Federal G overn­
m e n t
(4) T he  net profits of the Bank for each financial year shall be determined 
by the Bank after meeting all current expenditure for tha t year and after 
making such provision as it thinks fit for bad and doubtful debts, depreciation 
in assets, contributions to staff and superannuation funds, and all other 
contingencies.
A d m in is t r a t io n
8. (D  T here shall be a Board of D irectors of the Bank which shall be 
responsible. for the policy and general adm inistration of the affairs and 
business of the Bank.
(2) T h e  Board shall consist of a G overn^., a D eputy  Governor and 
five other directors.
. (3) T h e  G overnor or, in his absence, the D eputy Governor shall be 
in charge of the day-to-day m anagement of the Bank and shall be answerable 
to the Board for their acts and decisions.
9. (1) T he  Governor and D eputy G overnor shall be persons of 
recognised financial experience and shall be appointed by the Governor- 
General by instrum ent under the public seal on such terms and conditions 
as may be set out in their respective letters of appointm ent.
(2) T h e  Governor and D eputy G overnor shall each be appointed for 
a term  of five years and shall be eligible for reappoin tm ent: Provided that 
the appointm ent, or first appointm ent, o f the  first D eputy Governor shall 
be for a term of three years.
(3) T h e  Governor and D eputy G overnor shall devote the whole of 
their professional tim e to the service of the Bank and while holding office 
shall not occupy any o ther office o r em ploym ent w hether rem unerated or n o t :
Provided that they may, by v irtue of the ir office, be members of or 
advisers to the Loans Advisory Board o r its successor : Provided also that 
fhey may, if so appointed with the approval by resolution of the Board,
(a) act as members of any commission established by the Federal 
Government to enquire into any m atter (iffccting currency or banking in 
N igeria ;
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(b) become governors, director* or m em ben of the Board, by whatever 
name called, of any international bank or international monetary authority 
to which the Federal Government shall have adhered or given support or 
approval;
(e) become directors of any corporation in Nigeria fn which the Bank 
may participate under paragraph (f) of section 29.
10. (1) T he five other directors of the Bank shall be appointed by the 
Prime M inister of the Federation.
(2) A director shall be a person of recognised standing and experience 
in affairs, but as a director of the Bank he shall not be regarded or act as 
a delegate on the Board from any Federal or Regional authority or from 
any commercial, financial, agricultural, industrial or other interests with 
which he may be or may have been connected.
(3) A director shall hold office for three years and be eligible for re­
appointment : Provided that, of the first five directors to be appointed 
under this section, one shall, or shall in the first instance, be appointed 
for one year, and two shall, or shall in the first instance, be appointed for 
two years.
(4) A director shall be entitled to fees and allowances in accordance - 
with such rules as the Board, subject to confirmation by the Minister, may 
lav down.
11. (1) No person shall be appointed or shall remain Governor, Deputy 
Governor or other director of the Bank who—
(a) is a member of the Federal Legislative H ouse;
(b) is a member of a Regional Legislative H ouse;
(c) is a director, salaried official or shareholder of any bank licensed under 
the provisions of the Banking Ordinance, 1958;
(</) is an officer in the public service of the Federal or a Regional Govern­
ment : Provided that this paragraph shall not render ineligible any person 
whose sole duties are those of economic adviser to the Federal Government.
(2) (a) The Governor or Deputy Governor may resign his office on 
giving at least three months’ notice in writing to the Governor-General of 
his intention.
(b) Any Director may resign after a notice in writing o( at least a month 
to the Governor-General of his intention.
(3) The Governor, Deputy Governor or any other director shall cease 
to hold office in the Bank if—
(a) he becomes of unsound mind or incapable of carrying out his duties ;
(b) he becomes bankrupt or suspends payment or compounds with his 
c red ito rs;
(r) he is convicted of a felony or of any ofTence involving dishonesty ;
(d) he is guilty of serious misconduct in relation to his d u tie s ;
(e) in the case of a person possessed of professional qualifications, he is 
disqualified or suspended (otherwise than at his own request) from practis­
ing his profession in any part of H er Majesty's dominions by the oidcr 
of any competent authority made in respect of him personally.
12. If the Governor or Deputy Governor or any other director of the 
Bank dies, or resigns or otherwise vacates his office before the expiry of the 
term for which he has been appointed, another person shall be appointed in 
his place for the uncxpircd period in the manner specified in subsection (I) 
of section 9 or of section 10 as the case may be,
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13. (1) M eetings of the Board shall take place as often as may be required 
bu t not loss frequently than onco in each of any ten m onths in every financial 
year of the Banlc.
(2) T h e  Governor, o r in his absence the D eputy Governor, shall be 
chairman of the Board, and in the absence of both from any meeting the other 
directors attending shall elect a chairman for th a t m eeting from among 
themselves.
(3) Four m em bers of the Board shall form a quorum  at any meeting and, 
unless otherwise provided, decisions shall be adopted by a simple majority 
of the votes o f the mem bers p re sen t In  the case o f an equality of votes, the 
chairman shall have a casting vote.
(4) No act or proceeding of the Board shall be invalidated merely by 
reason of the existence of a vacancy o r vacancies among the directors of the 
Bank.
(5) All acts done by any person acting in good faith as a director shall 
be as valid as if he were a director, notw ithstanding that some defect in his 
appointm ent o r qualification be afterwards discovered.
14. (1) All appointm ents of officials and o ther employees of the Bank 
shall be only to  positions created by decision of the Board and on such terms 
and conditions as shall be laid down by the Board.
(2) No salary, fee, wage, or other rem uneration, or allowance paid by 
the Bank shall be com puted by reference to the net or other profits of the 
Bank. .
15. (1) T here  shall be an advisory com m ittee of the Bank which shall 
consist of—
(a) the Minister or his alternate;
(b) the M inister charged w ith responsibility for finance in respect of 
each Region o r his a lte rn a te ;
' (c) the G overnor o r D eputy Governor.
(2) T h e  Cpm m ittee shall-meet not less than twice in each calendar year 
for the purpose of considering m atters of com m on interest.
(3) M eetings o f the Com m ittee shall take place in Lagos or in such 
other places as may be agreed from tim e to tim e. T h e  Committee shall 
establish its own rules of procedure.
C u r r e n c y
16. (IV T h e  un it of currency in N igeria shall be the Nigerian pound 
which shall be divided into twenty shillings, each shilling being divided into 
twelve pence.
(2) Subject to the provisions of section 46, '• very contract, sale, payment, 
bill, note, instrum ent and security for money m d  every transaction, dealing, 
m atter and thing whatsoever relating to money or involving the payment of or 
the liability to pay any money Which, b u t for this subsection, would have been 
deemed to be made, executed, entered into, done and had, in and in relation to 
currency issued by the W est African Currency Board shall in Nigeria be 
deemed instead to be made, executed, entered into, done and had, in and in 
relation to Nigerian p o u n d s : Provided that this clause shall not affect any 
obligation to pay any money in any country other than Nigeria where currency 
issued by the W est African Currency Board is legal tender.
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17. T he parity of the Nigerian pound shall be one Nigerian pound to 
one pound sterling.
18. T he Bank shall have the sole right of issuing notes and coins through* 
out Nigeria and neither the Federal Government nor any Regional Govern­
ment nor any other person shall issue currency notes, bank notes or coins or 
any documents or tokens payable to bearer on demand being documents or 
tokens which are likely to pass as legal tender.
19. The Bank shall—
(a) arrange for the printing of notes and the minting of coins ;
(b) issue, reissue and exchange notes and coins at the Bank's offices and 
at such agencies as the Bank may, from time to time, establish or ap p o in t;
(c) arrange for the safe custody of unissued stocks of currency and for the 
preparation, safe custody and destruction of plates and paper for the prin t­
ing of notes and of dies for the minting of coins.
20. (1) Notes and coins issued by the Bank—
(a) shall be in such denominations of the pound or fractions thereof as 
shall be approved by the M inister on the recommendation of the Bank ;
(b) shall be of such forms and designs and bear such devices as shall be 
approved by the M inister on the recommendation of the Bank.
(2) The s tan d ar, weight and composition of coins issued by the Bank 
and the amount of remedy and variation shall be determined by the M inister 
on the recommendation of the Bank.
21. (1) Notes issued by the Bank shall be legal tender in Nigeria at their 
face value for the payment of any amount.
(2) Coins issued by the Bank shall, if such coins have not been tampered 
with, be legal tender in Nigeria at their face value up to an amount not exceed­
ing ten pounds in the case of coins of denominations of not less than sixpence 
and up to an amount not exceeding one shilling in the case of coins of a lower 
denomination. .
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) the Bank 
shall have power, on giving not less than three m onths' notice in the Gazette, 
to call in any of its notes and coins on payment of the face value thereof and 
any such notes or coins with respect to which a notice has been given under 
this clause shall, on the expiration of the notice, cease to be legal tender, but, 
subject to the provisions of section 23, shall be redeemed by the Bank upon 
demand.
22. A coin shall be deemec! to have been tampered with if the coin has 
been impaired, diminished or lightened otherwise than by fair wear and tear 
or has been defaced by stamping, engraving or piercing whether the coin has 
or has not been thereby diminished or lightened.
23. No person shall be entitled to recover from the Bank the value of any 
lost, stolen, mutilated or imperfect note or coin. The circumstances in 
which, and the conditions and limitations subject to which, the value of lost, 
stolen, mutilated or imperfect notes or coins may be refunded as of grace shall 
be within the absolute discretion of the Bank.
C entral B ank o f  N igeria No. 24 of 195 8  A  117
3 0 0
24. T he  Bank shall not be liable to the paym ent of any stam p duty under 
the Stam p D uties Ordinance in respect of its notes issued as currency.
25. T h e  Bank shall at all times m aintain a reserve of external assets 
consisting o f all or any of the following—
(а) gold coin or bullion ;
(б) sterling notes, coin, bank balances and money at call w ith banks in 
the United K in g d o m ;
(e) T reasury Bills of the G overnm ent of the U nited Kingdom  of a 
m aturity not exceeding ninety-three days ;
(d) bills of exchange bearing at least two good signatures and drawn on, 
and payable at any place in the  U nited Kingdom  and having a m aturity not 
exceeding three m onths exclusive of days of grace ;'
(«) sterling securities of, o r guaranteed by, the G overnm ent of the 
U nited Kingdom  and m aturing w ithin five years : Provided that securities 
held under the provisions of this paragraph shall not exceed thirty  per cent 
of the reserve specified in this sec tion ;
( / )  for a period not exceeding three years from coming into operation of 
section 18, notes and coins of the W est African Currency Board.
26. T h e  value of the reserve specified in section 25 shall—
(a) fora period of five years from the coming into operation of section 18, 
be not less than the aggregate of an am ount representing sixty per cent of the 
Bank’s notes and coins in circulation together with an am ount representing 
thirty-five per cent of the Bank’s other dem and liabilities ;
(b) after five years from the coming into operation of section 18, be not 
less than forty per cent of the aggregate of the Bank’s notes and coins in 
circulation and other demand liabilities.
27. (1) T h e  Bank shall publish in the return provided for in subsection
(4) of section 45 the proportion which the value of the reserve specified in 
section 25 and set out in each such re tu rn  bears to the total of demand 
liabilities shown in the same return.
(2) For a period of five years from the coming into operation of section 
18, the Bank shall in addition likewise publish the proportion of such reserve 
to its liabilities in  respect of notes and coins in  circulation.
O p e r a t io n
28. T h e  Bank shall on dem and—
(а) sell sterling for immediate delivery in L ondon at a rate of not less 
than ninety-nine pounds five shillings sterling for one hundred Nigerian 
p o u n d s ;
(б) buy sterling for imm ediate delivery in London at a rate of not more 
j than one hundred pounds fifteen shillings sterling for one hundred Nigerian 
p o u n d s :
Provided that the Bank shall not be required so to sell or buy sterling for 
an am ount less than ten thousand pounds in respect of any one transaction.
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29. (1) T he Bank may—
(а) issue demand drafts and effect other kinds of remittances payable at 
its own offices or at the offices of agencies or correspondents ;
(б) purchase and sell gold coin or bullion ;
(e) open accounts for and accept deposits from the Federal Government, 
the Regional Governments, the funds, institutions and corporations of all 
such Governments, banks, other credit institutions and, with the prior 
approval of the Minister, other persons in Nigeria ;
(d) purchase, sell, discount and rediscount inland bills of exchange and 
promissory notes arising out of bona fide  commercial transactions bearing 
two or more good signatures and maturing within ninety days, exclusive of 
days of grace, from the date of acquisition ;
(e) purchase, sell, discount and rediscount inland bills of exchange and 
promissory notes bearing two or more good signatures, drawn or issued for 
the purpose of financing seasonal agricultural operations or the marketing 
of crops, and maturing within one hundred and eighty days, exclusive of 
days of grace, from the date of acquisition ;
( /)  purchase, sell, discount and rediscount Treasury Bills of the Federal 
Government which have been publicly offered for sale arid sjre to mature 
within ninety-three day s; ' v.
(g) purchase and sell securities of the Federal Government maturing in 
not more than twenty-five years which have been publicly offered for sale 
or form part of an issue which is being made to the public at the time of 
acquisition : Provided that the total amount of such securities of a maturity 
exceeding two vears in the ownership of the Bank (other than securities 
held in terms of paragraph (/;)) or held by the Bank as collateral under sub- 
paragraph (if) of paragraph (k) shall not together at any time exceed twenty 
per cent of the total demand liabilities of the Bank ;
(h) invest in securities o( the Federal Government for any amount, and 
to mature at any time, on behalf of staff and superannuation funds and other 
internal funds of the Bank ;
(0  with the approval of the M inister, subscribe to, hold and sell shares 
of any corporation set up with the approval of, or under the authority of, 
the Federal Government for the purpose of promoting the development of 
a money market or securities market in Nigeria or of improving the financial 
machinery for the financing of economic developm ent: Provided that the 
total value of any holding of such shares shall not at any time exceed twenty 
per cent of the General Reserve Fund of the Bank ;
(J) grant advances for fixed periods not exceeding three months apainst 
publicly issued Treasury Bills of the Federal Government maturing within 
ninety-three d ay s;
(A) grant advances for fixed periods not exceeding three months at a 
minimum rate of interest at least one per cent above the Bank's minimum 
rediscount rate against promissory notes secured by the pledge with Dank 
of—
(i) gold coin or bullion ;
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(it) securities o f the Federal G overnm ent w hich have been publicly 
offered for sale and are to m ature w ithin a period o f twenty years : 
Provided that no advance so secured shall at any tim e exceed seventy- 
five per cent of the market value o f the security pledged and that the total 
o f such securities held by the  Bank is w ithin the lim itations imposed by 
paragraph (g);
(mi) such bills o f exchange and prom issory notes as are eligible for 
purchase, discount or rediscount by the Bank up to seventy-five per cent 
o f their nominal value ;
(to) warehouse warrants, or their equivalent (securing possession of 
goods), in respect o f staple commodities or o ther goods duly insured and 
with a letter o f hypothecation from the o w n e r: Provided that no such 
advance shall exceed sixty per cent o f  the curren t m arket value of the 
commodities in  q u estio n ;
(I) purchase and sell external currencies, and purchase, sell, discount 
and rediscount bills of exchange and T reasury  Bills drawn in or on places 
abroad and m aturing w ithin ninety-three days, exclusive o f days o f grace, 
from  the date o f acqu isition ;
(rrt) m aintain accounts w ith central banks and  o ther banks abroad ;
(n) purchase and sell sterling securities of, or guaranteed by, the Govern­
m ent of the U nited K ingdom  ;
(o) act as correspondent, banker o r agent for any central bank o r o ther 
monetary authority and for any international bank or international monetary 
authority established under governmental auspices ;
(p) undertake the issue and managem ent of loans publicly issued in 
Nigeria by the Federal or Regional G overnm ents or by  Federal or Regional 
public bod ies;
(q) accept from  custom ers for custody securities and o ther articles of 
v a lu e ;
(r) undertake on behalf o f custom ers and correpondents the purchase, 
sale, collection and payment o f securities, currencies and credit instrum ents 
at home and gbroad, and the purchase or sale of gold and silver ;
(s) promote the establishm ent of bank clearing systems and give facilities 
for the conduct o f clearing business in premises belonging to the Bank ;
(t) subject as is expressly provided in this Ordinance, generally conduct 
business as a bank, and do all such things as are incidental to o r consequen­
tial upon the exercise of its powers o r the discharge o f its duties under 
this Ordinance.
(2) T h e  G overnor may at any time in his discretion by previous notice in 
writing lodged with the Board decide that the powers conferred by subsection
(1) in  accordance w ith the provisions o f paragraphs ( /) ,  (g ), (h), ( i)  or sub- 
paragraph (it) o f paragraph (h) o f tha t subsection may be extended to the 
Treasury Bills or the securities, as the case may be, o f any Regional G overn­
m ent with which the Bank appears substantially to have established the rela­
tionship of banker, o r to any specified T reasury  Bills o r securities of such a 
Regional G overnm ent, subject to the same conditions as specified in those 
_  _ _ paragraphs and subject to the limitations specified in paragraph fg), which 
■3 U ±  limitations shall then apply to the aggregate valuo of the Federal ana Regional 
sccuritiei so dealt with.
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30. T he  Bank may not—
(a) engage in trade or otherwise have a direct interest in any commercial, 
agricultural, industrial or, save as provided in paragraph (») of section 29, 
any other undertaking, except such interests as the Bank, may in any way 
acquire in the course of the satisfaction of debts due to it, and provided that 
all such interests so acquired shall be disposed of i t  the earliest suitable 
m om en t;
lb) save as provided in paragraph (f) of section 29, purchase the shares of 
any corporation or company, including the shares of any banking company ;
(c) grant loans upon the security of any shares ;
(d) subject to the provisions of section 34, grant unsecured advances or 
advances secured otherwise than as laid down in paragraphs (J) and (ft) of 
section 29 : Provided that in the event of any debts due to the Bank 
becoming in the opinion of the Bank endangered, the Bank may secure 
such debts on any real or other property of the debtor and may acquire such 
property, which shall be resold at the earliest suitable m om ent;
(e) purchase, acquire or lease real property except in accordance with 
the proviso to paragraph (d) and except so far as the Bank shall consider 
necessary or expedient for the provision, or future provision of business 
premises for the Bank and its agencies and any clearing houses set up in 
terms of section 42, and of residences for the Governor, Deputy Governor, 
officials and other employees ;
(J) draw or accept bills payable otherwise than on demand ;
(j)  allow the renewal or substitution of maturing bills of exchange 
purchased, discounted or rediscounted by or pledged with the Bank save in 
exceptional circumstances when the Board may by resolution authorise one 
renewal or one substitution only in either case of not more than fifty per cent 
of the original amount of any such bill for a period not exceeding ninety 
d ay s;
(ft) pay interest on deposits ;
(0  accept for discount, or as security for an advance made by the Bank, 
bills or notes signed by members ot the Board or by the Bank’s officials or 
other em ployees;
(j) open accounts for and accept deposits from persons other than as 
provided in paragraphs (c) and (o) of section 29.
31. T he  Bank shall make public at all times its minimum rediscount rate.
■Re l a t io n s  w it h  t h e  F e d e r a l  G o v e r n m e n t
32. (1) T he Bank shall be entrusted with the Federal Government’s 
banking and foreign exchange transactions in Nigeria and abroad.
(2) T he Bank shall receive and disburse Federal Government moneys 
and keep account thereof without remuneration for such services.
(3) In  any place where the Bank has no branch, it may appoint another 
bank to act as its agent for the collection and payment of Federal Government 
moneys.
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33. N otw ithstanding the provisions of section 32, the Federal Govern­
ment may,
(a) m aintain accounts in Nigeria w ith o ther banks in such cases and on 
such conditions as may be agreed between the M inister and the Bank ;
(b) use the services of tho Regional Treasuries for the collection and 
paym ent of Federal Governm ent moneys in places where it may be appro­
priate and convenient to do so.
34. (1) N otw ithstanding the provisions of paragraph (d) of section 30, 
the Bank may grant tem porary advances to the Federal Governm ent in respect 
of tem porary deficiencies of budget revenue at such rate or rates of interest as 
the Bank may determ ine.
(2) T he  total am ount of such advances outstanding shall not at any time 
exceed twelve and one half per cent of the estim ated recurrent budget revenue 
as laid before the Federal Legislature for the Federal Governm ent financial 
year in which the advances are granted.
(3) All such advances shall be repaid as soon as possible and shall in any 
event be'repayable by the end of the Federal G overnm ent financial year in 
which they are granted. I f  after that date any such advances remain unrepaid 
the power of the Bank to grant further such advances in any subsequent 
financial year shall not be exercisable unless and until the outstanding 
advances have been repaid.
35. T he  Bank shall be entrusted w ith the issue and m anagement of 
Federal G overnm ent loans publicly issued in Nigeria, upon such terms and 
conditions as may be agreed between the Federal Governm ent and the Bank.
36. T h e  Bank may act as banker to any fund, institution or corporation 
of the Federal G overnm ent o r of a Regional Governm ent.
I
37. T h e  Baqk may act generally as agent for the Federal G overnm ent or 
of a Regional G overnm ent—
(a) where the Bank can do so appropriately and consistently w ith the 
provisions of this O rdinance and w ith its duties and functions as a central 
b a n k ; and
(b) on such term s and conditions as may be agreed between the Bank and 
the G overnm ent concerned.
R e l a t io n s  w it h  o t h e r  B a n k s
38. T h e  Bank may act as banker to other banks in Nigeria and abroad.
39. T h e  Bank shall wherever necessary seek the co-operation of, and 
co-operate with, o ther banks in Nigeria—
(a) to  prom ote and maintain adequate and reasonable banking services 
for the p u b lic ;
(b) to ensure high standards of conduct and m anagement throughout 
the banking system ;
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(c) to further such policies not inconsistent with this Ordinance as 
shall be in the national interest.
40. f l )  T he Bank may prescribe from time to time by publication in 
the Gazette the amount of specified liquid assets which each bank operating 
in Nigeria under the Banking Ordinance, 1958, is required to hold as a 
minimum in Nigerian pounds or in sterling.
(2) T he minimum amount so prescribed shall be expressed as a percent­
age of the gross demand liabilities of each such bank due in Nigerian pounds, 
together with a percentage of the gross time liabilities of each such bank 
arising out of its tiroe and savings deposits due in Nigerian pounds. No 
bank shall be required to maintain a higher percentage than any other bank.
(3) If  the Bank at any time increases either of the percentages referred 
to in subsection (2), every bank shall be allowed such period of grace, being 
not less than ten days nor more than twenty-one days, as the Central Bank 
may specify, in which to com ply: Provided that during a period of three 
years from the coming into operation of this section die Bank may if it 
thinks fit prescribe some period of more than twenty-one days for compli­
ance with this section, which period shall then apply in respect of all banks < 
operating in Nigeria.
(4) T he  Bank may require any bank to  furnish such -information in 
such form as the Bank may deem necessary to satisfy itself tiiktjthe bank 
concerned is holding not less than the prescribed minimum amount of 
specified liquid assets.
41. T he  Bank may appoint one or more other banks in Nigeria to act 
as its agent for the issue, reissue, exchange and withdrawal of notes and 
coins, or for other purposes, on such terms and conditions as may be agreed 
between the Bank and each of such other banks.
42. I t  shall be the duty of the Bank to facilitate the clearing of cheques 
and other credit instruments for banks carrying on business in Nigeria. 
For this purpose the Bank shall, at an appropriate time and in conjunction 
with the other banks, organise a clearing house in Lagos and in such other 
place or places as may be desirable in premises provided by the Bank.
A c c o u n t s  a n d  S t a t e m e n t s
43. T he  financial year of the Bank shall begin on the 1st day of April 
and end on the 31st Jay of M arch or shall be such other period as shall be 
prescribed by the Minister. _
44. (1) T he accounts o f the Bank shall be audited by an auditor 
appointed by the Bank with the approval of the Minister.
(2) W ithout prejudice to the provisions of. subsection 11) the Minister 
may at any time and from tim e to  time request the Director of Federal 
Audit to make an examination of and submit a report on the accounts relating 
to the issue, reissue, exchange and withdrawal of notes, and coins by the 
Bank or, in what the M inister shall think to be exceptional circumstances, 
the accounts of the Bank as a whole, and the Director of Federal Audit shall 
do so accordingly, and the Bank shal! provide all necessary and proper 
facilities therefor.
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45. (1) T he  Bank shall, w ithin two m onths from the close of each 
financial year, transm it to the M inister a copy of the annual accounts certified 
by the auditor and such accounts shall then be, as soon as may be, published 
in the Gazette.
(2) T he  Bank shall, within two m onths from the close of each financial 
year, subm it to the M m ister a  report on  its operations during that year. 
Such report shalljje^ published by the Bank.
(3) Both such annual accounts and such annual report shall be, as soon 
as may be, laid before the Federal Legislature.
(4) T he  Bank shall, as soon as may be, after the fifteenth day and also 
after the last day of each m onth make up and publish a re turn  of its assets 
and liabilities as at the close of business on that d a y ; or, if either of those 
days is a holiday, as at the close of business on the last preceding business 
day. A copy of the re turn  shall be transm itted to the M inister and shall 
be published in the Gazette.
T r a n s it io n a l  P r o v is io n s
46. (1) A t any time after the enactm ent of this Ordinance and before 
the coming into operation of section 19 the M inister may by writing under 
his hand authorise such persons o r authorities as he may think fit to make 
such arrangements as he may expressly authorise for the printing of notes 
and minting of coins for the purpose of this Ordinance, and for the safe 
custody of such notes and coins, and may provide for the m ethod of re­
im bursem ent of the cost thereof.
(2) A t any time after the establishm ent of the Bank and notwithstanding 
that section 19 may not have been brought into operation, the Bank may 
take up Treasury Bills of the Federal G overnm ent issued in respect of the 
expense incurred under the provisions of this section whether or not the 
same have been first offered to the public.
47. Currency notes and coins of the  W est African Currency Board 
which are legal tender in Nigeria on the coming into operation of section 18 
shall remain legal tender until such further day as the Bank, giving at least 
three m onths’ notice in the Gazette, may specify, and shall then cease to 
be legal tender in N ig eria : Provided that—
(а) the Bank may so specify different days in relation to different 
denominations of such currency notes and coins ;
(б) w ith effect from the coming into operation o f section 18, and there­
after while coins of the W est African C urreucy Board rem ain legal tender 
in Nigeria, such coins shall be legal tender a t their face value up  to an 
amount not exceeding ten pounds in the case of coins of denominations 
of not less than sixpence and up  to an am ount not exceeding one shilling 
in the case of coins of a lower denomination.
M is c e l l a n e o u s
J '
48. T h e  Board may, w ith the approval o f the M inister, make by-laws 
for the good order and managem ent of the Bank. Any such by-laws shall 
be authenticated by the Bank's seal and shall be published in the Gazette.
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49. T h e  Bank shall be exem pt from the  provisions of sections 27 and 
45 of the Incom e T ax  Ordinance.
50. T h e  provisions of the Com panies O rdinance shall not apply to the 
Bank.
51. Save w ith the w ritten consr.it o f the  M inister on the recom m enda­
tion of the Bank, no bank shall hereafter be registered under the provisions 
of any Federal or Regional legislation by a nam e w hich includes any of the 
words ‘‘C entral” , "F edera l” , "F edera tion” , "N ationa l" , "N igeria” , 
"N igerian” , “ Reserve" or "S ta te” .
52. T h e  Bank shall not be placed in liquidation except pursuan t to 
legislation passed in that behalf and then  in such m anner as tha t legislation 
directs.
T h is  p rin ted  im pression has been carefully com pared by me w ith  the 
Bill which has passed the  H ouse o f R epresentatives, and  is found by me to 
be a  true  and  correctly p rin ted  copy of the  said Bill. >■
B. A D E. M ANUW A,
' Clerk o f  the House o f Representatives
/
/
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